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Abstract 
The security literature has witnessed growing attempts to re-
conceptualize security outside of the traditional concern with interstate 
military conflict. However, the existing literature offers only limited 
explanations of this tendency and only focusses on new challenges and 
largely neglects to rethink how the new border security issues are 
actually governed in practice. These endeavours have brought about the 
need to re-conceptualise border security which was once taken as ‘a sub-
set of national security’, an isolated phenomenon. The research was 
carried out from an interpretive perspective and used qualitative 
methods - including semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors 
in this context in Turkey and a case study conducted in Turkey’s capital 
Ankara and in Kilis, a province at Turkey’s Syrian border - to collect the 
research data. The data were analysed thematically using sector 
standard software. The research found that Turkey’s compartmental and 
archaic national security architecture and the national security approach 
built around it, currently pose the main threat to the state and society as 
the organizations and practices of security were shaped by the particular 
geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War. The need for 
transformation emerges as an outcome of conflicts between the key actors 
(state and society) and the resistance to each other’s claims for control. 
There is a compelling case for the reconceptualization of border security 
as a comprehensive approach that leads all the relevant public and 
private capabilities, organises all departments, transforms national 
security understanding and shapes the future security architecture; not 
simply as the discursive identification of new threats. The research also 
found that the most salient feature of the politics of a non-traditional 
border security concept lies in the willingness of the state to challenge 
the conception that security issues can be resolved only at the national 
level. It is recognised that would be an explicitly political act that has the 
potential to transform traditional understandings of state-hood. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Turkey faces myriad security threats, however, it lacks a clear and 
coherent view of the nature and priority of risks. Arguably, its 
compartmental and archaic national security architecture and the 
national security approach built around it pose the main threat to the 
state and society. The national security architecture is flawed in its 
design. It has remained structured around functions and services with 
separate budgets for defence, foreign affairs, intelligence and police. The 
departments that make up the security architecture have changed very 
little despite the end of the Cold War and the dramatic increase in 
terrorist attacks in Turkey. 
With border security as its primary focus, this thesis underlines how old 
notions of national security produces today’s inefficiencies. It suggests 
that border security is not only a matter for the state and not just a sub-
set of national security. On the contrary, border security should be 
understood as a comprehensive approach that leads all the relevant 
public and private capabilities, and organises all departments. The 
solutions to security problems are to be found in societies. The old notion 
of security may have suited the Cold War environment when Turkey 
faced predictable threats to its national survival directly from other 
countries’ armies. However, today’s complex and uncertain security 
environment demands a fundamental review of security perspective and 
its framework. Despite the resurgence of state-based threats; and 
intensifying wider state competition, the common, unifying, external 
threat of Soviet aggression has been replaced by the emergence of more 
powerful non-state actors engaged in terrorism, illegal immigration, 
trafficking and organised crime. They are dangers that are present, but 
not clear. They are unbounded in time, scope and resources. Above all, 
they are unpredictable.  
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Turkey is now faced with a set of security problems it cannot resolve. It 
could be argued that it has not learned enough from learning from the 
escalating incidents and deaths of the last three decades. In order to 
respond to the new security environment, Turkey’s security architecture 
must adapt, not just in terms of processes and structures but in the 
culture and politics of the ministers and civil servants who oversee and 
direct it.  
Following dramatic increases in terrorist activities since June 2015 the 
President, the Prime Minister and other ministers have routinely 
asserted that “the government will not allow vandals to take over streets 
and disturb public order and security of the people”1. Despite some of the 
hopeful signs of a radical assessment and endeavours for a review of the 
current security system2, the state largely has missed a crucial 
opportunity to challenge the current assumptions about the meaning of 
defence and security in the very complex security environment of the 
post-Cold War era. The root of the problem lies in the framing of the 
review process. Reviewing the entire legal framework on the conduct of 
public demonstrations cannot be a solution. A priori, there is little 
evidence that the increase in legislation has made no real impact on 
security as there has been a shortage of effective security structure and 
effective administrators to run the services. 
The key question underpinning the review process should be how to 
modify current popular conceptions of security. This research argues that 
a radical review of collective thinking about national security policy and 
practice should be underpinned by a focus on the security needs of the 
Turkish people; not on the state’s territorial security - a ‘human-centric’ 
                                            
1 http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/07/31/pm-davutoglu-operations-against-pkk-
terrorists-to-continue, last accessed November 2015. 
2 PM Davutoglu: “On this, an administrative probe is already ongoing. Furthermore, I 
have instructed the cabinet to review our entire legal framework on the conduct of 
public demonstrations. There is a work [happening] for a new security concept,” 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/evidence-show-two-terror-organizations-behind-
ankara-massacre-pm-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=89832&NewsCatID=429, last accessed 
November 2015. 
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rather than a ‘state-centric’ approach. Therefore, the overarching aim of 
this project is to explain a new security agenda both in terms of policy 
and in the way it may answer the intellectual questions posed by scholars 
since the end of the Cold War. The research seeks to answer core 
questions: ‘How might Turkey increase the effectiveness of its border 
security arrangements?’ and ‘what further insights can the concept of 
societal security offer to help answer that first question? The research 
challenges the core assumptions underpinning national security in 
Turkey. This research argues that the concept of border security can 
serve a more vital role, in shaping the future security architecture. It 
seeks to apply the concept of ‘societal security’, whose main assertion is 
that people rather than the state should be the priority focus as referent 
object of security, and examines the practical implications of such an   
application.  It is fair to say that societal security and hence identity have 
become central concerns of political attitudes and conflicts within this 
issue. 
It is suggested that while Turkish governments have been struggling to 
cope with the challenges of  new security environment by creating new 
units within governmental departments, and allocating more resources 
for agencies to expand, the new security environment urgently demands 
a more integrated and strategic approach.  
Turkey has recently faced a changing range of threats, such as 
trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, of an unprecedented level of 
virulence, sophistication and variety. Since just before the 7th June 2016 
election it was targeted by the world’s two most brutal terrorist 
organisations PKK and DAESH3 (IS). The determination and capability 
of such groups are greater than ever before and the potential 
consequences more serious. Their objectives are clear: disrupting society. 
Fighting against these groups requires more than just a strong border in 
militaristic terms. It requires a range of tools, applied in a coherent way. 
                                            
3 Daesh is essentially an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group's 
previous name in Arabic "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham". 
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However, it does not mean that border arrangements are not important. 
It is right to consider how security organisations working at the border 
can be most efficiently and effectively structured. However, today ‘the 
border’ cannot be viewed as a purely geographical entity and ‘border 
security’ is much more than security at the border/boundary. 
It has been argued that the erosion of the rules-based international order, 
making it harder to build consensus and tackle non territorial threats. 
That implies that state to state relations are no longer enough to provide 
security. This erosion has resulted from a ‘paradigm-producing change’ in 
the security field after the Cold War (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000: 2). 
The old certainties were replaced by risks and threats not bounded by 
territory, and the emergence of new intellectual concerns such as identity 
issues. It is fair to say that states still continue to pursue what they call 
national security in an environment which is clearly different from the 
environment of earlier eras in which their structures were born. 
Therefore, this erosion is a push factor to replace the conception of 
territorial security with a more comprehensive approach; societal 
security.  
Turkey, like many contemporary states across the world, has found itself 
in an environment in which traditional concerns of nationhood and state 
building are still important but it recognises that it must listen to voices 
that increasingly speak of cooperation, integration and identity. This new 
security environment in this uncertain and contradictory context of 
transformation must be understood for better security. 
 
1.1. Security 
Understanding of the transformation of the security environment has 
gained speed after the end of Cold War. Growing numbers of scholars 
from different backgrounds found realism’s state-centric and military 
focused approach to security to be useless as an analytical tool (Buzan, 
1991; Waever et al., 1993; Gardner, 2005; Garnett, 1996; Buzan et al. 
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1998; Brown, 1998). After the end of the Cold War, the concept of security 
has been broadened to encompass a much wider range of issues and 
concerns. This intellectual transformation in security studies has focused 
on four interrelated issues. First, what should be the referent object of 
security? In the new security environment, the traditional state-centric 
focus of security studies is not relevant any more, given economic 
globalisation, rapid developments in technology and transportation, and 
hence the erosion of state sovereignty. In addition, threat groups from 
terrorists to organised criminals targeting society are in the main and the 
greatest risk. Consequently, attention has been paid to the security of 
societal groups and individuals rather than states. Second, what is the 
nature of threat? This implies that previous focus on military threats has 
been replaced by the economic, political, environmental, societal threats. 
Third, who is going to provide the security? Traditionally, it was the state 
itself. However, today it has broadened to include international 
organisations such as NATO, the UN, and OSCE; and more importantly 
society itself. Finally, with what instruments can you provide security? In 
the face of a more complex security context and the interrelated character 
of threats such as trafficking, terrorism and ethnic conflicts, and in the 
face of environmental disasters, the military instrument is no longer 
relevant (Garnett, 1996a; Nick Vaughan-William, 2009). 
Endeavours to find more relevant answers to security matters have 
brought the issues of identity to the debate. The search for a relationship 
between identity and security is not new of course, but the new 
developments related to intra-state conflicts and vast migration have 
pushed the identity issues to the forefront in the security field. As Kaldor 
(2013) suggested while the ‘Old wars were fought for geo-political 
interests or for ideology (democracy or socialism), new wars are fought in 
the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal).’   
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1.2. Identity 
Thinking about collective identity, in the end, takes us to notions of ‘we 
feeling’, or ‘us and them’, it leads to cleavages and solidarities 
simultaneously (Schlesinger, 1994: 321; Fest, 1994: 64). The end of the 
Cold War has had a significant impact on these new cleavages and 
solidarities because it operated as a curtain supressing the search for 
new identities of the various societies within. It also has removed the 
obstacles for these societies in pursuit of a new identity in an increasingly 
mobile world. As a result, it has created unprecedented insecurities and 
uncertainties. The rapid developments in communication and 
transportation technology, and increasing cross-border economic 
activities have contributed to this process on an enormous scale. 
While identity often was defined in national terms, characteristics such 
as ethnicity, religion, gender and so on have become salient. Ideological, 
ethnical and religious identities have begun to override the national 
identities. For example Tekin (2014: 232) describes the Gerdi tribe living 
in Hakkari, a Turkish province at the Turkey- Iraq border, and 
maintains that villagers feel a greater sense of belonging to Iraq than to 
Turkey. As a response to these kinds of cleavages, the search for 
integration has often generated new fears in communities. Traditional 
state building projects have become central once again in the post-Cold 
War world space where it is nearly impossible to determine the territorial 
boundaries which divide ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
In the Middle East, the prevailing model of territoriality in the world has 
failed to create institutions that operate according to this model for two 
reasons. One reason is the tribal structures blocking the transition to 
territorial state organizations, and the second a strong and deep 
sectarian structure creating an alternative focus of loyalty. In the context 
of this fragmented structure came an enormous challenge to locate and 
maintain the borders. Therefore, providing security in ways which keep 
the ‘other’ out is impossible for a territorial state while there is a 
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powerful mobility based on kinship and religious relations etc. on both 
sides of the boundary.  
 
1.3. Locating borders  
Traditionally, military forces have been in charge of the surveillance of 
the borders and looking for ‘infiltrating enemies’ therefore, obsession with 
easily guarded land borders is the characteristic of current border 
thinking in Turkey. It was thought that the more deserted the borderline 
the easier it would be to establish surveillance across the territorial 
boundaries. However, securitisation of borders should no longer 
necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundaries.  It can 
extend beyond the national territory while, simultaneously, it must deal 
with the security issues inside the territory. 
In the context of border security it can be argued that inside/outside or 
internal/external divisions are hardly relevant anymore. While the 
realities of the new security environment continue to prevail, an 
intention to control a certain territory by traditional means is disputed. It 
potentially requires the military to perform police work while police feel 
obliged to extend their jurisdiction beyond the traditional domain. Such 
implications are pushing Turkey in a direction which is not very helpful 
to the management of current border problems because borders are no 
longer necessarily situated at the border (Balibar, 2002: 84). They are 
unfixed, mobile and diffused throughout within and outside the state. 
Borders are no longer a line which determine the territorial authority’s 
ends. Rather, they are expanding in time and space. A series of examples 
suggest that today we are witnessing the ‘mobility’ of the actual border 
itself (Balibar, 2002). The development of transport, international trade 
and communications creates boundaries deep within the state territory, 
for instance, around international airports, and special customs or free 
economic zones.  Therefore, the concept of border now embraces not only 
the area along the boundary, but internal regions. In parallel, the notion 
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of security has been expanded beyond the physical border itself and some 
territories beyond the border are to be securitized as if they were part of 
the national border. As a result, by de-territorializing the issue of 
security, the need for the protection of physical boundaries is undermined 
and this provokes the view that the dominant philosophy of security must 
be reviewed.   
 
1.4. Outline of the chapters  
Chapter 2 explores existing theoretical debates with regards to their 
methodological approaches, in order to provide a point of departure for 
this research project. A review of the literature will focus on perspectives 
and themes within contemporary security debates such as:  
 The classical ideological cleavage in International Relations, 
between the two schools of realism and liberalism,  
 Critical security studies as these state-centric concepts are 
analytically insufficient to capture the changing nature of security,  
 In close relationship with them, the identity-security nexus will be 
examined. The chapter is concluded with a survey of the Turkish 
case and with gaps in the literature. 
Chapter 3 presents the general design of the study, multiple data 
collection and analysis activity and methods used. The purpose of the 
chapter is to illustrate how and with what methods the research is 
executed. The broad aims of the study required the exploration of a wide 
range of factors, an appropriate research design and an applicable 
methodological approach. All these facts led to the adoption of a case 
study design and triangulation of diverse data sources. The chapter also 
elaborates and justifies the process of the research, data collection 
methods, analysis of data as well as the choice and use of above 
mentioned approaches and methods. Methodological problems and 
limitations encountered in the process of research are other significant 
points presented in the chapter.  
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Chapter 4 presents the conceptual debates and the framework of the 
study arising from them. It describes the shift in the security paradigm 
and the limitations of old notions of national security in the face of new 
security challenges in the last decades after the Cold-War. It also 
explores in depth the new security paradigm with the guiding concept of 
societal security and its potential to bring efficiency to border security. 
The principle argument in this chapter is that border security is not an 
isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of national security, but is a 
comprehensive approach which is supposed to lead national security 
along with the all public and private capabilities; and organise relevant 
departments to achieve security. 
Chapter 5 explores the concept of border security from the perspective of 
traditional national security and non-traditional societal security, in 
order to answer the following question: What are the effects of prevailing 
perspectives of state-centric national security and non-traditional societal 
security on current and future interpretations of border security.  The 
answer provides a clear picture for readers and elucidates discussions at 
the analysis stage.  
Chapter 6 sets out a clear vision of the current situation in Turkey in the 
border security field. It examines the institutional structure of the 
current border security framework, the implications and policy aspects of 
the current approaches in Turkey. The chapter comprises two main 
components based upon the notion that problems stemming from the 
institutional structure and the politics of security are two sides of the 
same coin.  
Chapter 7 explores Turkey’s current response to border security 
challenges based on the findings from the primary research (mainly in-
depth interviews). It assesses how security professionals view border 
issues and border security; and how well the Turkish state has responded 
to the risks and threats in recent years, outlining the significant 
successes and failures of its policies and decisions. It identifies a number 
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of areas as being of particular concern. They are grouped under the 
headings:  coordination; institutional qualification; legal deficiencies; 
budget; civil governance; geography; kinship, and terror.  It also pins 
down the current approach which is reflected in government documents. 
Chapter 8 examines the case for a holistic approach to managing national 
security. Initially this will require a robust and comprehensive strategy 
to ensure the government is able to identify priorities in the new security 
environment, and explores the security sector’s approach to border 
security. The concept of societal security was used to assess the current 
practices and tried to answer the research question: How might Turkey 
increase its border security? And going on from there; what insights the 
‘societal security concept’ might offer in answer to this question? 
The announcement that the government will put into action a national 
action plan to set up a professional border security unit before the end of 
2016 is a step forwards but questions remain as to its likely impact on 
the security architecture given the current framework of border security. 
Therefore, this chapter also will examine the effectiveness of the 
government’s approach? It argues that departments and agencies within 
the national security architecture are not well equipped to achieve 
security in the face of challenges of the new security environment. The 
chapter speculates on reforms including the creation of a national 
security secretariat subsuming the Secretariat General of National 
Security Council. 
Chapter 9 summarises the research aims, findings, and analysis and 
concludes by reflecting on the Turkish government can transform itself in 
response to the challenges identified in the thesis. The chapter ends with 
a number of recommendations for reforming the current national security 
framework. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From the 1990s, Turkey has taken steps to give a new direction to its 
foreign and security policy towards its eastern neighbours, organising 
complex programmes of economic, cultural and governmental assistance 
on a much larger scale than in the past. At the turn of the century, 
Turkey also developed its bilateral relations with Middle Eastern 
countries. In addition to that, it commenced a radical policy of openness 
introducing the virtually visa-free treaties between itself and 
neighbouring countries. Taking into consideration Turkey’s substantial 
military capacity compared to its neighbours, all three of these initiatives 
now raise opportunities and policy issues in the context of border security 
in particular.   
 
Despite attempts to conceptualise Turkey’s national security policy, 
border security policy is almost an unexplored issue. The very limited 
literature available discusses the transformation process in the frame of 
European integration. Although there are a growing number of studies 
explicitly concerned with the Europeanization of security institutions, it 
still lacks consistent and systematic concepts to account for the varying 
patterns of security understandings and institutional adjustments in the 
policy field.  
 
In the reviewed literature on Turkey below, there is a clear trend to 
examine only the effective factors which are driving or triggering security 
reforms. However, examining positive effects alone, does not provide a 
useful tool for a better understanding of the new security environment of 
today’s world and what Turkey needs to change in the border security 
field to secure its future. This trend has also resulted in an inability to 
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appreciate properly the requirements of the EU in the border security 
field. It is clear that there is an urgent need to discuss security issues in 
line with the post-Cold War norms in the field, which the literature 
suggests is totally different from the past. This has been reflected within 
the field of Security Studies as pressure to redefine the concept of 
'security'; as a result, several academics have discussed what is and what 
should be with regards to its referent object. While traditionalists favour 
the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security - defined in 
military and state-centric terms - the non-traditionalists have attempted 
to broaden and deepen the definition. These non-traditionalists argue 
that other issues, such as economic, environmental and social threats, 
pose serious risk to societies and individuals rather than states per se. 
 
However, the analytical distinction between traditionalists and non-
traditionalists does not mean that there is a consensus within each 
distinct group. Some realists, such as Stephen Walt, continue to 
emphasize their traditional preoccupation with military threats, while 
others, such as Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob, agree that a broader 
definition of security is necessary. On the other hand, there is a 
disagreement between non-traditionalists (wideners and deepeners) such 
as Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998; Krause/Williams 1996. The wideners 
argue that the greatest threats to state survival may not be military, but 
environmental, social and economic. The deepeners, on the other hand, 
ask the question of whose security is being threatened as opposed to the 
state. 
 
In many ways, critical, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches 
have also transformed border studies.  This shift in the analytical and 
methodological perspective has led to an understanding in which borders 
have multiple meanings and functions, and the border concept cannot be 
reduced to a singular meaning.  Thus, most importantly, this shift has led 
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to the admission of the approach that borders are processes and not fixed 
lines.   
 
Today, borders are not placed at the territorial limits of the state, or at 
other traditional entry points such as train stations and airports. They 
are unfixed and mobile, diffused throughout, within and outside the state 
(see Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2008).  They are, 
as Etienne Balibar has stated: ‘dispersed a little everywhere, wherever 
the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is 
controlled’ (Balibar, 1998: 1). 
 
Thus the notion of border security today is also radically different from 
the past because both the concept and the nature of security have 
undergone a profound transformation. The concept of the border of the 
state has been used to frame dominant notions of who and where the 
‘enemy’ of the state might be. Although aspects of such thinking continue 
to invade security practices, the insights of this approach have been 
questioned over recent years, particularly so since the end of the Cold 
War. By de-territorializing the issue of security, the need for the 
protection of physical boundaries is also undermined. Therefore, this 
chapter will concentrate specifically on the recent conceptual changes to 
provide an analytical basis to examine how Turkey’s case conforms to or 
diverges from the post-Cold War concept of border security and discuss 
whether the current system is providing the required level of security. 
 
2.1. Non Traditional versus Traditional Concept of Security 
Traditional thinking about security has been dominated by the realist 
paradigm. The two seminal texts in that context are Hans Morgenthau's 
Politics among Nations (1948) and Kenneth Waltz's Theory of 
International Politics (1979). Together they constitute the two main 
strands of realism. On the one hand, Morgenthau's classical realism, 
which emphasizes ‘the importance of the states (Glasser, 2013: 15) which 
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have an inherent desire for territorial expansion. On the other, Waltz's 
neo-realism (also referred to as 'structural realism') emphasizes the 
structural dynamics of the system as key to understanding state 
behavior. The realist paradigm suggests that states are only interested in 
maintaining their sovereign control over their territory, and anarchic 
international systems provoke the states to arm races and war. 
 
In a broader sense, realism is a theory which explains the power and 
power politics in international relations. ‘Realists, tend to see states as 
the key actors in the international system’ (Glaser, 2013: 14). A basic 
shared element of the realist paradigm, related to this research, is a clear 
demarcation between the domestic and international domains. The 
domestic sphere is defined by the boundaries of the sovereign state by 
which the state controls its territory. Outside the state, there is anarchy 
which means the absence of a central authority. In this harsh and 
unforgiving 'self-help' system, survival is the primary concern of all 
states. The ‘security dilemma’ is thus seen as a central and inescapable 
feature of international life (Jervis, 1981). In a multipolar system, states 
can most effectively find security through alliances and the effective 
operation of the balance of power. For realists, therefore, sovereignty is a 
key organizing principle of the international system; states are inevitably 
and rightly the referent object of security; and security can only be 
assured through power politics and military force. 
 
Walt's (1991) traditionalist perspective of security is firmly rooted in 
realism. Walt takes a position which is state-centric and restricts the 
'security' to threats in the military realm. He equates security with peace 
and the prevention of conflict through military means such as deterrence 
policies. Walt argues that Security Studies 
[…] may be defined as the study of the threat, 
use and control of military force. It explores the 
conditions that make the use of force more 
likely, the ways that the use of force affects 
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individuals, states and societies, and the 
specific policies that states adopt in order to 
prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991: 
212). 
Realist perspectives were increasingly challenged by neo-liberal 
institutionalism or liberal-institutionalism. This approach accepted many 
of the realist paradigm's assumptions (states as key, the anarchic nature 
of the international system), but rejected their conclusions. In particular, 
liberal-institutionalists emphasize the potential cooperation, both 
through multilateralism and institutional integration.  ‘The national 
interest then transcends sovereignty and autonomy’ (Morgan 2013: 34). 
Their focus on the emergence of 'complex Interdependence' also led them 
to highlight the importance of the economic and political dimensions of 
the international system. While seeing the states as the most important 
actors, it also stressed the non-state actors such a non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) international regimes and major private economic 
entities (Morgan 2013: 30). Thus it moves away from realism's focus on 
power politics and military force.  
These discussions led to an important shift of academic thinking about 
security and a rethinking of many of the traditional and realist 
assumptions about security, with a growing emphasis on the importance 
of the non-military dimensions of security. However, as discussed before, 
assumptions such as state centrism remained unchanged. For example, 
Robert Keohane, a prominent figure in liberal institutionalism, has 
acknowledged that his approach ‘borrows as much from realism as from 
liberalism’ (1993: 272). The emergence of these ‘neo-neo’ discussions led 
to a dissatisfaction and created a third influential approach, ‘critical 
security studies’ (Krause and Williams 1997). 
 
‘Critical security studies’ is a broad church, embracing elements of post-
Marxism, feminism, peace studies and postmodernism, but does not 
identify with any one of them. Although they are conceptually different, 
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they share a common rejection of many of the basic assumptions of both 
realism and liberal-institutionalism. First, they reject the notion of 
'anarchy' as a defining feature of international relations; second, they 
replace the state by either societal groups or individuals as the referent 
object of security; third, they emphasize the role of both non-state actors 
and the non-military dimension of security. 
 
2.2. Changing Scope of Security 
2.2.1. Broadening the Security paradigm 
From the 1980s onwards, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, scholars of international relations increasingly began to 
emphasize the need for a broader understanding of security. There has 
been a tendency among scholars (Buzan, 1991; Waever et al., 1993; 
Gardner, 2005; Garnett, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998) to develop a concept of 
security that brings up a range of 'non-traditional security issues'. Among 
the most discussed non-traditional security issues are terrorism, 
organized crime, migration, asylum seekers and environmental 
degradation which, they argue, create serious instabilities. Chalk (2001) 
identifies seven issues that are commonly associated with contemporary 
sources of transnational instability: internal war and conflict, terrorism, 
heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, the transnational diffusion of infectious 
disease, environmental degradation and unregulated mass population 
movements. They criticize the narrow definition of territorial security 
against military invasion, imposed by the Cold War conditions. They 
argue that it is misleading to confine security analysis to traditional 
military threats to the territorial integrity of states (Garnett, 1996a: 14), 
and that these traditional threats have not disappeared completely, but 
other non-military sources of threat have become more pressing (Nick 
Vaughan-William, 2009). 
 
One of the most noticeable attempts to widen the security agenda has 
been provided by Barry Buzan and his colleagues (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et 
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al., 1998). They stress that the security of human collectivities is affected 
by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and 
environmental. In general, military security concerns the two-level 
interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and 
state’s perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns 
the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the 
ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security is concerned with 
access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security is 
concerned with the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for 
evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and 
national identity and custom. Environmental security is concerned with 
the maintenance of local and planetary biosphere as the essential support 
system on which all other human enterprises depend. Buzan’s work 
raises interesting and important questions about whether national and 
international security considerations can be compatible, and whether 
states, given the nature of the international system, are capable of 
thinking in more cooperative international and global terms (Baylis, 
2014: 231). 
 
In Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe however, 
Ole Waever argues that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach had 
become ‘untenable’ as a present context for societal security. As a result, 
he proposed a reconceptualization of Buzan's previous theory; not as a 
five sector approach of state security, but as a duality of state and 
societal security (Waever et al. 1993:25). Societal security, here, is still 
kept as a sector of state security, but now it is also a referent object of 
security in its own right. Therefore, although the state is still a referent 
object for the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental 
sectors, 'society' is also a referent object for the societal sector. In other 
words, it combines state security, which is concerned with sovereignty, 
and societal security, which is concerned with identity. 
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On this issue, Klare and Thomas (1994) take a different perspective. 
They argue that the concept of security needs to be expanded because of a 
declining significance of geographical boundaries. They see state actors 
incapable to respond to global problems like environmental degradation 
and financial currency crises. Instead of focussing on domestic threats to 
state survival, they advocate a ‘world security’ concept that accounts for 
the global nature of contemporary problems. Their assumption is that all 
actors are influenced equally by global threats and that they are 
motivated to respond cooperatively to them. Similarly, Ayoob (1997: 130) 
brings a different perspective and argues that national security is a 
function of state building, which requires that a state possesses more 
than simply ‘security hardware’ (control of coercive force) but also 
‘security software’ (legitimacy and integration). Ayoob argues that: 
‘security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both 
internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring 
down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and 
institutional, and regimes’ (1997: 130). A central element for the question 
whether or not to broaden the notion of security is; whose security we are 
considering or what is the referent object of security? The limits of the 
traditional approaches show us that it is surely no longer the security of 
the state, but of some other object/s. 
 
2.2.2. Deepening of Security: Whose security? 
The 1990s have witnessed a series of intense and broad-ranging debates 
concerning the nature of security issues. These debates have questioned 
both existing definitions of security's referent object, and how it can be 
studied. In other words, in addition to the debate on broadening the focus 
of security studies to include non-military issues, conventional thinking 
about security was also challenged by those who criticized the state-
centric approach of neo-realists.  As we have seen, state-centrism is one 
of the central tenets of realism. Mearsheimer argues that states are still 
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the main actors on the world stage and are likely to remain so for the 
foreseeable future, (2005: 139-140). This state-centric approach has been 
charged with neglecting the people. Munster suggests that, the privilege 
given to the state is inadequate to address problems of 'common' or 
'human' security, which would need consideration on the level of the 
individual, sub-state groups or on the level of humanity as a whole (2005: 
2).  
 
As Jones asserts: ‘When one begins to focus on security referents other 
than the state, it becomes apparent that ‘existential’ threats to those 
referents - be they individuals, nations and so on - are far broader than 
those posed by military force.’ It means ‘deepening’ and ‘broadening’ are 
inseparable processes (1996: 209). For example, Brown argues that the 
state-centric lens ‘fails to illuminate many of the momentous 
developments occurring within, above, and across the jurisdictions of the 
nation-states that are creating dangerous incongruities in world politics 
and society’ (1998: 1). Brown also emphasizes that separate nation-states 
have become increasingly impotent in dealing (that is, through national 
laws and national institutions) with threats to security and safety on 
their own, he suggests ‘Sovereign national enclaves of security and order, 
fenced off from the "chaos" of the world at large, are becoming unviable’ 
(1998: 4). A striking example of this new reality is the cross border 
dimension of terrorism and counterterrorism. Since terrorism is 
facilitated by the new technologies of mobility and due to the fact that it 
appears to manifest itself in cross border networks, counterterrorism will 
be ineffective when it is conducted unilaterally through national 
agencies. The significant question here is about differences it creates 
which change the state-centric lens.  
 
For critical security theorists, states are not only providers of security, 
they can also be a source of threat to their own people. According to this 
view; individuals should be the central concern rather than state. ‘This 
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has led to a greater attention being given to what has been called human 
security and has resulted in further broadening of the conception of 
security to include areas such as health security’ (Baylis, 2014: 236). 
However, conceptualizing security in terms of ‘individual security’ or 
‘global security’ has become more popular in the contemporary debate, 
Waever states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international 
security exist’ (1995: 48). However, despite this he gives security of 
individuals’ importance as it has a potential to affect the whole of society, 
Waever puts ‘society’ at the centre of his concept beside the ‘state’ (1995: 
67).  The key objective for both state and society is survival. For the state, 
it is defined in terms of sovereignty, whereas for the society, it is defined 
in terms of identity. In other words, while a state cannot survive if it 
loses its sovereignty, society cannot survive when it loses its identity.   
 
The broadening and deepening of the security agenda away from its 
traditional focus on state and military dimensions has led to a growing 
importance of identity in security studies. This increased significance of 
identity issues within security studies has led to an increasing awareness 
of the limitations of realist, structuralist accounts of international 
politics. Analysis of the structural distribution of power at systemic levels 
provides only a very limited and one dimensional understanding of the 
underlying political and societal dynamics of international security 
(Buzan 1991:368). Focusing on the military dimension of security or on 
the state as the referent object fails to capture the complexity of the new 
security environment. This is because security is intimately bound to 
societal identity and cohesion. In this context, Barry Buzan’s definition is 
particularly useful. He argues security ‘is about the pursuit of freedom 
from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change 
which they see as hostile’ (Buzan, 1991: 432). 
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2.3. Realism and identity 
The relationship of identity and culture within international relations 
has presented the greatest challenge to realist thinking on security. ‘This 
is because realist thinking has traditionally focused on material and 
systemic factors underpinning the security dilemma and the operation of 
the balance of power in anarchic systems’ (Hyde-Price and Aggestam 
2000:238).  As highlighted earlier, its two main streams are the 
structural, or neo-realist variant propounded by Waltz and Mearsheimer, 
and the classical realist tradition propounded by Hans Morgenthau, 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Arnold Wolfers. 
 
The response of neo-realists has taken three main forms. First, neo-
realists like Mearsheimer (1995) have flatly denied the relevance of 
ideational factors, and reasserted the ontological primacy of material and 
systemic factors. Second, Waltz, for example, has simply argued that neo-
realist theory can only seek to explain ‘certain big and important things’ 
about the international system, and therefore has to exclude factors such 
as domestic politics, culture or identity (1998). One of the primary 
examples of a neo-realist attempt to amend the limitations of the realist 
approach to security with material structures and relative power 
capabilities, is Walt's influential work, The Origins of Alliances (1987). 
Walt seeks to modify Waltz's structural realist approach by suggesting 
that states safeguard not against power but rather against threats. 
Anarchy and the distribution power alone are not enough to predict 
which states will be identified as threats. Walt argues that threats derive 
from a combination of geostrategic and military factors and 'aggressive 
intentions', in other words, capabilities and intentions (1987: 22-6). 
Walt's approach is clearly a major deviation from structural realism. 
However Barnett criticizes Walt that ‘[it] is the politics of identity rather 
than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better understanding of 
36 
 
which states are viewed as a potential or immediate threat to the state's 
security’ (Barnett 1996: 401). 
 
 A second example was Snyder’s approach. First, he suggested what he 
calls ‘structural modifiers’, and second, a focus on ‘relationships’. 
Structural modifiers are ‘system-wide influences that are structural in 
their inherent nature but not potent enough to warrant that designation’ 
(Snyder 1996: 169). These include norms (ideational factors), institutions 
and military technology. These structural modifiers mean that conflict 
and aggression are not intrinsic to the nature of international anarchy, 
and suggest that norms and institutions can profoundly alter the 
structural dynamics of international society. On the other hand, 
relationships ‘lie between structure and interaction’, providing ‘the 
situational context of behavior: the conflict, common interests, 
alignments and power relations that motivate and shape behavioral 
choice’ (Snyder 1996:172). Snyder maintains: 
[Relationships] are the conduit through which 
structural effects are transmitted to behavior. 
Likewise, the internal characteristics of states 
affect interaction largely through their effects 
on relationships. Relationships are more than a 
transmission belt for structural and unit 
effects, however; they also exert independent 
effects (Snyder 1996: 172). 
Snyder’s comments are interesting because he establishes a link between 
realist views and constructivist approach, which – arguably – allows for 
the opposing factions to achieve a compromise. 
 
2.3.1. Classical realism and identity 
There are significant differences between Morgenthau and Waltz in their 
definition of power. According to Waltz, the elements of power are: ‘size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability and competence’ (Waltz, 1979: 131). 
For Morgenthau, the most important material aspect of power is armed 
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forces, but even more significant is a nation’s character, morale and 
quality of governance (Morgenthau, 1956: 186). This means that states 
with more or less same material capabilities but different identities 
might act differently. In this respect, Waltz’s approach is far closer to the 
traditional view. Neo-classical realists argue that the dominant factor 
shaping broad patterns of foreign policy over time is their material power 
capabilities in relation to the wider international system. According to 
them, therefore, this must be the starting-point of any analysis of inter-
national security. However, these neo-classical realists (Rose 1998; 
Schweller 2003 for example) also focus on the internal characteristics of 
the states interacting with international systems to shape state behavior. 
They argue that the impact of such power capabilities is indirect and 
complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level (Hyde-Price and Aggestam 2000: 
241). This suggests that the relative material capabilities, different 
structures and, identities of states are also determinant factors on actions 
of the states. 
 
Classical realism recognizes the significance of shared values and 
universal standards of action for the operation of the balance of power, 
and their acknowledgement of a role for law and international 
organizations.  As Ruggie has argued, ‘notwithstanding Morgenthau's 
emphasis on power as the driving force, he saw the world of international 
politics in socially textured terms’ (Ruggie 1998: 5). Thus, neo-classical 
realism’s conceptualization of the relationship between material and 
ideational factors is in the interest of the debates on security and identity 
and makes a significant contribution to the security-identity nexus. 
 
2.4. Liberal Institutionalism and identity 
There are different repercussions against the challenge of identity among 
liberal institutionalists. While some of the liberal-institutionalists view 
identity as pre-given and objectively determined, other cite the mutually 
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constitutive relationship between interests, identity and institutions, and 
the key role of institutions in creating ‘identity’ and ‘perception of 
interests’ (Hyde-Price and Aggestam, 2000: 242).  
 
Keohane (1984: 61) views ‘international regimes’ as principles, norms, 
rules, procedures and orders about actions: ‘they imply obligations, even 
though these obligations are not enforceable through a hierarchical legal 
system’. He argues that ‘international regimes’ should be seen within the 
boundaries of issue-areas and since issue-areas depend on actor’s 
perceptions and behaviour, ‘their boundaries change gradually over time’. 
Complex relationships within the NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are 
structured and channelled by the principles and rules of the institutions. 
To support this claim Keohane and Nye (1989:55) argue that ‘a set of 
networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult 
either to eradicate or drastically to rearrange’. Keohane and Nye also 
argue that ‘in the long run, one may even see changes in how 
governments define their own self-interest in directions that conform to 
the rules of the regimes’ (1989:259). Thus, the long-term participation in 
international regimes has the potential to transform the participant 
actors’ identity because cooperation can lead to an internalized 
commitment to the practices of the regime.  
 
Another area in which liberal-institutionalism has contributed to the 
security-identity nexus is in the area of peace theory and security 
communities. The theory of democratic peace stems from Immanuel 
Kant’s To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Michael Doyle based 
his theory on Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’. In his book, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs (1983) Kant states that the spread of democracy makes 
the elimination of war possible (Doyle in Rasmussen, 2003: 21). The 
democratic peace thesis suggests that democracy and peace are linked. 
Democratic institutions play a crucial role in the development of a stable 
peace (1) because of their institutional impact on the policy-making 
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process, and (2) by changing the norms and values of the political actors 
concerned - that is, their identity (Hyde-Price and Aggestam, 2000: 243). 
‘It is an extension of Liberalism’s inside-out approach and the belief that 
the nature of an international system[is] significantly shaped by the 
character of its members’ (Morgan: 2013: 34, 35). However, the wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and in the Middle East clearly demonstrate that 
democracies do not go to war only for self-defense purposes.  
2.5. Critical security studies and identity 
This approach has developed through its engagement with identity and 
cultural issues which traditional approaches have largely ignored. It is a 
broad church it has drawn scholars from a range of theoretical 
perspectives such as constructivism, post structuralism and post 
Marxism. Williams and Krause (1997b: x, xi) stress that ‘our appending 
of the term critical to security studies is meant to imply more an 
orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label’. In 
particular, their approach has begun to question the referent object of 
security: who or what is to be secured. The traditional answer to this 
question is that the referent object is the state. For example, Ayoob 
(1997, 121-2) questions the nature of the state and argues the state in 
traditional security studies is that of the advanced, industrial north. So, 
security refers to protecting the state from external threats and people 
living within the territory are considered secure as long as the state is 
secure. This approach also considers security as more than just military 
security. One of the interesting contributions has been made by Booth 
(1997: 112) who suggests:  
 
The argument has been that the meaning of 
studying security is not simply or necessarily 
created by changes out there in the world, but 
the changes – or lack of them- in here (who we 
think we are, and what we think we are doing). 
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In his defense of traditional security studies, Walt dismissed critical 
theory arguing its lack of theory and suggests ‘issues of war and peace 
are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-
indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’ (1991: 223). If 
identity is made a concern of security, then who judges ‘what counts as 
the parameters of collective identity, and by what criteria must 
judgments be made’ (McSweeney 1996:88). However, Hansen, by using 
the term ‘poststructuralist’, argues that ‘[it] offers important insights on 
the construction of the national-international dichotomy, the relationship 
between national identity and security politics, the discursive character 
of the concept of security, and the late modern transformation of security’ 
( 1997: 369).  
 
2.6. Copenhagen School: A balanced approach 
Just after Critical Security Studies had come to the agenda Barry Buzan, 
Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde published Security: A new framework for 
Analysis (1998) which was designated the Copenhagen School, and  is a 
mixture of Barry Buzan’s notion of sectorial analysis and Ole Waever’s 
concept of ‘securitization’. The school widens the definition of security by 
encompassing five different sectors: military, political, societal, economic 
and environmental security. Waever suggests that security is a speech 
act and examines how a specific matter becomes a security matter. 
Further suggesting that, the referent object can vary across the sectors 
and collective identities are the referent object of societal security. 
Although they both agree on the social construction of security the 
Copenhagen approach distances itself from Critical Security Studies. It 
contends that construction in the security realm is sufficiently stable over 
the long run that it can be treated as objective (Buzan et al. 1998: 34-5).  
 
Although the approach will be examined in detail in the next chapter, it 
is useful to note here that Waever emphasises the duality of the state and 
societal security, and explains that while state security is about threats 
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to its sovereignty, societal security is about the threats to a society’s 
identity. Both Waever and Buzan contend that societies are 
fundamentally about identity. In Waever’s words, ‘society is about 
identity, about the self-conception of communities and of individuals 
identifying themselves as members of a community’ (1993: 25). 
 
2.7. Social Constructivism and Security Studies 
Social Constructivism offers considerable insights for investigating the 
security identity nexus because it focuses on social relations and why 
identity, norms and culture matter. Although traditional approaches such 
as (realism and liberalism) focus largely on material elements to argue 
security matters, social constructivism stresses that the ideational factors 
as well as material factors construct the world around us and the 
meanings we give to it. This is a significant difference from realist and 
liberalist perspectives.  For both of them state behavior is determined by 
the anarchic international system and the distribution of material 
capabilities in it. However, ‘Constructivism puts into context the actions, 
beliefs and interests of actors and understands that the world they 
inhabit has been created by them and impacts on them’ (Agius 2013: 88) 
It argues security is socially constructed and identity is crucial because 
actors cannot act without an identity. ‘Identities give actors interests and 
those interests tell us something about how actors act/behave and the 
goals they pursue’ (Agius 2013: 88). Likewise, Frederking (2003: 365) 
argues that ‘global security arrangements include beliefs about the world 
(e.g. the nature of security), norms about social relationship (e.g. 
appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and [the] 
other (e.g. Enemy, rival, citizen, or friend)’.  
 
2.8. Identity and the ‘Other’ 
In connection with identity ‘otherness’ is a significant concept in security 
studies. Many writers about identity issues draw attention to the critical 
role of ‘other’ in forming security identities. They have argued that 
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identity requires an ‘other’. Wendt, for example, distinguishes between 
different types of identity: corporate and social identity. Corporate 
identity refers to the intrinsic, self-realized identity of an actor. Social 
identity refers to ‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while 
taking the perspective of others’ (Wendt, 1994: 385). He later adds three 
more types of identities, ‘type’, ‘role’, ‘collective’ identities.  Wendt (1999: 
226) claims that ‘type’ identities do not rely on other states, ‘roles’ 
identities exist only in relation to others. He gives an example of the 
professor and student relationship. One cannot be a student without a 
teacher or vice versa. Collective identity is a mix of role and type 
identities where self and other become blurred (Wendt, 1999: 226). 
 
With regard to the role of the ‘Other’ in forming security identities Hyde-
Price and Aggestam point out the power of conflicts and argues: 
‘Historical experience seems to suggest that the most influential and 
resilient forms of political identity are those generated through conflict –
either real or imagined- with the ‘Other’, that is, with other political 
communities.’ (2000: 250). Philip Schlesinger (1994: 321, 325) argues that 
‘the making of identities is an active process that involves inclusion and 
exclusion.’ To be ‘us’, we need those who are ‘not-us’. Similarly, Fest 
argues (1994: 64) that ‘every country needed an adversary, with the 
border and the rival just beyond; it was only these conditions that made 
each people refine its own identity.’ However, according to Hyde-Price 
and Aggestam (2000: 251,252) this is not the case in the Nordic lands, 
where a sense of Scandinavian or Nordic identity has emerged which 
involves relations of difference, but which is not directed against each 
other as a hostile ‘other’.  They also give an example of post- war 
Germany which was built around a self-understanding of itself as a 
liberal-democratic social market economy, committed to European 
integration and the forging of a stable peace order (Hyde-Price and 
Aggestam (2000: 252).  
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Most of the discussions above focus on the external environment and 
external rivals. Berger and Luckman (1991: 194) argue that ‘identity is 
formed by social processes’. Based on this idea, constructivists think that 
‘the process [of] acquiring identity is interaction’ (Agius 2013: 91). 
Therefore, as opposed to the rationalist perspective, the behavior of the 
states should not be the result of external forces only. For example, 
Germany and France have historically been enemies, but, through their 
cooperation in the context of European integration, their relationship has 
evolved into a different one (Agius 2013: 91). Thus, one important lesson 
to learn from these discussions is how you define yourself in a significant 
security strategy indeed. One notable example to this was the research 
program on national roles, defined in terms of states’ self-defined role 
conceptions (Hyde-Price and Aggestam (2000: 253). Kalevi Holsti was one 
of the first who drew on sociological interpretations of role in order to 
suggest how perceptions may structure and guide foreign policy making. 
He argued that foreign policy makers are influenced by role conceptions 
which are a product of a nation’s traditions, history and national values 
along with the other factors (Holsti 1970: 245). 
 
As Hudson and Vore argued: 
National role conception is one of the few 
conceptual tools we have for the study of how 
society and culture serve as a context for a 
nation’s foreign policy. It allows one to bridge 
the conceptual gap between the general beliefs 
held in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy 
makers (1995: 226). 
 
Role theory, thus, provides a useful tool for studying the impact of the 
identity conceptions on security policies. 
2.9. Changing Perceptions: Where are the borders? 
In many ways, critical, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches 
have also transformed border studies. The shift in the analytical and 
methodological perspective has led to an understanding in which borders 
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have multiple meanings and functions, and the border concept cannot be 
reduced to a singular meaning.  And, thus most importantly, this shift 
has led to the acknowledgment of the approach that borders are processes 
and not fixed lines.  In this context there are mainly two contesting 
arguments in the academic world: the ﬁrst is ‘the claim that borders 
between states are a thing of the past’; the second is ‘the assertion that 
borders between states are here to stay’ (Nick Vaughan-William, 2009: 4). 
These are reviewed below. 
 
The first discourse is mainly based on the consequences of economic 
globalisation. ‘The transformation of global production, involving the 
growth of multinational companies, a twenty-four-hour market and post-
Fordist industries, has rendered the notion of a national economy 
obsolete’ (Brown, 2005: 167). Similarly, Strange (1999: 345-6) points out 
the inability ‘to govern and control the institutions and markets that 
create and trade the credit instruments essential to the real economy’ 
and argues that the modern, sovereign, territorially bordered state has 
failed. In the same vain, Agnew (2008: 7) also argues the ineffectiveness 
of ‘territorial limits’ and points out the ‘technological and geopolitical 
changes’ as reasons. 
 
As a consequence of the recent changes discussed above, some other 
scholars also argue that the erosion of state borders over recent decades 
threatens the Westphalian state system which is territorially deﬁned 
(Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 39 and Scholte, 2000, pp. 135–6). The 
emergence of the European Union, with its a ‘borderless area of freedom, 
security and justice’, could be cited as an example of this transformation.  
 
By contrast, the second discourse maintains that national economies 
have been left intact if not actually strengthened by globalisation (Hirst 
and Thompson, 1996, 2002). According to this perspective, the modern 
state continues to remain the primary political entity in world politics 
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(Carlson et al., ‘Foreword’, 2006: 1, 2). Especially after the 11 September 
2001 attacks, there have been challenges to the concept of globalisation 
and borderlessness which raised new arguments (Coward, 2005: 105, 34; 
Newman, 2006: 181). The events of 9/11 have once more brought a 
paradigm change in the study of borders and brought the more rigidly 
controlled borders on to the agenda. In the face of mounting American 
military aggression, and various reassertions of territorial sovereignty, 
some writers, argue that state borders are more important than ever 
(Starr, 2006: 3–10). Thus, contemporary studies are, once again, focusing 
on the implications of the border-closing process, particularly after the 
vast migration to Europe. 
However, one can easily observe that these discourses are both based on 
a particular understanding of the concept of the border of the state which 
reflects modern geopolitical imaginary. A great many authors (including 
Balibar, 1998; Eyal Weizman, 2007; Achille Mbembe 2005; Nick 
Vaughan-William, 2009) bring the ‘conceptual transformation of state 
borders’ onto the agenda as a third way. Nick Vaughan-William (2009: 5) 
argues that the dynamics of today’s political practices which render the 
‘present or absent discussion senseless’. The words of Balibar are very 
striking as they engender a different perspective: 
We are living in a conjecture of the vacillation 
of borders – both of their layout and function – 
that is at the same time a vacillation of the 
very notion of the border, which has become 
particularly equivocal (Balibar, 1998: 217).  
The signiﬁcance of Balibar’s argument is that the vacillation of borders 
does not mean their disappearance. Borders in today’s world are not 
where they are supposed to be according to the modern geopolitical 
imaginary. On the contrary and most importantly, for Balibar, borders 
are being ‘multiplied and reduced in their localisation, […] thinned out 
and doubled, […] no longer the shores of politics but […] the space of the 
political itself’ (Balibar, 1998: 220). Balibar’s words force the readers to 
think outside the modern geopolitical imaginary, to begin to comprehend 
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what is going on in global politics: ‘borders are no longer at the border, an 
institutionalised site that could be materialised on the ground and 
inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins’ 
(Balibar, 1998: 217-8). 
 
In his call for re-conceptualising the borders, Balibar is not alone. Walker 
(1990: 180; 1993: 20,159,161; 2002: 343) has systematically questioned 
the inside/outside logic of the traditional concept of the border which the 
modern state rests on argues the issues in a similar way to Balibar. He 
argues that: ‘We have shifted rather quickly from the monstrous ediﬁce of 
the Berlin Wall, perhaps the paradigm of a securitized territoriality, to a 
war on terrorism, and to forms of securitization, enacted anywhere’ 
(Walker, 2002: 17). Similarly, Mbembe (2005: 11-40) suggests that ‘it 
makes little sense to insist on distinctions between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ political realms, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries’. 
In the same vein, Weizmann (2007: 13) writes: ‘New and suggestive 
cartographic representations of today’s world [are] a departure from the 
traditional view of a world that consists of a series of more or less 
homogenous nation states separated by clear borders in a continuous 
spatial ﬂow.’  
 
However strong fences and walls do, for the ruling elites, create a 
manageable situation where the ‘us here’ and the ‘them there’ line of 
binary separation is easier to control (Newman, 2006: 150). Even the 
globalization purists would accept that the basic ordering of society 
requires categories and compartments, and that borders create order (see 
Albert et al., 2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002). Borders on this 
logic are instruments of the state and therefore symbolise state power 
and identity (Anderson, 1996: 1). This does not mean that state borders 
are necessarily simply lines of separation. Anderson criticizes the 
perspective that sees borders as ridged lines in space because political life 
is problematic to the extent that it is difficult to determine where one 
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jurisdiction ends and another begins.  He argues that borders are not 
somehow part of a natural order of sovereign nation-states, but rather 
‘different conceptions of the frontier as an institution which existed 
before the modern sovereign state, and other kinds will emerge after its 
demise’ (Anderson, 2004, p.319). As institutions’ borders are established 
by political decisions and regulated by law, they become visible in its 
traditional form of territory demarcation which symbolizes the 
organisational power of the state.  However, for Anderson, borders are 
not only institutions, but they are also processes.   
 
As processes, Anderson argues that borders have four dimensions.  First, 
borders remain instruments of the state and are operated to their 
advantage (Anderson, 1996, p.2).  Second, the state’s ability to control its 
borders enhances or impedes its policy-making capacities.  Third, borders 
are markers of identity and form political and mythical beliefs about 
unity, heavily embedded in nationalism (Anderson, 1996, p.2), although 
Anderson has acknowledged that political identities can exist on micro as 
well as macro levels (Anderson, 2004, p.319).  Finally, borders are a term 
of discourse and the meanings given to borders can change over time 
(Anderson, 1996, p.2). In his own words, Anderson argues:   
  
What frontiers are, and what they represent is 
constantly being reconstituted by human 
beings who are regulated, influenced and 
limited by them.  But these reconstructions are 
influenced by political change and the often 
unpredictable outcome of great conflicts, 
against a background of technological change 
(2004: 320). 
 
New approaches, which are not directly concerned with where the border 
lies, but what the border means to different people experiencing the 
border, have brought new insights in border studies (see Newman and 
Paasi, 1998; van Houtum, 2000). Focusing on the process of bordering has 
created new possibilities in understanding how borders are constructed, 
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maintained, and reproduced. Thereby it has opened up new paths to 
produce tangible and meaningful border security strategies. Therefore, 
there is a tendency to concentrate on how people create  their own 
borders through constructing their own ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ instead of 
the territorial dividing line, and such a tendency sees the border as a 
space in which these identity dynamics can play out. For example, Paasi 
(2005) is particularly interested in the relationships between 
borders/boundaries and identity construction. For him, ‘Boundaries are 
means of and media for organizing social spaces’ (Paasi, 2005: 28). 
Indeed, for Paasi, in a globalising world – a world of flows – borders are 
no longer material, at least in their traditional guise as material limits, 
as they are social processes and practices.   
Analogous to Anderson, both Newman and Paasi argue that  
[…] borders and their meanings are historically 
contingent, and even if they are arbitrary lines 
between states they may also have deep 
symbolic, cultural, historical, and religious, 
often contested meanings for social 
communities. They manifest themselves in 
numerous social, political and cultural 
practices (Newman and Paasi, 1998: 188).  
 
Borders, in this sense, are social constructs. The insights of van Houtum 
are representative of critical, post structural approaches to the study of 
borders. Van Houtum focuses on the ways in which borders order social 
space and produce difference.  Van Houtum and van Naerssen, for 
example, have described bordering as ‘relating to practices of othering’ 
(2002: 125). For van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002: 134), processes of 
bordering, ordering and othering (constructing difference) are 
‘intrinsically territorial’. Otherness, therefore, is a requirement of border 
construction and is constantly reproduced to maintain the stability of 
territorially demarcated society.   Therefore, ‘overcoming borders’, van 
Houtum and Struver (2002: 142) argue, ‘is mainly about overcoming the 
socially constructed imaginations of belonging to a certain place and of 
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the need for a spatial fixity’. This spatial fixity represents the traditional 
views on border security. 
 
2.10. The Case of Turkey 
The existing limited literature on Turkey problematizes the state-
centrism and the military’s unquestioned authority over security issues. 
Issues related to border security have been discussed in the framework of 
the EU accession process and related to mainly illegal migration. 
 
In Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey, Icduygu 
and Keyman focus on migration to display the effects of globalization in 
framing security relations (2000). They take a position against state-
centrism and see globalisation as the main driving force behind the 
necessity of rethinking security. They argue that ‘in the post-Cold War 
era identity, body and ecology issues are more important interstate 
relations when the greater dangers and contingencies are global in 
character’ (2000: 383). According to them ‘there is a need to go beyond the 
state-centric approach and analyse critically the link 
between globalization and security’ (2000: 383).They specifically point out 
the link between globalisation and security ‘as the nature of security 
cannot be captured within the limits of interstate relations’ (Icduygu and 
Keyman, 2000: 383).  In their own words: 
The focus and subject of security in the world 
have begun to shift from state to identity as a 
result of political turmoil, so-called ethnic wars, 
and fundamentalist attempts to return to the 
origin by eliminating in bloody ways what is 
regarded as the other(s). In addition, the 
processes of globalization give rise to societal 
affairs that are increasingly interconnected 
through information and communication 
technologies. The crisis Turkey faces in terms 
of migration thus comes as no surprise […] it is 
in fact a crisis of state-centric logic that makes 
nation-states unable to create 
effective migration policies, especially with 
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respect to migration flows that stem from 
identity-based conflicts (2000: 385). 
 
In other words, the national level of analysis is not enough to deal 
effectively with societal problems because of globalisation process. In this 
sense it is globalization that makes security a multidimensional form of 
relationship whose scope ranges from state to identity (Icduygu and 
Keyman, 2000: 388). ‘It introduces possibilities for new ethnic identities 
to bring their cultures to the centre’ (Icduygu and Keyman, 2000: 387). 
Icduygu and Keyman argue more specifically that ‘the migration regimes 
of nation-states (largely framed by the state-centric logic of the Cold War) 
are becoming problematic and ineffective as migration flows in a 
globalizing world are becoming multi-layered and not easily controlled by 
nation-states (2000:383). In their essay they give Turkey’s case as an 
example to prove the nation-state lacks an effective migration policy and 
treats migrants--especially those from the Southeast Asian and Middle 
East regions--as a security threat to its national integrity and 
territoriality. To support their claims specifically, they argue that 
Turkish officials were reluctant to see any flow of Kurdish refugees from 
northern Iraq because of the concern that such a flow could add 
momentum to the separatist Kurdish movement in the country. However, 
they report a figure of approximately 650,000 Iraqi refugees, mostly 
Kurds, who entered Turkey between 1980 and 1995. Indeed, in 1988 
subsequent to the Halapja (Halepce) incidents, close to 60,000 ethnically 
Kurd Iraqis sought refuge in Turkey. This was followed by another 
450,000 after the end of the first Gulf War. Indeed, this is in clear 
contradiction with their claim. Today with 2.7 million Syrian refugees 
(tens of thousands of whom are Kurds), Turkey clearly proves that it does 
not view migration as a national security threat. 
To sum up, while Icduygu and Keyman view state centrism as a problem 
they acknowledge that as a result of globalisation, the decline of 
territorial constraints does not mean the end of the state. Rather, it 
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means a qualitative change of governance. Migration issues are therefore 
now the issues of new public policies rather than of the control of borders 
and space (2000: 396). 
A related line of state-centrism is pursued by Ferhat Tekin (2014) in his 
book: Boundaries’ Sociology: Nation, State and Border landers. He 
explored the Turkey-Iraq boundary and identified the nation-state as the 
main source of border problems. He suggested that the issue is a clear 
indication of the limits imposed arbitrarily where ethnic and state 
boundaries do not overlap with each other and where there is no 
possibility of overlapping. During the period of Ottoman Empire 
boundaries were porous and vague; and overlapping sovereignties were 
indefinable. With the establishment of Turkish Republic, both the 
concept of border and of sovereignty changed. Once the ‘Sevr syndrome’ 
was added also, the main priority in determining a Turkey-Iraq boundary 
became the security issue, the main cause of concern being that people 
living on both sides were ethnically Kurds. Hence, the humanitarian 
dimension was ignored (Tekin, 2014: 184). 
Kemal Kirisci, in his research Border Management and EU-Turkish 
Relations:  Convergence or Deadlock, stresses the military’s dominant 
presence in the field of border security. He discusses Turkey’s concerns 
with neighbours such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, and geographical 
conditions which make defence and border control difficult. He suggests 
this is further complicated because of the terrorist infiltrations by PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) that perpetuate acts of violence and terrorism 
within Turkey. Strikingly, as a consequence: ‘This often leads Turkey to 
give priority to border protection by the military rather than the 
management of the border by a civilian authority that the EU prefers’ 
(Kirisci,2007: 3, 4). As a result, Kirisci argues that: 
Under these circumstances inevitability the 
priority becomes national defence in the 
narrowest sense of the word, such as 
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preventing infiltration and militarily 
confronting such infiltration, rather than 
broader issues of public security and control, 
such as intercepting illegal migration, detecting 
forged documents and pre-empting smuggling, 
as well as enforcement of law, especially the 
Schengen acquis, that is of more immediate 
concern to the EU (2007: 22). 
 
His assessments are mainly based on the assumption that the 
harmonization of Turkey’s legislation with the EU acquis in these four 
important areas concerning ‘justice, freedom and security’ can reform 
Turkey’s border security framework and Turkey will benefit from it 
(Kirisci, 2007: 46, 47). However, there is no clear evidence with respect to 
both theoretical and empirical meaning. 
 
Similarly, Dervis et al (2004), also highlight the geographic factors and 
the borders which became conduits for PKK terrorists operating out of 
neighbouring countries. As a result, those borders have been heavily 
militarised and a good part of the Syrian border is mined (2004: 26). They 
suggest that Turkey should continue with its efforts to put into place a 
professional border control administration in close cooperation with the 
EU, stating ‘Such initiatives would also constitute an important 
confidence-building measure, besides being mechanisms for the exchange 
of expertise and know-how’ (Dervis et al, 2004: 40). As discussed above 
this approach also lacks a clear theoretical and empirical basis indicating 
in what way Turkey benefits through EU membership in the field of 
border security. 
In line with the other researchers, Altunisik examines the changing 
nature of the security environment in the Middle East after the end of 
the Cold War. She argues: 
 
The Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 and the 
developments afterwards have presented a 
major challenge to the status quo in the region. 
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The weakening of Iraq as a result not only 
upset the distribution of power in Turkey’s 
neighbourhood, but also reopened the questions 
of borders in the region with particular 
emphasis on Kurdish aspirations (2007: 69). 
 
She suggests that Turkey’s strategic culture has been dominated by the 
tradition of realpolitik which is a security-focused and state-centric 
foreign policy perspective (Altunisik, 2007: 70). 
 
In his PhD thesis: The Impact of the EU Securitization Process on the 
Border Security Framework of Turkey “Towards the Emergence of a 
Border Security Actor?” Kaya also debates the issue in terms of the EU 
securitization process and uses the notion of ‘security actor’. He argues 
that the securitization process enables Turkey to be present in the 
international arena and ‘its enhancing capability through legal, 
administrative, external, and budgetary actions in the area of border 
security will also increase Turkey’s capability to become a border security 
actor’ (2012: 175).  However, this approach is still highly state-centric and 
based on steps to gain operational control. It implies the achievement of 
‘operational control’, over fixed borders and focuses on the threats to 
territorial boundaries, to provide security. Although he acknowledges the 
dramatic change in the role and capabilities of nation states due to the 
globalization process (Kaya, 2012: 175), he suggests an enhanced state to 
state relationship to meet the new security challenges. 
 
Along with the discussions above, the existing literature on Turkey also 
questions the military’s authority over security issues. The military, 
which has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the political system 
(Cizre-Sakallıoglu, 1997: 151), considers itself the ultimate guardian of 
the democratic Republic, vis-a`-vis internal (e.g. fundamentalism, 
separatism) and the external (e.g. foreign attack) threats (Hale, 1994: 80; 
Heper and Guney, 2000: 637), and of the secular.  General Erguvenc 
defined the EU as ‘a solution to Turkey’s insecurity’ in a series of articles 
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(1999, 2000a, 2000b) and criticizes the security strategy for its over-
reliance on the military without due regard for economic, political and 
societal costs (Erguvenc 1999: 46), he argues that Turkey no longer has 
the option of resolving conflicts with its neighbours through military 
means, given that the global community no longer condones such actions.  
 
Similar to the views of Erguvenc, Ambassador Turkmen argues that 
joining the EU would eventually transform approaches to security in 
Turkey (2001: 61). They both stress that military dimensions of security 
should be considered in conjunction with other dimensions of security 
(Erguvenc 1999; Turkmen, 2001: 61). Thus, the issues related to border 
security have been discussed within the framework of the EU accession 
process and, in terms of internal security, related mainly to illegal 
migration. However, by drawing from ‘securitization theory’, Bilgin takes 
a different perspective on the issue and argues that: ‘Treating civil-
military dynamics as the main concern, the literature fails to discuss the 
‘politics of security’ (Bilgin 2007; 567). She further argues that ‘failing to 
enquire into the politics of deciding what constitutes a security problem 
would abandon the issues left on the security agenda to be governed by 
the statist and militarized understandings and practice’  (2007: 567-8). 
These discussions over the Turkish security culture illustrate that 
Turkey has responded to border security matters in the post-Cold War 
era in a way which can be described as a military-focused and state-
centric national security perspective. It is military focused because there 
has always been military authority over the production of ‘security 
knowledge’ and national security policy.  
 
2.11. Gaps in the Literature and Summary 
It is fair to say that while most of the existing literature on non-
traditional security revolves around the new threats and their referent 
objects; largely, it neglects to explore how new security issues are 
governed in practice in different contexts. The most striking gap in the 
55 
 
security literature which pertains to Turkey is that most of the studies 
are dominated by debates about Europeanization and therefore are 
limited because of their scope as much as their theoretical weaknesses - 
described here. Efforts to account for the dynamics of the new security 
environment are rare and the evidence that has been brought forward 
often is uneven and contested. What remains largely unexplored in 
Turkey however, is an understanding of border security in the context of 
the changing concepts of security and borders discussed in this thesis. 
Most analyses seem to ignore the relationship between the border 
security field and its socio-political and economic contexts. The literature 
also is limited in that primarily it relies on secondary documentary data 
rather than on empirical data. 
 
Most importantly, a review of the literature reveals that one source of 
these weaknesses is that this literature does not provide a strong 
conceptual framework for institutional change that can travel across 
different contexts and issue areas.  For a better understanding of the 
transformation process, in general, it is necessary to embrace the 
dynamics of the new security environment, changing security and border 
concepts. A specific theory such as ‘societal security’ might be a useful 
tool to understand the process better. Because understanding 
transformation requires ‘an understanding of the structure and dynamics 
of each change process’ (Olsen, 2002: 924). The new security environment 
has led to significant changes in domestic politics and continues to 
change both political structures (e.g., institutions) and policies. Constant 
transformation has become necessary to be able to keep pace with 
changing security risks. Thus, this study seeks to provide a conceptual 
framework of institutional change in the domestic realm and applies it to 
the transformation process of Turkish national security.  More 
importantly, such a framework will enable us to test the whole system in 
such a way the imminent limits are illuminated. 
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The purpose of this chapter was to conduct a survey of different 
approaches and key themes of security particularly in post-Cold War 
Security Studies and International Relations literature. The discussions 
were organized and examined along a traditional versus non-traditional 
cleavage. The fundamental difference between these two perspectives is 
the state centric perspective which is limited to military security on the 
one hand, and society or individual as the referent object with a much 
broader range of threats on the other.  
 
The discussions largely centred on whether the notion of ‘security’ should 
be broadened or not (Mearsheimer, 2005; McSweeney 1996; Wæver 1993; 
Booth 1997; Walt 1991). Traditional realists tended to argue that 
widening the security agenda risked making both scholarship and state 
policy incoherent. Others argue that the state-centric lens fails to 
understand many of the insecurities occurring within, above, and across 
the jurisdictions of the nation-states (Brown, 1998; Ayoob, 1997 Buzan, 
Waever, Wilde 1998; Wæver 1993). 
 
The need to reconsider traditional approach stems from its limitations in 
meeting the requirements of new security challenges. These limitations 
mainly are:  First, the privileged position of the military sector and the 
exclusion of other potential threats; thus, unless an environmental, 
economic or social problems interfere with the military sector, it does not 
take part in a state's security analysis. For example, the environmental 
problem of water shortage would only be considered a national security 
concern if a state threatened, or initiated, a military response against 
another state, in defence of its interests. Second, as its focus is clearly 
state-centric with the state as the referent object, it excludes sources of 
insecurity at the societal and individual level. Thus, it is unequipped 
against the intra-state threats such as identity conflicts. Even if a 
government posed an immediate and lethal threat to its citizens, this 
would not be considered a security threat within this perspective. As a 
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result, it is questionable if the traditional approach is the applicable to 
reality. As Mohammed Ayoob (1997) illustrates, traditional perspectives 
assume that the greatest threats to national security are external ones 
and thus, do not recognize intrastate conflict as being a source of 
insecurity, so that potential separatist movements do not qualify as a 
national security threat.. 
 
In the current security environment, the focus has shifted from the 
territorial security of the state to a broader and deeper security 
understanding.  The use of only military means for addressing security 
threats and challenges is increasingly perceived to be ineffective. In other 
words, border security practices based on the modern political imaginary 
seem inadequate to provide solutions in today’s multi-dimensional 
security environment. The traditional model of border security is eroding, 
while new approaches continue to develop. Therefore, the notion of border 
security has been expanded beyond the defence of the physical border 
itself. By expanding a border mentality beyond the state territorial 
boundaries, the state has not undermined the domestic front but has 
strengthened, the notion of a secure border is enlarged to include the 
sources of external threats as well. Therefore, border security is not 
compromised but rather expanded with policies defending issues beyond 
the domestic front. Thus, de-territorializing security practices make fixed 
borders less meaningful than they once were. 
 
However, this chapter does not argue that borders between states are 
obsolete or that the modern geopolitical imaginary does no longer matter 
in international relations. In other words, the strong emphasis on non-
traditional border security does not mean that traditional military and 
economic border control tasks have disappeared. Clearly, as the violence 
in Ukraine and Syria illustrates, the traditional geopolitical conﬂict over 
territorial borders is still very much a part of contemporary political life.  
Similarly, for the vast majority of illegal immigrants, border checks 
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continue to be a practical obstacle to transnational mobility, and vast 
amounts of money are paid to smugglers to evade these state controls, 
sometimes at the expense of their lives. However, this research argues 
that the concept of a fixed border of a state and its conventional 
inside/outside ways of thinking, has, to a great extent, lost its 
appropriateness in today’s world. There is an urgent need to 
reconceptualise a proper model for border security.  
 
The tremendous global changes in the security environment that have 
taken place since the early 1990s – including the end of the cold war and 
the new security risks driven by the revolution in transportation and 
communications technology – are forcing states and Turkey, in 
particular, to consider new ideas, distancing themselves from Cold-War 
conceptualisations of security, in a transformed world.  
The crucial role of the state in shaping security policies is challenged by 
the emergence of new risks and threats in today’s security environment; 
these risks and threats challenge national sovereignty and national 
security; under these circumstances, traditional means are not enough to 
deal with new threats that emerge on the global stage. Therefore, state 
capacity has to be reconsidered in the context of changing security 
notions. 
 
Having considered the new threat environment and new security era, 
there is need for a new vision of security, more appropriate to the 21st 
century. This new perspective should combine the elements of the other 
visions, but break away from the traditional modes of thought formed in 
the past which are no longer relevant. This more relevant philosophy 
might help Turkey transform its system to meet today’s security 
challenges as well as the technological and cultural realities of the 21st 
century. Transformation should provide a new philosophy and the 
building blocks to adapt new concepts, to develop new capabilities and 
structures in line with changes in the security environment. Given the 
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complexity of risks to be addressed, border security requires an 
innovative comprehensive conceptual framework. An overall approach to 
address all of these issues can be found in the concept of ‘societal 
security’, while, at the same time, considering all border interactions as a 
holistic system from global to local.  Such a system can help us to 
understand the position and role of border security in national security 
policies and thus help us to make political choices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the formulation of a research design and 
methodology adopted to achieve the main goal of the study. After 
considering the aims of the study, the research question and the complex 
nature of the research topic, the researcher decided to adopt qualitative 
research techniques supported by semi-structured interviews as the most 
appropriate choice. This choice was also influenced by the paucity of 
research and documentation on the subject matter, it was therefore 
important to use primary source information to bring new perspectives to 
the debate. 
 
In order to explain the methodological approaches, design and procedures 
of the study, the chapter is structured under five major themes. Firstly, 
the choice of the case study design is explained and justified, and 
triangulated through the addition of significant references from related 
literature. Then data sources and data collection activities are described 
and the use of selected interviews and documentary sources are justified. 
In the next section, the analysis processes of selected interviews and 
documentary sources are explained with reference to the applied models. 
Resolutions of the quality and reliability concerns of the research are 
presented in another section. The last section before the chapter 
summary refers to the challenges and limitations of the research.   
 
3.1 Rationale 
With the threat of this terrorism escalating and spilling across the border 
into the country, trafficking and migration is the top of the political 
agenda in Turkey. It is necessary to employ the full range of assets and 
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options available for the state to defeat or neutralize a growing national 
security threat to the security of its society and the sovereignty of the 
Turkish state. 
This research aimed to explain the changing perception of border security 
and how these changes could be used to improve a border security 
framework in Turkey. It gave the researcher an opportunity to evaluate 
the current border security context to discover its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Despite an increased interest in border security issues, it is surprising 
that so little research has actually been conducted on the topic, 
specifically there is no research from the changing perspectives of 
security and border as discussed in the chapter 3. Very few studies have 
focused on how the EU membership process has affected current border 
security practices and those that do lack a theoretical basis. What 
remains unexplored, however, is a new border security understanding in 
the face of changing concepts of security and border. In addition, the 
relationship between the border security field and its socio-political and 
economic context is missing. 
 
3.2 Research Aims and Research Question 
Dunleavy (2003: 33) recommends that researchers frame their research 
around ‘an intellectual problem or a paradox’, focusing on a ‘set of 
phenomena that ask for an explanation... and for which [the researcher] 
can formulate an interesting and effective answer’. Ultimately, the 
question that this thesis set out to answer was simply: How might 
Turkey increase its border security? And going on from there what 
insights the ‘societal security concept’ might offer to this question? 
 
The general and specific aims of the research were: 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
General aim 
 To critically investigate, on the basis of a case study, the new 
security agenda both in terms of policy and the intellectual 
questions it has posed since the end of the Cold War. 
Specific aims 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of the variety of border security 
practices and methods being used. 
 To determine the views of key policy makers and senior executives 
in the key border security agencies. 
 To make reliable recommendations on how to improve border 
security in Turkey in line with contemporary norms. 
 
3.3. Research Design  
I am not a ‘value free researcher’. My experiences in police forces and in 
public administration have created, of course, some preconceptions, 
attitudes and beliefs and as a result, my views on the research topic differ 
from those of an ‘outsider’. These preconceptions and beliefs necessarily 
shaped the research and methods chosen. This insider status led to more 
rapid and more complete acceptance by the participants. Therefore, 
participants were more open with me as a researcher, which resulted in a 
greater depth to the data gathered. This, of course, might have raised 
questions about objectivity. However, complete objectivity is impossible 
and qualitative methodology is not completely precise because human 
beings do not always act logically or predictably (Holloway & Wheeler 
2002:3). Adler and Adler (1987: 85) asserted that the distinction between 
researcher and participant has ‘traditionally existed more strongly in 
theory than in practice’ and that ‘objectification of the self has occurred in 
the analysis rather than the fieldwork’. For the aim of this research, after 
examining the objectives of the study and realizing the lack of previous 
study and published literature on border security in Turkey, a 
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qualitative, exploratory research design had been chosen, because it 
would conclusively describe the characteristics of the border security 
system under study.  
Examples that qualitative methods have been used successfully in this 
context are unavailable as there has almost been no research in this area. 
Hence, the lack of literature on Turkey’s border security framework 
compelled me to adopt an explorative approach. ‘Exploratory research 
tends to tackle new problems on which little or no previous research has 
been done’ (Brown, 2006: 43). So it was appropriate to best capture and 
understand the topic and the views of the key professionals in the 
decision-making process regarding border problems.  It may also be used 
to explain current practice and to make judgments and also develop 
theories. For the purpose of this study, descriptive research was used to 
obtain a picture of key professional’s views of border and security in the 
border security field, as well as their views for improving the standards of 
the current system.  
 
In addition, limited resources also necessitate a focus on a specific 
province, Kilis, at the Syrian border was selected to explore everyday 
border security as practiced in the field. Kilis was chosen because of its 
unique geographical location and diverse border problems, such as 
smuggling, terrorist activities and human trafficking. This constraint 
lent itself to the case study method, which allows the examination of a 
particular border in detail. Being confronted with exhaustive statements 
on the challenges that the state faced in implementing border security 
policy, in deciding on the case study of a single province I tried to provide 
a picture of the experiences and views of mainly security professionals 
from different posts and levels which were important for the formulation 
of policy and strategy in the security field. So rather than just focusing on 
facts, I tried to understand inside perspectives of the key people, which 
rendered my research ‘interpretive’. The exploratory nature of the 
research is also supported by the case study method. As Gerring (2004: 
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349) argues, ‘case studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an 
exploratory nature’. Lastly, the final purpose was to advance and 
contribute to a debate on an under researched issue. 
 
3.3.1. Case Study 
The case study was exploratory and aimed at uncovering the key issues 
concerning Turkey’s border security framework by focusing on 
understandings and perceptions of key professionals.  At its simplest 
definition, a case study is ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim 
to generalise across a larger set of units’ (Gerring, 2004: 342; 2007:  20). 
Yin claims the ‘distinctive need for case study research arises out of the 
desire to understand complex social phenomena (1989: 14), then 
characterises the case study’s scope as an empirical inquiry which 
‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident’ (1989: 23; 2009: 19).  
 
The first aim of the study also incorporates the examination of the 
environment and factors that have been affecting securitization processes 
by implicating some casual mechanisms and patterns within 
relationships. According to Gerring (2004: 349) ‘investigation of such 
casual mechanisms is associated with the case study research design’. In-
depth analysis of a single unit, according to the author, is quite useful in 
clarifying such casual mechanisms because the ‘style of evidence 
gathering – over-time and within-unit variation – is likely to provide 
clues into what connects a purported X to a particular Y’ (Gerring 2004: 
349).   
 
Secondly, and related to the secondary aims, exploring operative factors 
of current border practices in Turkey inevitably leads to the possibility of 
lesson learning for countries which have similar border problems to 
Turkey. What distinguishes the case study method from all other 
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methods according to the Gerring is its reliance on evidence drawn from a 
single case and its attempt, at the same time, to illuminate features of a 
broader set of cases (Gerring 2007: 29). Gerring also suggests ‘It has been 
demonstrated [that] the difference between a case study and a study is 
rarely clear-cut. Indeed, the case study is probably best understood as an 
ideal-type rather than a method with hard-and-fast rules’ (2007: 345, 
346).  More clearly, he argues that it is quite difficult to study a single 
unit which wouldn't function as a case study because in such research, 
the researcher wishes to know both the particular and the general facts 
about the unit. ‘Case studies usually perform a double function; they are 
studies (of the unit itself) as well as case studies (of a broader class of 
units)’ (Gerring 2004: 352).   
 
When we turn our attention to data collection and analysis, Yin (2009:18) 
argues that a case study inquiry ‘copes with a technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many variables of interest; relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulation and benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis’. Lastly, Yin (2009: 19) 
states the case study is a form of neither exclusively qualitative nor 
exclusively quantitative research. Gerring (2007a: 29) similarly argues 
‘the number of observations employed by a case study may be either 
small or large, and consequently may be evaluated in a qualitative or 
quantitative fashion.’ 
 
Case study design is the most appropriate option for the aims and 
rationale of this research which has many variables and relies on 
multiple data sources. It requires triangulation of the data and peer 
review to guide the collection and analysis of the data and to ensure the 
validity and reliability of both this research and the recommendations 
made here.  
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3.3.2. Triangulation   
In social science, triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or 
methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast a light upon a 
topic (Olsen 2004: 3). Rothbauer (2008: 892) defines triangulation as a 
multi-method approach to data collection and data analysis. The basic 
idea underpinning the concept of triangulation according to the author is 
the phenomena under study can be understood best when approached 
with a variety or a combination of research methods. Bryman (2003: 
1142) argues that triangulation refers to the use of more than one 
approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance 
confidence in the ensuing findings. Because much social research is 
founded on the use of a single research method, and as such may suffer 
from limitations related with that method or from the specific application 
of it, triangulation offers the prospect of improved assurance. With a 
parallel approach, Denzin (1989: 307) states that ‘by combining multiple 
observations, theories, methods and data sources, [researchers] can hope 
to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-methods, single-
observer and single-theory studies’.  
 
Another significant point about triangulation is the fact it is recognised 
as an important method of ensuring quality and validity of the research 
(Yin 2001; Bryman 2003; Patton 1990, 2002). Additionally, the term is 
usually referred to multi-method studies by researchers. Having a multi-
method approach and three sources to gather data and three methods for 
analysing them, it is therefore appropriate to employ triangulation 
approach to the research. Denzin (1978, 1989) extended the idea of 
triangulation beyond its conventional association with research methods 
and designs by distinguishing four forms of triangulation. The research 
adopts the methodological triangulation of this classification, which is 
proposed as the most common of the meanings of the term by relevant 
literature.  
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In this case study, triangulation involved the collection and analysis of 
information from multiple sources, which includes in-depth interviews 
with officials and executives from different positions and academicians; a 
review of relevant primary and secondary documentary sources. Other 
benefits of the triangulation for the study is the validation of interview 
data with documentary sources, closing the gaps in the interview data 
and balancing the data sources as interviews contain more data about 
later periods while documentary sources involve earlier periods.  
 
3.3.3. Peer Review 
Internal reliability is established through triangulation, member checks, 
peer examination, and the reduction of bias. Peer review provided an 
external check of the researcher’s process and the reliability of her/his 
conclusions (Creswell, 2014: 202,203) In this case study, peer reviews 
were conducted by asking some experienced district governors who were 
PhD students at different Universities to read the researcher’s thesis and 
provide feedback on the analysis and recommendations. The intent here 
was to ensure that the researcher’s conclusions made sense and were 
consistent with the analysis of the data collected. 
 
3.4. Data collection methods  
According to Parahoo (1997:52, 325), a research instrument is ‘a tool used 
to collect data. An instrument is a tool designed to measure knowledge 
attitude and skills’. In this research, data were collected during the semi-
structured elite interviews.  Yin (2009: 102) proposes the interview as one 
of the most important sources of evidence in case studies. With a similar 
idea, the research employs semi-structured elite interviews as the major 
method for data collection. Obtaining data from participants with 
different experience prevents bias and thus increasing credibility of the 
information.  
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3.4.1. Background 
I firstly would like to talk to people within the key agencies so that I can 
identify the main issues of current border security framework that are of 
concern to those agencies, and to determine their perspectives on border 
security. Secondly, i would like to collect relevant data from within the 
organisation, by interviewing members and taking written notes and 
reading some official reports. To achieve this, i would need access to 
members of the agencies in order to gather data relating to their 
perceptions to set up a framework to tackle with the problems they faced. 
Since this research adopted qualitative research technique, data would be 
obtained through semi-structured elite interviews. Semi-structured elite 
interviews have been presented as the major source of data for the study 
by several authors (Burnham et al.2008: 231; Patton, 2002: 342; Pierce, 
2008: 118, Yin 2009: 102). Brinkmann and Kvale (2015: 171) define elites 
as ‘persons who are leaders or experts in a community, usually in 
powerful positions.’ Pierce (2008, p. 119), considers some examples of 
elites to be ‘ministers, MPs, senior civil servants, business leaders, union 
leaders, etc.’  
  
The goal of using interviews in this thesis is to attempt to provide a more 
complete picture of the changes that have occurred in the border security 
field over the period of post-Cold War.  Moreover, they will be used to 
help qualitatively determine the effects of the border and its 
securitization on border communities. However, this is a method which 
requires the ability to draw interesting and meaningful results. 
Obtaining useful results depends on the ability to read and interpret the 
interviews (Piore, 2006: 145). 
Although these interviews have proven to be very helpful for this 
research, they present methodological problems at the same time. When I 
decided on this research I planned first acquiring all the related data, 
and then conducting the interviews with questions based from analysis of 
the data. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, I could not find enough 
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data until after all the interviews had been completed.  Furthermore, 
some of the key decision making actors such as defence and interior 
ministers that I had hoped to interview for this thesis refused to be 
interviewed.   Fortunately, I could manage to conduct interviews with 
elites in all key agencies in the border security field who were extremely 
helpful and encouraging. 
 
When this research topic was being explored I naturally thought of trying 
to interview some local people involved in illegal cross-border activities. I 
soon recognized the difficulties in setting up, conducting and having such 
interviews approved because of the nature of the topic. As there has been 
no legitimate authority at the other side of the border, it was also 
impossible to conduct interviews with Syrian border agencies. 
 
Research respondents were chosen because of their close involvement in 
the decision making and implementation phases of border and/or national 
security. I interviewed a number of high ranking executives in Ankara 
from the military, police, coast guard, customs and gendarmerie. That 
included an interview with the Secretary General of National Security 
Council. I also interviewed the most senior officials (number of top 
officials including the governor and chief of staff from key border security 
agencies) in Kilis, a southern province of Turkey at the Syrian border. 
This also gave me the opportunity to carry out some field observations. 
This gave me an appreciation of the unique nature of the Turkey- Syrian 
border and the challenges border security agencies face in stopping illegal 
cross-border activities, when the border is often little more than a two-
meter ditch or a line of razor wire.  
 
The candour of most of the respondents was striking. A small number of 
individuals seemed uncomfortable about speaking openly and relied on 
bureaucratic rhetoric. This was something I considered when planning 
this research and I was not surprized that I witnessed it; it is perhaps 
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understandable in such an environment. Ultimately, I interviewed 27 
respondents – all of whom were key actors in the fields of security and 
governance in Turkey. I am satisfied that was enough to reach 
saturation.  
 
3.4.2. Interview Methods 
For this research I used semi-structured interviews rather than 
structured or unstructured interviews.  I chose the semi-structured 
interview style because I wanted to give the interview subjects latitude in 
their responses. To allow their words and experience to stand out, but at 
the same time ensure some structure to help move the interview forward 
in a consistent and systematic way. As Weiss (1994: 49) notes, allowing 
interview subjects to speak on their own terms, as long as it is near the 
topic of interest, will produce more robust data. Hesse-Biber and Leavy 
(2011) believe that semi structured interviews allow for a more natural 
conversation appropriate for qualitative research.  This more 
conversational form can take the interview in unexpected places which 
may elicit valuable information (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011:102). 
 
Part of the reason I did not use highly structured interviews is because of 
the varying positions and locations of those interviewed. It would not be 
helpful to ask the same questions both military and customs or police as 
each has different story and perspective. These interviews were designed 
to reflect their practical experience of border security. The interviews 
ranged in length from 20 minutes to nearly two hours. All but one of the 
27 interviews was done in person at the place of the interviewee’s work 
places. Data were collected using a tape recorder and transcripts were 
made. The interviews were conducted with a focus on a previously 
circulated list of key interview topics and questions drawn from the 
literature, and from some preliminary discussions with the professionals 
working in agencies responsible for border security.  
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In some cases, additional questions were asked to prompt subjects to 
address important points that were not eliciting adequate answers to the 
standard questions. Moreover, often for clarification, a response would 
necessitate another question that was not on the list. I generally asked 
the same questions to all those interviewed but often had to modify the 
questions depending on the position and location of the interview subject.  
 
Participants were assured that their names, personal information would 
remain confidential, and would not be disclosed to anyone. With their 
consent and permission, I used the names and job title of four of the 
interviewees. Joining the interview and participating in the research was 
up to the participant on a voluntary basis. The data was kept 
confidential, as participants’ identifiable information was coded. The data 
were thus qualitative in nature, and the NVIVO software program 
appropriate for handling such data was used for organising and 
undertaking a detailed analysis. 
 
 
3.4.3. Interview technique  
 The researcher used the following technique for interviews:  
 The researcher conducted the interviews with the participants 
using an interview guide with semi-structured questions.  
 The researcher maintained eye contact with the participants.  
 The researcher started interviews with broad questions, such as 
“What is your opinion on Turkey’s current border security 
framework?”, and continued with more specific questions such as 
“How effective are the physical measures such as walls?”  
 The researcher used a semi-structured interview guide, but the 
line of questioning and responses from participants maintained 
flexibility and consistency.  
 The researcher asked if there were more comments at the end. 
This assisted in closure of the interview.  
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The following interviewees provided data on the border security 
framework of Turkey: 
 Seyfullah Hacimuftuoglu, Governor, Secretary General of National 
Security Council and former Deputy Minister of Interior Ministry. 
 Faruk Ozlu, Deputy Undersecretary of Defence Industries. 
 Suleyman Tapsiz, governor of Kilis. 
 Professor Dr Ali Karaosmanoglu, chairman of Defence Reform 
Board and Director of the Foreign Policy and Peace Research 
Centre of Ihsan Dogramaci Foundation. 
 M01 – senior executive in Interior Ministry 
 M02 – senior executive in Interior Ministry 
 M03 – civil servant in Interior Ministry responsible for border 
issues 
 M04 - civil servant in Interior Ministry responsible for border 
issues 
 M05 – district governor worked responsible for a part of western 
border of Turkey. 
 M06 – district governor 
 M07 – district governor worked at Iraq and Iran borders of Turkey. 
 M08 – district governor responsible for border gate and refugees. 
 M09 – retired general worked in border security sector 
 M10– senior executive in Military. 
 M11– senior executive in Military. 
 M12 – senior executive in Police Force. 
 M13 – senior executive in Police Force, responsible for fight 
against terrorism. 
 M14– senior executive in Police Force 
 M15 – high level executive in Police Force 
 M16 – high level executive in Police Force, responsible for drug 
smuggling. 
 M17 – police officer working at a border gate 
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 M18 - senior executive in Customs 
 M19 – senior executive in Customs 
 M20 – senior executive in Customs 
 M21 – senior executive in Cost Guard. 
 M22 – senior executive in Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible 
for security issues. 
 M23 – senior executive in Secretariat- General of National 
Security Council 
 
3.4.4. Archival Research  
Yin (2003) suggests that archival research can be utilized in combination 
with other qualitative data methods thereby contributing to the 
construction of a case study. Burnham et al. (2008: 208) emphasise the 
importance of documentary and archival sources and propose that they 
‘offer great opportunities for political scientists to develop novel accounts 
and interpretations of significant events’. Thus, in the project, the focus 
of archival research was on the primary and secondary documentary data 
related to border security framework in Turkey. The contents of cited 
official papers were examined during the process of this archival 
research.  The author also used retrospective data enclosed in EU 
projects and legal regulations obtained from the Ministry of Interior, the 
Border Security Bureau. This method also shed light on the differences 
between discourses of the official papers and actual practices with regard 
to the topic of border security.  
 
3.4.5. The Primary and Secondary Documentary Data  
Many political scientists, according to Vromen (2010: 261), study existing 
documents or text in their research and most of these are ‘primary 
sources which are original documents produced by political actors 
ranging from executive, parliamentary or judicial arms of governments, 
policy-making agencies or non-governmental organisations’. However, 
Burnham et al. (2008: 212) argue, at the same time, ‘documents do not 
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speak for themselves but only acquire significant meaning when situated 
within a context set by vigorous analytical and methodological 
assumptions.’ 
 
I have used documents to support and validate the evidence provided by 
respondents. The role of documentary sources have mostly been kept in 
the background which helped understanding the context of the research 
and facilitating the analysis of the interviews results. If we distinguish 
between the two types of documentary sources, primary documentary 
data sources used in the research were obtained from mentioned 
organisations and/or their websites and they consist of textual data in the 
form of the EU Commission Progress Reports, the Accession Partnership 
Paper, the National Action Plan Towards the Implementation of Turkey’s 
Integrated Border Management Strategy and the official reports of 
governorships.  
 
Secondary documentary data sources, in the form of media records were 
obtained from major newspapers’ archives, organizational publications 
obtained from related organizations and think-tanks such as SETA and 
other literature pieces were obtained from major libraries both in the UK 
and Turkey.  
 
Table 1: Type, Utility and Aims of Data Sources  
Data Source  Type of Data  Utility of Data  Aims to Use  
Semi-
Structured  
Elite 
Interviews  
Tape records of 
interviews with 
participants, their 
transcriptions and 
translations.  
  
Provided in 
participants’ 
experiences, 
knowledge and 
interpretation 
with their own 
words, provided 
Assisted in 
exploring practices, 
processes and forces 
that influenced 
current border 
security context of 
the country. Helped 
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evidence about 
the current 
border security 
understanding 
to understand 
reasons for the need 
of a new approach.  
Primary Data  
Source  
Material and  
Documentary  
Evidence  
Official Records  
(Legislations, 
Regulations of state 
departments and 
projects 
implemented with 
the EU)  
 
Publications and 
reports of public 
services, 
governorships and 
the European 
Union.  
  
Provided official 
and semi-official 
accounts about 
the context and 
the research 
questions. 
Facilitated the 
analysis of 
interview 
transcriptions.   
Assisted in 
discovering current 
contextual 
framework of the 
period, 
understanding and 
analysing factors 
shaping border 
security practices in 
Turkey.  
Secondary  
Data Source  
Material and  
Documentary  
Evidence  
 Research produced 
and published by  
influential think 
tanks,   
Material from  
Media Sources,  
Material from other 
literature in the 
field.  
  
Provided 
background 
information and 
material which 
facilitated the 
analysis of the 
interview results.   
Assisted in 
discovering 
contextual 
background of the 
period and 
analysing some 
factors affecting 
border security 
framework of 
Turkey.  
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3.5. Data Analysis  
The research adopted a qualitative content analysis method with a 
‘directed approach’ for analysing the data, in which ‘analysis starts with a 
theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes’ (Hsieh 
and Shannon 2005: 1277). Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1281) argue that 
‘the goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or 
extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory’. The technique I 
used was to re-read the interview transcripts several times; enough to be 
familiarised with the data, and then attempt to identify the key issues 
and the relations between them. Mason (2002: 149) argues that ‘an 
interpreting reading will involve you in constructing and or documenting 
a version of what you think the data mean or represent, or what you 
think you can infer from them.’ 
 
The next stage involved classification of the key issues in the data, noting 
the sources, how often they occur and coding by using the predetermined 
themes prepared in line with the conceptual model of the study. As 
classification was carried out, recoding or redefining the key issues was 
necessary. Eventually, by interpreting the respondent’s views on these 
issues and the relationships between them, it became possible to 
recognise clear patterns and emergent findings in the fieldwork. 
 
3.5.1. Coding  
This stage of the study is conducted with the use of NVivo-10 software 
program by coding major themes. Bernard and Ryan (2010: 76) argues 
that ‘thematic codes are the most common kinds of codes. There are the 
codes we use marking instances of themes in a set of data.’ Coding 
basically fulfils two functions: data management; and explore and 
interpret the data (Boeije 2010: 119). Burnham et al. (2008: 245) put it 
as, ‘the point of this task [coding] is to make a judgement about the data 
in the light of the theoretical framework. In line of these arguments, I 
used a selective coding method which helped to make connections 
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between the categories in order to make sense of what is happening in 
the field. This is also a part of analytical induction. Jorgensen (1989: 110) 
argues that ‘As you sort, sift, arrange, and rearrange the data and 
analytic labels and comments about them, it will be increasingly 
necessary to become more directly and explicitly involved in theory and 
theorizing.’ 
 
3.5.2. Clustering  
Weiss (1998: 286) defines ‘clustering’ as ‘the procedure of putting and 
grouping similar things together.’ ‘Such a method is not only data driven 
but also allows a researcher to see patterns in large data sets with a large 
number of codes’ (Guest and Mclellan 2003: 195). Thus, the researcher 
also benefited from using a clustering method in order to examine the 
strength of the similarities between emergent categories by the help of 
the NVivo-10 software program. Patton (2002, p.442) argues ‘computers 
and software are tools that assist analysis. Software doesn't really 
analyse qualitative data’. Thus, clustering is used as an exploratory 
simplification tool for analysis and it helps simplify qualitative analysis. 
 
3.5.3. Data Analysing Process  
The data analysis process was the most challenging part of the research 
as responses of 27 interviewees were transcribed in a software program 
called NVivo-10. After coding all the data from interviews, I reached the 
first analytical results (initial findings) used for the research. After 
completing the first stage of coding of the data the researcher reached 
initial categories and then recoded these categories in order to provide for 
reliability and validity of the data results. To do so, the data was retested 
or recoded in order to prevent any possible biases from occurring over the 
course of the study.  
 
To aid understanding, the researcher made use of visualizations of the 
emergent categories in accordance with their coding frequency. The 
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coding and visualization of emergent categories verified the qualitative 
analysis was based on a systematic data reduction process. I also used 
cluster analyses which provided me with an opportunity to see the 
similarities between emergent categories. As understood from the chosen 
analytical methods, including interviews and archival research, the data 
was triangulated from different resources as discussed before. Thus, the 
analysis benefited from the perceptions drawn from personal experiences 
and first-hand experiences, and the researcher used qualitative data to 
enrich and brighten the picture. 
 
3.6. Quality of the research 
This research reflects my personal position and while my views are 
shared by many others, they by no means shared by all. For the 
assessment of the research quality, this research would never aim to 
achieve concrete findings that were prevalent one time to another and 
one border to another because of the nature of the subject. It can change 
according to time and place, and every border display different 
characteristics. Even the same border can exhibit different 
characteristics from time to time. However, instead, this research aimed 
to reach a new philosophical perspective in evaluating border security 
framework and practices in Turkey on a new conceptual basis. 
 
Regarding the judgement of the quality of documentary sources, Scott 
(1990: 19) argues that ‘Whether it is actually what it purports to be?’, and 
continues to argue that ‘credibility is closely related with authenticity 
and concerns the accuracy and sincerity of the author of the project’ 
(Scott, 1990: 22). To overcome this problem, Burnham et al. (2008: 210) 
recommend that the researcher needs to pay attention to the conditions 
under which the document was produced and the interests which may 
have affected the author. With regard to the genuineness of a document, 
primary documents consisting of the official reports, official archival 
documents should not have such a problem. Likewise, secondary 
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documentary data sources such as publications of some institutions are 
also unlikely to have an issue of authenticity. Other literature, on the 
other hand, mostly consists of scientific studies created within the 
academic system. On the other hand, the choice of a digital recording 
machine for the majority of interviews assured reliable data compared to 
the use of written notes of interviews. 
 
In line with Burnham et al. triangulation approach is adopted and this 
provided a useful tool to cope with this diverse data from numerous data 
sources to validate each other. Triangulation can contribute both to the 
reliability (that is, the extent to which the application of the same 
research design produces the same result each time it is used under the 
same condition with the same subjects) and validity (that is, that the 
research leads to valid conclusions) of the case study.  
 
I spent long hours in order to collect credible and relevant data and to 
achieve a valid and reliable outcome during the fieldwork, conducting 
interviews with police chiefs, high ranking military personnel, high 
ranking representatives from cost guard, gendarmerie, district governors, 
governors, deputy minister of National Defence Ministry and Secretary 
General of National Security Council; carrying out direct observations 
and examining documents and archive materials could be counted.  Thus 
the case study’s ‘unique strength’ (Yin, 2003: 8), the ability to deal with a 
full range of evidence was demonstrated.  
 
3.7. Research Challenges and Limitations 
The thesis is predominantly theoretical, conceptual and contextual in its 
approach.  This is both a strength and a weakness. While it is easy to 
observe traditional way of border security empirically as barriers, my 
focus in this thesis, however, has been the importance of other key actors’ 
interests and their power of reshape the border, such as society.  Thus, 
the real challenge in that context was the ‘real-life’ aspect of the research.   
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Therefore, I used my inside knowledge acquired from long years in police 
force and governorship to collect data from a wide variety of sources.  
However, researching and making determination about trends in security 
sector is full of problems in terms of reaching information.  To begin with, 
the data acquired from the government fails to measure the successes of 
border security framework because increased security measures at the 
border may cause a professionalization of illegal activities, by either 
scaring away of smaller operators or arresting less skilled individuals 
because of security enhancements. In addition, this can serve as a 
pushing factor towards more sophisticated techniques.  
 
The second major challenge I encountered was that so little research had 
actually been conducted on the topic. After my first unfruitful attempts to 
collect literature pieces, I made a number of phone calls with professors, 
associate professors who were likely to give me the correct directions to 
find my way. However, it was really a disappointment. I was told that 
there was no research on Turkey’s border security framework. Struggling 
with searching any data or literature, I discovered that very few studies 
had focused on how the EU membership process would affect the current 
border security practices, particularly with regard to migration issues. 
However, many of them were lack of conceptual basis and based on some 
personal assumptions. What remains unexplored, however, is the current 
border security understanding in the face of changing concepts of security 
and border.  
 
The third major challenge was the wide scope of the research topic and 
complexity. The amount of data required for a comprehensive 
understanding went well beyond the researcher’s anticipation and 
dispersed in the national security framework. The researcher tried to 
overcome this by objective selection and reduction of the material. As a 
result, you had to put information pieces together as a researcher. It was 
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not simple as it sounds because much of the information regarding border 
security was classified. 
  
The selection and reach of interview respondents was among the 
significant challenges and overcome by the researcher’s previous role in 
the Turkish bureaucracy. Another challenge was the difficulty to conduct 
interviews with ordinary local people who somehow had connections with 
illegal activities, but not professional criminals. The nature of the topic 
and their possible position against the law created an unsurmountable 
obstacle to conduct an interview with them. However, some of them made 
some valuable comments on the issue. 
 
The other disappointment was my inability to interview the defence and 
interior ministers and deputy minister of interior ministry, as they have, 
by law, the main responsibility for border security. However, fortunately, 
deputy ministers of National Defence agreed to be interviewed in their 
place. Despite prior official approval, I also experienced difficulties in 
arranging interviews with some police chiefs who refused to be recorded 
or to answer questions directly. As I described earlier, I had considered 
this in my research design and their refusal does not in my view impact 
the validity or reliability of the research. 
 
Conceptually and theoretically, the most prominent limitation of the 
research is to make a distinction between state and society. Modern 
states, today, are infiltrated by and integrated into multiple, overlapping 
networks of power and practice that extend into society within and 
beyond state boundaries and encompass a range of non-state actors 
(Held, 1995). A singular conception of the state security is therefore 
problematic. The state is integrated into society but simultaneously 
stands apart from it, and perhaps attains unity only as a referent object 
to be ‘secured’ at an ideological level (Ringmar, 1996). State security is 
therefore intimately connected to societal security or vice versa.  
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The second conceptual limitation was the definition of security as a 
concept. As Smith argues, there is ‘no neutral place to stand and 
pronounce on the meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are 
theory-dependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments’ 
(Smith, 2005: 18). This can be applied equally to the framing of security 
in the project. However, the research reached the conceptual purpose of 
this thesis though which was to provide a starting point for future 
research.  To this end future directions of research must be empirically 
informed and, in terms of non-traditional way of border security, analysis 
must rest on people doing their border work. 
 
In the interests of clarity, the researcher has made a distinction between 
traditional and non-traditional methods for analytical purposes. The 
researcher considers non-traditional security as an opposite concept to 
traditional security concept which views individual states as the only 
referent object and military as means for protection. On the other hand, 
according to non-traditional concepts state is still the major concern but 
it is not necessarily the only referent object. Likewise, external military 
threat is no longer the major threat to national security. The aim of this 
analytical differentiation is to pull together some of the key themes and 
issues which are expected to contribute to this research, as the most 
dangerous threats are generated by the security identity nexus in the 
new security agenda.   
 
3.8. Ethical Issues 
I carried out the research in line with the Ethics Policy of the University 
of Portsmouth. As this chapter shows, I designed, reviewed and 
undertook the research in a way that ensured its integrity and quality. I 
started my fieldwork after ethical approval of University’s ethics 
committee. I gave all respondents an information sheet that provided 
them with the aim, purpose and intended use of the data.  None of the 
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respondents was a member of what would usually be considered to be a 
vulnerable group.  I ensured that there were no specific risks in relation 
to their participation in the research and none of the participants raised 
any concerns about the research and its use. 
At first, all respondents were guaranteed anonymity and this was 
confirmed by an information sheet handed over to the participants. Four 
of them declared that I could use their open identity. All participation in 
the study was voluntary. At the beginning of each interview, all 
participants were reminded that they could withdraw at any time. They 
freely gave their consent and a consent form was signed which I then 
stored in a secure place.  All participants were assigned a unique 
reference number and all their contributions to the thesis are attributed 
to that reference number. I have retained the recordings and 
transcriptions in an encoding database.   
 
I conducted the research in a way that minimised harm or risk to the 
respondents.  All interviews and focus groups were conducted in places 
and at times mutually agreed in advance.  All respondents chose to be 
interviewed in their workplaces except for one. To the best of my 
knowledge no pressure was put on respondents either to participate in 
the research or to present their views in a particular way.  I also ensured 
that there was no personal gain from this opportunity for the 
participants. I selected respondents for interview on the basis of their 
knowledge on border security. I applied purposive sampling techniques to 
ensure that all the main views from key agencies were represented in the 
study. I tried to ensure that the independence and impartiality of the 
research was clear.  There were no conflicts of interest or partiality in the 
study though it was inevitable that my research was influenced by my 
own assumptions and beliefs as an insider.   
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3.9. Summary 
This chapter described the research methodology. The principal aim of 
the research required a deep understanding of main factors affecting 
current border security framework and the casual relationships between 
these factors in the everyday practices. Taking into consideration the lack 
of research, the complexity and comprehensiveness of the topic and a 
need for an in-depth examination made a case study the most possible 
design selection for the research. The choice of a case study enabled a 
logical progress of the research with its variables, reliance on multiple 
data sources, a need for triangulation of the data coupled with an initial 
theoretical model to guide the collection and analysis of the data. 
Triangulation is employed in the research to provide validation of the 
findings and completion of any omissions and gaps.   
 
To be able to conduct the research, data were collected through archival 
research and in depth-interviews with a purposive sample of research 
participants as a major source of data; the semi-structured elite 
interviews with high ranking personnel in key border security agencies 
and academicians. Whilst the data analysis was carried out in an 
objective and open-minded manner, it was inevitably, shaped by my own 
knowledge and experience in police organisation and deputy governor 
responsible for Sarp Border Gate, one of the busiest in Turkey. 
 
In order to provide insightful evidence to determine the main problems 
and the solutions, participants were carefully selected from the ones who 
worked in the field in their career and had great knowledge and 
experience on the issue. Other sources of data have been the primary and 
secondary documents in the shape of legislations, official documents, 
official publications, international organisation documents, literature 
pieces, media materials. While elite interview transcriptions have been 
mainly used for the exploration of the research question and core analysis 
of discussion, documentary sources have been used for providing 
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background information, facilitating the analysis of interview results and 
filling some blanks left by the interviews. Elite interviews, on the other 
hand, are transcribed, translated to English and analysed with a 
qualitative approach. 
 
Despite the appropriateness of the research strategy, design and 
methodological approaches the process proved to be challenging. The first 
major challenge was related to the lack of research on the topic. The 
second major challenge was the wide scope of the research topic and 
complexity. This problem was dealt with objective selection and reduction 
of the material. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
FROM NATIONAL (TERRITORIAL) SECURITY TO 
SOCIETAL SECURITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, the defence of the nation has been viewed as the 
primary duty of the state, and has been understood as protection of 
territory. All around the world emperors, kings and heads of state 
concentrated on stopping outside attacks by enemies who were bent on 
seizing land, resources, or people. However, rapid developments in 
communication and transport technologies is blurring the distinction 
between the internal and external, and destabilising related concepts: 
sovereignty, territoriality and security. The old notion of border is fading 
away and the concept of security must be adapted to these changes. In 
this information age, simply securing the borders against attacks by 
another country’s army is not adequate because ‘the principal focus of the 
new insecurity is society rather than the state’ (Waever et al 1993: 2). 
Thus, border security must be more than just defending territory or a 
narrow band. Too narrow a definition of ‘border security’ can lead to 
inappropriate policies that can risk the whole system. Such a definition, 
in fact, is based on narrow approaches to security. 
During the Cold War era, security was overwhelmingly a matter of the 
state’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. It identified military 
power as the primary tool in the maintenance of state’s sovereignty and 
national security. However, due to economic expansion, financial 
integration, spread of global investment and production, rapid 
developments in communication and transportation technologies 
traditional state-centric thinking has been increasingly challenged.   That 
traditional approach to security was viewed as inadequate to defend new 
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security challenges and therefore since the late 1980s, security studies 
have witnessed a broadening and deepening process. It has moved away 
from merely military concerns and included economic, societal, political 
and environmental issues, focusing on people rather than the state 
(Sheehan, 2005: 44). In other words, military concerns have been 
replaced by the other types of threats in the hierarchy. Buzan argues that 
‘increasing securitisation of two issues’ came to the agenda ‘that had 
traditionally been thought of as low politics: the international economy 
and the environment’. (1997: 7). 
This paradigmatic shift has been identified as broadening and deepening 
of the security concept. Broadening security means that security cannot 
to be limited to military discourse but should instead incorporate the 
economic, the political, the environmental, and the societal domains 
which are both causes and effects of security. On the other hand, 
deepening is related to the referent object of security. It means that 
security issues which needed to be addressed cannot only be in reference 
to the state, but also to people, nongovernmental sectors and the 
international community. Critical theorists, therefore, needed to go 
‘beyond realism’ (Shaw, 1994: 62). 
This chapter concentrates on the evolution of the concept of security from 
its traditional ‘territorial’ base through to more ‘broadened’ and 
‘deepened’ concepts and their impacts on border security in particular to 
meet the main objective of this project. The general aim is to explore the 
new security agenda both in terms of policy and intellectual questions it 
has posed since the end of the Cold War. It, thus, moves beyond the 
conventional ‘national’ paradigm, while exploring the concept of societal 
security, and in doing so, questions whether the traditional (national) 
concepts of security in the post-Cold War era are still relevant.  
Most of the academic literature hitherto has dealt with national security 
issues from an international and realist point of view. This approach has 
consequently neglected the internal dynamics of state security dilemmas 
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as conventional state-centric (territorial or national) security allows only 
for an external location of a threat (Bishai, 2000: 161). Therefore, this 
chapter also studies the likely impact of societal security on state 
national security and border security policies. It focuses three main 
questions: How can society replace the state as a referent object? What is 
societal identity and how is it threatened? And, how can societies defend 
themselves against the threats? This chapter, thus, will discuss the 
application of the concept of societal security to border security. This 
application allows the argument that the most pressing threat to state 
national security is within the territory, not from the other side of the 
borders.  There is in fact a strong argument that there is no traditional 
‘other side of the border’ any more, therefore, we need a new paradigm. 
The need for a new paradigm of security is associated with two sets of 
dynamics: first, societal security is needed in response to the complexity 
and the interconnectedness of both old and new security threats, from 
ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, 
and terrorism to economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to 
acquire transboundary dimensions and move beyond traditional notions 
of security with its focus on external military aggressions alone. Second, 
the concept of societal security provides an inclusive approach with wide 
range of new opportunities to tackle such threats in an integrated 
manner. Contemporary security risks and threats cannot be tackled 
through conventional mechanisms alone. Instead, they require a new 
consensus that acknowledges the linkages and the interdependencies 
between society’s needs and national security. In other words, it provides 
us new tools to convert old mechanisms and create new ones. 
Therefore, systematic and empirically grounded research on societal 
security will contribute to border security in a number of ways. First, 
‘societal security based-border security strategies’ will enhance societal 
cohesion within each society and among societies in a global framework. 
Second, it will bring knowledge and data together that illuminates the 
interaction between the material dimensions of border security 
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(infrastructure, everyday security practices, etc.) and the perceptions of 
society, to create greater security safeguards. Third, the research will 
enable the development of security solutions that will avoid the deadlocks 
and dilemmas of national security strategies based on territory. 
 
4.1. Evolving Conceptions of National Security 
Throughout the Cold War, under the influence of realist views security 
was conceived as being coterminous with military security as against 
other states’ military power (Booth, 2005: 2). Realism identifies military 
power as the primary tool in the maintenance of a given state’s 
sovereignty and national security. National security is referred to 
territorial state and focuses mainly on the political and military sectors 
(Buzan et al, 1998: 119). This undermines a proper understanding of 
security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’ (Sheehan, 
2005: 6). 
Since the 1980s and 1990s the world has witnessed a dual process in the 
security studies. One aspect of this process is separation in three key 
elements. First the referent object: the question of whose security is to be 
guaranteed; second the spatial aspect: the extension from national to 
regional, international and global security and third, the 
conceptualization of risks and threats. However, we have witnessed a 
duality of process simultaneous to the first, a separation has gradually 
disappeared and meanings of internal and external, national and human, 
military and economic, territorial and global security have merged into 
an extended concept of security over the last fifty years (Daase, 2010: 27). 
 
4.1.1. Referent Object of Security 
Since the beginning of the Westphalian state system, the state 
established itself as a guarantor for the safety of its citizens. Due to the 
dominance of Realism, what characterized the traditional approach to 
security was the focus on the state as the referent object of security. State 
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security can only be defined in terms of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. According to the realist views, the international system is 
anarchic (lacking a supranational authority) and consists of sovereign 
states, each pursuing its own national interest and power in order to 
secure survival of the state. Since states are inherently insecure because 
of anarchy, they are compelled to ensure that they have enough power to 
fight against threats from other states in order to secure their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and to deter others. Thus, the 
traditional realist views have placed the main emphasis on military 
threats, hence, also on military strength as the most reliable safeguard of 
‘national security’. As a result, security in international relations was 
understood primarily as state security by the safeguarding of the nation’s 
territory and the defence of national borders in the face of other states. 
This security understanding was called ‘National Security’ by Hans 
Morgenthau (1954), John Herz (1950) and others. This realist 
understanding of security suggest that all states live in a self-help system 
and their first and foremost duty is to assure national survival, ‘In 
anarchy, security is the highest end’ (Waltz 1979: 126). Thus, there must 
be two key components to traditional security views: territory and 
sovereignty. However, where is nation then? Even though the term 
‘national security’ was preferred, this might have been a misuse, because 
nations are not the same as states, except for a genuine nation states 
(Japan, for instance) where nation and state are almost coterminous 
(Buzan et al.1998, Waever et al. 1993). Therefore, what the Realists were 
really referring to was the security of the territorial presence. 
The rising incapability of the traditional security approach to cope with 
new security threats, caused the world to witness some attempts to 
modify this security strategy, using the term ‘common security’, without 
any radical rejection of its focus on state security. The term was used in 
the Palme Commission's 1982 report Common Security. A Blueprint for 
Survival. Its main message was that security under conditions of anarchy 
and high levels of armaments required ‘mutual restraint and proper 
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appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age […] the pursuit of security 
can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, 
at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned’ (p. 138). 
Common Security was thus envisaged as a way of resolving the well-
known ‘security dilemma’. However, the state remained the referent 
object of security and the focus remained on threats from other states, 
primarily military threats, against which a military defence was 
essential. Another extension of the state-centric concept of security was 
‘Collective Security’, which was, in a sense, more radical than Common 
Security because it envisaged a transfer of powers from the state to 
supranational authorities. However, it did not address the fundamental 
problematic areas of traditional approach, instead it sought to dissuade 
attack through deterrence and it did not change anything about the 
referent object.  
The reality that no national security apparatus on its own has the 
capacity to handle security issues calls for the cooperation of states. 
However, internationalisation of security did not solve the referent object 
problem. The term ‘international security’ still refers to inter-state 
cooperation in security issues. In other words, it does still take the state 
as the only referent object. However, it departs from the Realist 
assumptions by arguing that cooperation among security-seeking states 
is possible even in the absence of an overarching framework that could 
coerce states to keep their promises (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). 
According to this approach institutions, conventions, regimes and 
organizations are seen as the principal tools for the multilateral 
preservation of international security (Martin 1992; Haftenforn et al, 
1999). 
Finally, the concept of global security goes beyond even international 
security. While international security still refers primarily to states, 
global security refers to human beings all over the world. ‘Global security 
often goes hand in hand with human security and integrates measures to 
protect the environment and the climate, to secure access to food and 
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clean water, and to end civil strife and violent conflict’ (Daase, 2010:31). 
These discussions were taken a step further by the concepts of human 
security and societal security. While human security take individuals as 
referent objects, societal security consider human collectivises as 
referents. 
 
4.1.2. Spatial Aspect 
This element focuses on the geographical scope of security. It deals with 
the geographical concerns that security should encompass. Traditional 
security policy can only be applied to a national level confined within the 
national boundaries because of anarchy and the self-help system. Waltz 
(1979: 109) defines it as ‘world-shaking problems cry for global solutions, 
but there is no global agency to provide them’. In other words, in anarchy, 
as there is no central authority, it is not possible to design security 
policies beyond the boundaries. National security therefore has remained 
confined to the security of the state and its territory.  However, states 
began to develop new strategies to cope with the common security 
problems. In many regions of the world, security communities have 
emerged to overcome the narrow notion of national security (Adler and 
Barnett 1998). 
By the end of the 1990s world leaders began to understand that more 
serious threats to national security could come from non-traditional 
sources, such as non-state actors and internal conflicts. Such an 
awareness has led to new concepts such as societal security and human 
security. ‘Societal security is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct 
from, political security, which is about the organisational stability of 
states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments 
and states their legitimacy’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 119). One of the 
significant flaws of the old national security perspective is that it equates 
the state boundaries to the societal boundaries, and assumes that inside 
is homogenous while outside is different. The creation and consolidation 
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of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to the nation-state is crucial to its existence 
because it generates an identity by confining the insiders with 
boundaries.  
The presumption of the territorial state borders overlapping with societal 
borders has not only led to disregard for some problems such as 
integration, but also to the creation of new insecurities for the system as 
a whole. Buzan et al. discus that state boundaries may be different from 
society’s boundaries. They suggest that this difference creates different 
logics of security because state is based on fixed territory and formal 
membership, while ‘societal integration is a much more varied 
phenomenon- possibly occurring at both smaller and larger scales and 
sometimes even transcending the spatial dimension altogether’ (1998: 
119). Thus, trying to put citizenship in place of societal identity simply 
might be considered as a flaw of the territorial understanding of security 
because identity is naturally a complex issue.  This complexity is best 
described by Buzan et al. as: 
Some self define their nation in terms of the 
people living in and loyal to the same state; 
others define theirs as an ethnic, organic 
community of language, blood and culture. In 
the former case, emotional attachment is to 
something nonorganic and more political, 
whereas in other cases- and sometimes among 
competing groups in the same case- the ethnic 
community of “the real X people” is contrasted 
with the more amorphous group of all those 
who happen to live on the territory (Buzan et 
al.1998: 120).  
 
 
4.1.3. Risks and Threats Aspects 
Traditional territorial security threats were mainly perceived in military 
terms because the biggest security concerns for states are military 
attacks and the danger of being occupied. This concept of symmetrical 
threat became problematic when more de-territorialised threats have 
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come to the agenda. In times of great social and economic 
interdependence, threats emanate not necessarily from hostile actors and 
through military capabilities. Today, however, risks, not threats, 
dominate the discourse about security politics. The ‘clear and present 
danger’ of the Cold War has been replaced by unclear and future ‘risks 
and challenges’. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
transnational terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation and 
many other issues are discussed in terms of uncertainty and risk. What 
makes them similar is their relative indeterminateness (Daase, 2010: 33). 
 
While Turkey had already been struggling against terrorism, the 9/11 
attacks (and later Paris attacks) for Western countries highlighted an on-
going trend: states faced a range of asymmetric threats and challenges 
from non-state actors, willing and able to strike targets at home and 
abroad. The Paris and Ankara attacks proved that terrorists would 
attack not only embassies or military installations abroad, they could 
strike at the core of a society’s daily life. The Balkan wars of the 1990s 
had already demonstrated that non-state actors were a significant 
problem. Terrorists and paramilitary groups which were statistically 
weaker than conventional armies could massacre civilians and 
peacekeepers. Under these new conditions, conventional armies of 
peacekeepers could be thwarted by smaller, weaker and hence 
asymmetric elements. The 9/11 attacks showed that modern technology 
can make a small group capable of being highly lethal. A small group of 
well-organized terrorists could kill thousands of civilians. From the 
dramatic example of using an airplane as a bomb to exploding a 
homemade road side bombs, terrorist can use tools to impose large-scale 
damage and loss of life. Moreover, the Internet facilitates communication, 
enabling terrorists to spread grievances and their own interpretation of 
issues. Rather than worrying about state led invasion, many national 
governments are contending with de-territorialised threats from terrorist 
cells and networks. Thus, the post-Cold War innovation in thinking about 
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security has been the recognition that there are a variety of potential 
non-military threats to the state which surpass the monolithic military 
ones which once dominated the world. The differentiation in key 
dimensions discussed above set out the limitations of the old notion of 
national security as well. 
 
4.2. The limitations of traditional notion of national security 
National security was often equated with the territorial state security 
and hence security of the regime in power. The principles of the 
Westphalia state system privilege existing states, regardless of their 
nature, and disallow any interference into domestic affairs in spite of the 
murders committed within the territory. To a certain extent the UN have 
tried to interfere with the “domestic affairs” to   modify international 
systems with an amended set of rules as incidents inevitably affected 
other countries such as the Iraq war and Syria later. In the 1992 Agenda 
for Peace, the then UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali introduced the 
following formulation:  
The foundation-stone of this work is and must 
remain the State. Respect for its fundamental 
sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any 
common international progress. The time of 
absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, 
has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality 
This situation is described as ‘new world order’. A ‘new world order’ 
would, however, no longer be based on sovereign states with impermeable 
borders, but would be a truly global one in which ‘international politics’ is 
replaced by ‘domestic politics on a global scale’ (J.A. & Jim Falk, 1992).  
In his book People, States, and Fear, Buzan points out the limitations of 
realist security discourse, its state-centric orientation and the 
predominance of military power as an instrument of state policy in the 
international context. Buzan, in opposition to the realist thesis, argues 
that people are affected by threats in areas other than military ones, such 
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as in political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. He 
maintains that individuals, states, and the international system all play 
significant roles, and all facets of life including economic, societal and 
environmental ones must be regarded as being as important as military 
and political ones. Traditional security thinking focuses on military 
issues and the use of force. This undermines a proper understanding of 
security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’ (Sheehan, 
2005: 6). Thus, with regards to security, despite an important role played 
by the state, it is nevertheless not a sufficient actor. This was pointed out 
specifically, in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP): 
[…] it has been related to nation-states more 
than people. . . Forgotten were the legitimate 
concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives. […]With the dark 
shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see 
that many conflicts are within nations rather 
than between nations. 
Buzan (1991: 18, 19) argues with regard to interstate relations that the 
traditional concepts underpinning national security studies are 
increasingly irrelevant, especially in the post-Cold War era. He 
emphasizes the notion of a societal security dilemma in terms of 
ethnicity, nationalism and religious identities and suggests that the 
dangers that societal insecurities pose to a state’s stability are more 
serious than external threats which are mostly the regular armed forces 
of other states. They are more dangerous because traditional national 
security is not equipped to deal with them because of its flaws and 
limitations. These are: 
1. Traditional national security understanding equates the state 
boundaries to the society’s boundaries, and assume that inside is 
homogenous while outside is different. The presumption of the 
territorial state borders overlapping the society’s borders has not 
only led to ignore some problems such as integration, but also 
create new insecurities for the system as a whole. 
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2. In anarchy, as there is no central authority, it is not possible to 
design true security policies beyond the boundaries. National 
security therefore has remained confined to the security of the 
state and its territory.  
3. The privileged position of the military sector and other potential 
threats are excluded; thus, unless an environmental, economic or 
social problem interferes with the military sector, it does not take 
part in a state's security analysis. For example, the environmental 
problem of water shortage would only be considered a national 
security concern if a state threatened, or initiated, a military 
response against another state, in defence of its interests.  
4. As its focus is clearly state-centric as the referent object, it 
excludes sources of insecurity at the societal and individual level. 
Thus, it is unequipped against the intra-state threats such as 
ethnic conflicts. Even if a government posed an immediate and 
lethal threat to its citizens, this would not be considered a security 
threat within this perspective. 
5. Closely related to the previous point, the traditional perspective 
assumes that the greatest threats to national security are external 
ones and thus, does not recognize intrastate conflict as being a 
source of insecurity, so that potential separatist movements do not 
qualify as a national security threat (Ayoob, 1997). When a state 
somehow takes it as a national security threat it inevitably uses 
military force to suppress the secessionist movement. 
In the current security environment, the focus has shifted from territorial 
security of the state to broader and deeper security understandings. 
Using only military means for addressing security threats and challenges 
is increasingly perceived to be ineffective. Therefore, security practices 
based on a modern political imaginary seem inadequate to provide 
solutions today’s multi-dimensional security environment.  
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4.3. Societal Security: Entrusting security to society 
4.3.1. What is ‘Societal Security’? 
Societal security has emerged as a conceptual approach which was 
motivated by developments after the end of the Cold War, particularly 
with the end of the Soviet Union. The term ‘societal security’ was first 
used by Barry Buzan in the book People, States and Fear (Buzan: 1991). 
It was then just one of the five sectors in his five-dimensional approach to 
security theory, along with military, political, economic, and 
environmental security. Here, however, all of Buzan's dimensions, 
including the societal one, were still sectors of state security. Society was 
just one sector where the state could be threatened.  However, in 
Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe Ole Waever 
(1993) argues that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach had 
become 'untenable' as a present context for societal security. As a result, 
he proposed a reconceptualization of Buzan's previous theory; not as a 
five sector approach of state security, but as a duality of state and 
societal security. Societal security, here, is still kept as a sector of state 
security, but now it is also a referent object of security in its own right. 
Therefore, although the state is still a referent object for the military, 
political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, 'society' is also a 
referent object for the societal sector. 
Waever et al. (1993) discussed that ‘nation’ and ‘state’ do not mean the 
same thing in a majority of countries around the world and that ‘national 
security’ is becoming an increasingly irrelevant framework for 
developments in the new security environment. Accordingly, the 
assumption that state and society are synonymous is a key factor which 
flaws the notion of national security. They suggested a new term ‘societal 
security’ instead of state- centred national security and gave importance 
to the insecurities of societies understood as national, ethnic, or religious 
communities. Waever defines societal security, thus, 
In the contemporary international system, 
societal security concerns the ability of a 
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society to persist in its essential character 
under changing conditions and against possible 
or actual threats. More specifically, it is about 
the sustainability, within acceptable conditions 
for evolution, of traditional patterns of 
language, culture, association and religious and 
national identity and custom. Societal security 
is about situations when societies perceive a 
threat in identity terms (Waever et al. 1993: 
23). 
This definition indicates a radical shift from territorial state (national) 
security to society as the referent object. The most prominent element of 
national security is that ‘the focus has been on the political and 
institutional unit-the state- and accordingly on the military and political 
sectors’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). According to Bilgin (2003: 
210) in the national security framework ‘the tension between the security 
needs and interests of the state and of the society is resolved by assuming 
that the state, the society, and the nation are one and the same.’  
However, post-Cold War developments such as the ethnic separatism and 
cleansing in Yugoslavia and the emergence of domestic resistance to the 
expansion of the European Union have demonstrated that the security 
needs and interests of the state and society do not always coincide (Bilgin 
2003: 210). It is clear that such insecurities are unexpected by the 
traditional national security concept. To take it a step further, this 
national security approach may create insecurity and destroy what it 
intends to protect, which is the state itself as it is based on the 
assumption that state and the nation are the same.  However, ‘only 
rarely are state and societal boundaries conterminous’ (Buzan, Waever, 
Vilde, 1998: 119). If nation is different from state, we need a different 
security concept as they are understood to have different logic of security. 
This situation forces societal security onto the agenda as a key concept 
because ‘state is based on territory and formal membership, whereas 
societal integration is a much more varied phenomenon-possibly 
occurring smaller and larger scales and sometimes even transcending the 
spatial dimension altogether’  (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 119). 
100 
 
Traditionally, national security has had a territorial focus and the main 
emphasis has been to protect national boundaries and state institutions 
with priority given to the defence of territory, this is thought to be an 
‘insufficient to guarantee people’s security’ (Commission on Human 
Security, 2003). However, a state is grounded on societies. The present 
state can vanish, but as seen throughout history, society continues to 
exist. In other words, we can have a society without a state, but no state 
can exist without a society. Societal security is thus something different 
from national security. Societal security, thus, has to ensure the 
functioning of society to enable it to reproduce itself, thereby enabling the 
population to organize their lives regardless of the form of government 
and national boundaries. As a collective phenomenon, societal security is 
‘not the sum of the security of smaller social groups…not the security of 
individual parts, nor is it the sum of the security of parts’ (Waever et al. 
1993: 20, 26). In addition societal security comprises not only the 
material aspects of life such as physical protection, shelter, food and 
subsistence, but also depends on complex moral and social aspects such 
as confidence, trust, belonging, and loyalty. All of these elements 
ultimately contribute to the way of life and   the well-being of a group of 
people which is called society. In other words, assuring societal security 
means not only physical protection from any man made or natural 
disasters but also it depends heavily on the cultural and even moral 
facilities of people. 
The key to this reconceptualization is again ‘survival’. However, this 
time, it refers to society’s survival instead of state survival.  Societal 
insecurity exists when communities define a development as a threat to 
their survival as a society.  The logic is that if a society loses its identity, 
it will not survive as a society. Thus, the key organising element for the 
societal security concept is identity. The concept could also be understood 
as ‘identity security’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). Some authors 
equate societal security with the security of society at the level of the 
nation-state at large (ETTIS, 2012: 8, 10). This is a reflection of a state-
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centred concept of security which ignores the significant fluidity and 
overlaps between contemporary societies. However, the term ‘society’ 
comprises different sub-societies, which may extend jurisdictional 
boundaries. By introducing this fluidity to debates on security, ‘societal 
security’ complements and strengthens the notions of state security. In 
other words: societal security is not just security of society, but rather 
security of societies.  
 
4.3.2. What is ‘society’ in the concept? 
Society is defined by Giddens (1985: 164 [in Waever 1993: 21]): ‘a 
clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity’. 
Buzan, Waever, Vilde (1998: 119) define society suggesting that ‘Society 
is about identity, self-conception of communities and of individuals 
identifying themselves as members of a community.’ Societies, according 
to Waever’s notion, differ from other social groups ‘in having a high 
degree of social inertia, values and ‘institutions’ in the wider sense’ 
(Waever et al. 1993, 21). Buzan, Waever and Vilde, (1998: 120) argue that 
their use of ‘societal’ is also different from ‘state population which is 
vague’ and ‘nation’ by giving the example of Sudan, thus, the ‘Sudanese 
population is that population contained by Sudanese state but which is 
composed of many societal units (e.g. Arab and black African)’. They 
argue that they use the term societal for identified communities. By 
‘society’ is meant not only the physical gathering of individuals, but also 
their “meaningful existence” (Waever et al. 1993: 20). This definition 
substantiates Parson’s approach, ‘A society must constitute a societal 
community that has an adequate level of integration or solidarity and a 
distinctive membership status’ (1969: 19). Among the many explanations, 
the conception of societal security comes closest to the notion of society as 
‘the community of people living in a particular country or region and 
having shared customs, laws, and organisations’. Thus, ‘Societal security 
is about large, self-sustaining identity groups what these are empirically 
varies in both time and place’ (Buzan, Waever, Vilde, 1998: 119). 
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4.3.3. Society and Nation  
For traditional thinking, state borders have been commonly 
conceptualised as being fundamentally attached to ‘territorially defined 
societies’ providing a tangible ‘society-defining’ function.  Here the border 
is directly experienced through border control and embodied in the 
concept of a ‘container model of society’ (Beck, Bonss, and Lau, 2003: 1). 
In security analysis, society mostly  is expressed as ‘nations’ or other 
ethno-political communities modelling on the nation-idea – whether this 
be at the level of Europe, nation or national minorities (Waever et al. 
1993: 27). Waever et al. take the term ‘nation’ as modern because ‘older 
national sentiments had no major political importance, they were not the 
source of political authority’ (1993: 28). 
Historically in Europe as elsewhere the source of authority was 
hereditary, not national. After the French revolution the legitimate 
source of political authority was changed, it was handed over from king to 
‘nation’.  Smith (1991: 14) defines nation as ‘a named human population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members’. This means that national identity is based on 
ethnic and cultural similarity.  ‘The national identity is about a special 
way of being alike to a degree where time-crossing identification is 
particularly strongly felt’ (Waever et al. 1993: 40).  
In close relation to nation, Waever et al. (1993: 35) points out the 
distinction between Western and Eastern types of nationalism. The 
importance of this distinction is the focus of the political frame (the 
state). They argue that whereas western nationalism is innate within 
existing state frameworks and therefore has a given population which fits 
the territory, eastern nationalism has to frame people somewhere other 
than in the (non-existing) state. ‘There had to be a pre-political reality to 
point to, a reference to a people that existed although it did not have a 
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state, and the argument then ended up as one about culture, about ethnic 
identity’ (Waever et al, 1993: 36). Anderson (2004: 319) also suggests that 
borders are not a natural part of sovereign nation-states, but rather that 
‘different conceptions of the frontier as an institution existed before the 
modern sovereign state, and other kinds will emerge after its demise’.  
This definitional attempt is useful in explaining why state and society 
may not be the same and why societal security is about identity security.  
 
4.3.4. Referent object of societal security  
Ole Waever and Barry Buzan have proposed society as the referent object 
and have sought to explore the implications of this new approach (see 
Waever et al. 1993, Buzan et al. 1998). By defining society as the referent 
object of security, they have shifted the concept of security away from its 
traditional focus on state. In addition to suggesting a new referent object 
of security, it also implies a new agency for providing security. That is, 
Waever asserts that society has a sustainable existence independent of 
the state (Waever et al. 1993: 23). This clearly suggests that society is not 
just the passive object (to be protected) of security but also an active 
producer of security that protects alongside a number of other state 
institutions.  
Buzan theorises that a threat to society is whatever might put its ‘we’ 
identity at risk (Waever et al. 1993: 42). As societal security is about ‘we’, 
consideration should be given to its variability according to time and 
place. Someone who identifies himself as ethnically situated in a given 
country might identify himself in a different way based on citizenship of 
that country or a religious group.  Historically identification was often 
limited to family or clan or religious groups, such  loyalties to religious  
groups  are still operative throughout the world,  today ‘the most 
important referent objects in [the] societal sector are tribes, clans, 
nations, (and nation like ethnic units, which others call minorities), 
civilizations, religions, and race’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 123). 
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Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of 
individuals identifying themselves as members of a community , these 
identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly 
political organisations concerned with government (Buzan et al.1998: 
119).  Societal security relates to large, self-sustaining identity groups; 
what these are empirically varies in both time and place (Buzan et 
al.1998: 119). In contemporary Europe, these groups are mainly national, 
but in other regions religious or racial groups have more relevance. Thus, 
the concept could also be understood as ‘identity security’ (Buzan et 
al.1998: 119, 120). Differentiation between the security of groups in 
society and the security of society as a whole then come into question, 
Waever et al. suggest that their study 
 […] will deal with both kinds of security, but 
mostly the second. [small group’s security and 
individual security is important] because 
threats to individual and small group security 
can in the case of powerful actors trigger strong 
reactions with effects on other groups and 
potentially society at large or even other 
societies or states in the international system. 
Thus we must have an interest in security at 
all the lower levels (Waever et al.1993:  20). 
 
4.3.5. Threats to societal security 
A societal identity can be threatened in many ways which in turn 
threaten its ability to reproduce itself. In other words, society feels 
threatened when its ‘we’ feeling or identity is put into danger.  For 
example, ‘if the institutions that reproduce language and culture are 
forbidden to operate, then identity cannot be transmitted effectively from 
one generation to the next’ (Waever et al 1993:43). In the societal sector, 
the main threats come from competing identities and migration. Buzan et 
al. (1998: 121) discuss the threats mainly under three categories: 
migration, horizontal competition, vertical competition. Consideration 
should be given to the notion that the societal security agenda differs 
according to time and place. However, migration, horizontal and vertical 
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competition are understood to be the most common threats to societal 
security. 
Migration manifests as a rapid change in a society which was subjected 
to an influx of others. Intra-state conflicts and a huge gap in quality of 
life creates strong incentives for international migration. As a result of 
this influx, the host society’s identity was threatened because ‘it will not 
be what it used to be’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 121). Changing composition of 
the population creates fears over its identity which often becomes a 
political issue. The degree of the fear depends on the adaptive capacity of 
the society. For example, former UKIP leader Nigel Farage discussing 
immigration said: 
These figures show the continuing failure of the 
Government to get a grip on immigration into 
this country. The results of this increase in 
population can be felt in communities up and 
down the country as public services struggle to 
cope with the increase in demand.4  
He further commented ‘We must be mad to take this risk with the 
cohesion of our societies.’5 Some governments might also use migration as 
a weapon to supress other identities like Stalin’s Soviet Union or Israel in 
the West Bank. ‘It should not, however, be forgotten that threats can 
strengthen the identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to supress 
an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with 
which the group coheres’ (Waever et al. 1993: 43). 
Horizontal competition represents dominant cultural and linguistic 
influence.  Examples of this, seen throughout the world, are the diffusion 
of English/American words, fast food, fashion and other western 
practises. This diffusion creates changes in the way of life of a society and 
these changes are perceived as a threat to identity. ‘Economic and 
technological developments may well carry such threats, not only 
undermining one identity but giving support to a competing one’ (Waever 
                                            
4 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2386812, last accessed September 2015. 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34197707, last accessed December 2015. 
106 
 
et.al. 1993: 44). Societies instinctively resist the pressure of change, 
however the dynamic character of identity allows them to adopt some 
changes as a result of contemporary circumstances, although complaints 
about Americanisation and Westernisation changing societal identities 
are prevalent. 
Vertical competition is illustrated by an integration project such as the 
EU or a secessionist project. People feel threatened by the imposition of 
wider or narrower identities. ‘Threats from competing identities arise 
when identities are mutually exclusive: one cannot be simultaneously 
both a Christian and a Muslim, or both a Greek and a Turk’ (Waever et 
al. 1993: 44). Yugoslavia is a good example where groups are pushed 
towards both a wider or a narrower identity and its consequences. This 
does not mean that all the societal identities are competitive. It is 
possible to be a European and English or British or all of them.  
For Turkey, societal security is mostly about nation and ethnic groups 
and related to vertical competition between nation state and ethnic 
groups.   Long-term PKK terror which consists strong secessionist 
elements has undermined societal cohesion to a certain degree. This is 
also mainly a consequence of the historical conditions of Middle East. 
In the Middle East ‘there is a constellation of states in which nations do 
not always fit into state boundaries’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 132). There are 
stateless minorities and ‘overarching identities’ such as Islamic and 
Arabic that play important roles for security issues (Buzan et al. 1998: 
132). As seen in the current Syria and Yemen examples, vertical 
competition such as the Shia- Sunni conflict has been the most important 
factor. Both can be seen as threats, while both can be found helpful for 
mobilising people. In the Middle East,  
despite the dominant rhetorics, the unifying 
Arabism and Islamism, the region is actually 
less integrated, more conflictual, and more a 
balance-of-power system than Europe; [and] 
the region has a stronger perception of external 
threat of Western orchestrated conspiracies, 
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threats of divide and rule, cultural and 
economic imperialism, exterminism against 
Muslims in the Gulf and in Bosnia and the like 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 133). 
 
It is a historical reality that Western led territorial fragmentation in the 
region after the Ottoman Empire has been the main factor fuelling border 
problems and the antagonism between societies over territory and 
religion because of kinship groups and nuanced religious difference. 
Buzan (1998) argues that the state’s territorial integrity can be 
threatened by internal separatist movements which may seek 
independence or reunion with other states. He emphasises that ‘such 
states may be threatened by separatism’.  As a result, multi-ethnic states 
are more likely to face intra-societal conflicts. Mary Kaldor’s (1999) views 
on the changing nature of war also support this claim. She defines old 
war as being conflict over territory and sovereignty and usually as 
conflict between states while new wars generally are a matter of 
fragmentation or integration, and a matter of the homogenisation or 
diversification of society. Kaldor (1999) argues that ‘The political goals of 
the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly 
traditional identities - nation, tribe, religion’ (1999, 69). Kaldor (1999) 
clarifies that the new wars are not ideological conflicts, but are in fact 
conflicts of identity. 
 
4.4. Typical societal responses to perceived threats 
As discussed above, the nature of threats differ from traditional notions 
of security in a number of ways. Evidently, state and non-state actors can 
be a threat to societal security and therefore threats to states are not 
merely external. Even the state itself can be a threat to a society, if 
societal security is undermined by governments and state institutions in 
the name of national security.  In other words, if the state fails to 
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reconcile the relationship between itself and its society/societies, conflict 
and confrontation are likely to occur.   
If a society recognises that its identity is threatened, it may react either 
passively and culturally or militantly and coercively in order to defend 
itself. Both these methods can consequently deepen and strengthen the 
defended societal identity within the community and can lead to ethnic 
suppression or civil war. The two major societal actors related to this 
process are: ethno-national identities and religious identities. These two 
factors are most likely to produce violent conflicts within a society.   
O. Waever (1993: 191) suggests that ‘for threatened societies, one obvious 
line of defensive responses is to strengthen societal identity. This can be 
done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and 
distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively’. 
The society, therefore, defends its identity against a dominant rival by 
holding onto its own culture, its indigenous myths and symbols. In other 
words, they create a cultural form of nationalism, aimed at strengthening 
the internal identity of the ethnic minority. It refers to language, religion, 
culture, and history as its main means.   
It is suggested that national security policy may negatively contribute 
(not the sole cause) to ethnic conflicts. Tension between the state and its 
societal sub-groups undermines, for instance, the territorial integrity and 
political autonomy of the state, as well as the identity of those societal 
sub-groups. As previously argued, states survive by maintaining their 
sovereignty and society survives by maintaining its identity. As a result, 
societal groups may defend their identity by militarising their members. 
In other words, societal confrontations destabilise the political security 
and undermine the legitimacy of the state. In explaining how states can 
be threatened by societal insecurity, Waever (1993: 49) articulates the 
way in which societal insecurity can weaken and threaten the functioning 
of the mechanisms of a government, and indeed can hinder its related 
ideologies which ‘give governments and states their legitimacy.’   
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4.5. The societal security dilemma 
The security dilemma describes a situation where the actions of one 
state, in trying to increase its security, causes a perception of insecurity 
to other states and prompts a reaction  from the second state in the effort 
to balance this perception (Roe, 2013: 185). The key to this concept is 
uncertainty. Consequently, an escalation of arms and other means, by 
both actors to fill the gap between the perception of the lack of security 
and the resources to reduce the threat perceived and a worst case 
scenario is created. 
The societal security dilemma describes a situation where the actions of 
one society, in trying to strengthen its identity, causes a reaction in a 
second, which, in the end, weakens the identity of the first (Roe, 2013: 
186). In other words, it is a problem where one group's security spells 
insecurity for the others.  
Many writers describe ethnic (political) 
nationalism in rather malign terms, often 
characterized in this regard with the 
annexation of territories and the disintegration 
of states. By contrast, cultural nationalism is 
often seen as more benign, as it tends to work 
within existing state structures. The goal of 
cultural nationalists is to amend the current 
order and not overturn it: it is more status quo 
than revisionist (Roe, 2013: 185, 186). 
 
However, for the societal security dilemma, ambiguity is linked with the 
two sides of nationalism, ethnic (political) and cultural as the line 
between two strategies is very thin. Hutchinson (1994: 125) discusses 
that cultural nationalist projects may sometimes employ ethnic 
nationalist strategies in order to secure their goals. In those 
circumstances, cultural nationalism might be conflated with political 
nationalism (Roe, 2013: 186). 
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4.6. Criticisms of societal security 
The concept is not without its flaws. One of the arguments directed at the 
societal security approach is that Waever et al. tend to take society and 
identity as pre-given categories, rather than as inter subjectively 
constituted. McSweeney (1996: 81-83) believes that national identity 
cannot be taken as an objective fact and thus studied its implications for 
conflicts or security. The core of McSweeney’s criticism is that the 
reading of identity is too objectivist. McSweeney believes that identity is 
not a factual situation of a society; it is rather a process of negation 
between people and interest groups. He also asserts that societal security 
defines society as a having a single identity, and that this presents a risk, 
that of supporting the rise of intolerant identities that, in fact, can make 
inter-ethnic conflict more likely (1996, 88-93). 
Paul Roe, similarly, maintains that ‘the problem lies in whether identity, 
and thus society itself can be seen as either an object or a process; that is 
whether identity is something solid and constant or whether it is 
something fluid and changing’ (1999, 183). Thus, the societal security 
paradigm is charged with creating an imagined and excessively holistic 
identity for society, the same way that traditional security studies had 
created a monolithic type for the state.  Also, their distinction between 
society and social groups is not clear (Adrian Hyde-Price, 200: 28). Pinar 
Bilgin (2003: 212) also criticises the concept of societal security by 
arguing that ‘clashes over identity are not the cause but the outcome of a 
process through which conflicts over economic and political interests are 
reframed and presented in terms of identity.’ 
One of the most common criticism of the concept of societal security is 
that it is ‘unmanageably broad’. Walt (1991: 213) argues that broadening 
the concept of non-military security may result in perceiving issues such 
as poverty, pollution, drug abuse, child abuse, and diseases as a threat to 
security. He adds ‘Defining the field in this way would destroy its 
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intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to 
any of these important problems’. 
However, in spite of these strong drawbacks, societal security offers a 
useful analytical tool to solve the limitations of state-centric traditional 
security concept. First, it gives a powerful insight into security problems 
in general and border security problems in particular after the end of the 
Cold War. It highlights the issues of identity problems which are 
neglected by the territorial security. Second, it gives us a useful tool to 
analyse reactions against national security and integration policies 
because ‘reactions to integration in the sphere of identity can easily 
become strong enough to halt, and possibly reverse, even a well-
established process of integration’ (Waever et al. 1993: 186). Hence, it 
helps us to identify major problems. Third, shifting the referent object 
from state to society makes a qualitative difference and has emphasized 
that ‘there is another social and collective focus in security analysis 
additional to the state’ (Waever et al. 1993: 186).  
 
4.7. Summary  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts occurring 
throughout the world brought societal security concerns to the forefront 
of the international security agenda. In fact, many modern societies are 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The presence of kinship relations across 
the borders of two or more countries that identify themselves with their 
ethnic ties in formally opposing states increases the likelihood of 
interstate conflict and societal insecurity, such as the war in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Societal security should be brought to the forefront of 
security studies as it provides a way of thinking about security issues in 
which the referent object is not the state, but societies.  
This chapter has argued that the concept of societal security is critical in 
examining a significant range of threats that cannot be understood 
through the old realist state-centric/military-centric national security 
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perspective. Societal security suggests that identity groups are concerned 
with survival through preserving their identity, whilst states seek to 
maintain their sovereignty. This leads to a dilemma in which traditional 
security concepts fail to appropriately address the sub-state security 
problems (Smith, 2000, 83). Moreover, an increase in state security might 
lead to an increase in the insecurity of certain societal groups. From the 
point of view of the state, however, ‘any defence of societal identity by the 
groups may be perceived as a threat to the state’s legitimacy, sovereignty, 
and such groups can also be construed as “harbouring secessionist goals” 
(Roe, 1999, 199). 
Whilst traditional thinking, based on realism, advocates the state as a 
mere referent object of security, this study, argues that such a view is too 
narrow and inadequate in answering the question of identity and the 
societal security dilemma. Smith in criticizing the realist’s security views 
argues that ‘the state is no longer the only or core actor, and as a result it 
is less privileged than before’ (2000: 77).  Roe argues that, ‘societal 
security is particularly effective for understanding the security concerns 
of multi-ethnic states: the relation between the regime (majority group) 
and the country’s minority groups’ (2007: 179). So ‘reducing 
contradictions between the state and societal security is thus a 
precondition for successful ‘national’ security policy’ (Waever, 1993: 57). 
Societal insecurities occur when a society feels its identity to be targeted 
and endangered. In sum, when people’s identity and their state’s ideology 
do not coincide, people react so as to defend themselves. Any attempt to 
increase the security of a nation by the state, inevitably increases the 
insecurity of the state. It is clear that societal security is a significant and 
complimentary factor for state security, not an obstacle. If society is 
secure within a particular state, other important elements such as 
territory, state apparatus will be secure. Societal security and state 
security can sometimes be at odds, and weak states which are unable to 
mobilise their own power may pose a considerable security risk to their 
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societies because they would be more vulnerable to penetration by 
outside actors. 
   
In short, today’s cross-border risks and threats are largely targeting 
societies and defending against them requires a more holistic 
understanding of security. A delicate web of values, connections, and 
infrastructure characterizes societies today. Striking out against this 
form of connection means trying to destroy societies. Border security 
includes not only preventing an attack, physical protection of assets, and 
consequence management, but also security for the identity of those 
societies that it is supposed to protect. One step further, it is expected to 
shape the environment within which it operates. In other words, border 
security must be embedded in a larger notion of ‘societal security’. This 
approach can create a more useful context for border security and lead to 
a transformation of whole system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOCIETAL SECURITY -
IMPLICATIONS FOR RETHINKING BORDER SECURITY  
FROM TRADITIONAL TO NON-TRADITIONAL BORDER 
SECURITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the pace of reconceptualising security over the past decades, border 
security issues have become increasingly important and need to be 
adequately addressed both in practical and academic terms within 
security studies. Given that the nature and scope of new threats border 
security can no longer be considered a domestic issue or an internal 
security matter. The cross-border nature of new threats affects all 
countries throughout the world. However, the two different face of 
security are still operative, both national and state security on the one 
hand, and societal and identity security on the other. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the concept of border security 
from the perspective of traditional national security and non-traditional 
societal security, in order to answer the following question: What are the 
effects of prevailing perspectives of state-centric national security and 
non-traditional societal security on current and future interpretations of 
border security.  The answer provides a clear picture for readers and 
elucidates discussions at the analysis stage.  
Bearing in mind the discussions in previous chapter (conceptual 
framework), this paper will first examine the traditional border security 
concept and its limitations will be analysed. Following that, non-
traditional border security approaches will be laid out, including the new 
modes of border security practice. Finally, interpretations of border 
security from the perspective of societal security will be analysed.     
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5.1. Traditional concepts of border security  
In a common understanding of the term, the concept of the border of the 
state refers to ‘external’, ‘interstate’ or ‘international’ borders that delimit 
and delineate states as independent entities in the state system 
(Anderson, 1996; Prescott, 1987). William Walters (2006:193) defines 
border as a continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign 
authority of the state, enclosing its domain. It corresponds most closely 
with the historical spatiality of political power (Walters, 2006) which 
Agnew calls the ‘field of forces’: a geopolitical world of ‘rigidly defined 
territorial units in which each state can gain power only at the expense of 
the others and each has total control over its own territory’ (1999: 504). 
Borders here are primarily understood as empirical and physically 
tangible manifestations of political territorial units, whereby the 
geopolitical borderline serves to contain state sovereignty and jurisdiction 
(Prescott, 1965). Borders, based on this paradigm, become visible lines in 
space. 
 
Indeed, the concept of the border of the state frames dominant notions of 
who and where the ‘enemy’ of the state is (Nick Vaughan-William, 2009: 
3). Because ‘realist and neo-realist perspectives understand security in 
terms of the history of the defence and/or transgression of states’ borders’ 
(Linklater and MacMillan, 1995: 12). Due to the relative dominance of 
realist and neo-realist approaches in security studies, with their 
emphasis on state survival in an anarchical self-help system, other states 
were viewed as the sources of threat to the key element of national 
security and boundaries were viewed as the likely means of overcoming 
that threat. In other words, they operate like a barrier. Therefore the 
notion of border is traditionally militarized and the traditional 
understanding of the role of state boundaries in national security is based 
on the prevention of military threat. As Andreas (2003: 81) suggests 
‘early geopolitical thinking stressed the centrality of territorial 
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competition and acquisition’ and Kolossov affirms that ‘border areas 
become militarised zones with a special regime, where the highest 
priority is the fighting efficiency of military units ready to repulse the 
aggression of a potential enemy’ (2012: 622). In other words, borders are 
strategic lines to be defended, they are highly militarized because of their 
deterrent functions against possible military attacks by other states. In 
the realist assessment border ‘and territorial security is about 
fundamentally interstate rather than transnational relations’ (Adreas, 
2003: 81). As a result, the main focus of security studies is the 
phenomenon of war (Walt, 1991: 212). Eventually, this perspective 
creates an understanding of border as a fixed, front line designed to stop 
the penetration of undesirable individuals, goods and information. It is a 
means of the greatest possible control over any transboundary flows 
(Kolossov, 2012: 622). Strikingly, in this sense, Kolossov (2012: 622) 
claims that border zones are economically undeveloped ‘because of 
deliberate limitations on investment in certain branches’ and there are 
attempts ‘to subordinate all social life to military needs’ to forestall 
possible future security problems. 
 
In a deeper analysis; the most distinguishing feature of traditional border 
security is based on ‘a state-centric territorial defence’ which is the 
foundation of the modern Westphalian state system which Agnew (1998) 
has called the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’. According to Agnew 
(1998: 51), the ‘state-centric account of spatiality’ is characterised by 
three geographical assumptions: first, ‘states have exclusive sovereign 
power over their territories’; second, ‘domestic and foreign are separate 
and distinct realms’; and third, the ‘boundaries of a state define the 
boundaries of 'society'.’ Ó Tuathail further suggests that ‘Modern 
geopolitics, according to this logic, is a discursive formation, which 
privileges sovereign states, bordered realms and distinct territorially 
delimited societies’ (1998: 17). It implies that traditional border security 
aims at the securitisation of the state in general rather than society. 
117 
 
 
The perceptions of this traditional thinking undoubtedly continue to 
impinge on security practices today. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine 
and annexation of the Crimea demonstrates that borders are still 
contested militarily to alter interstate boundaries. However, this has 
been questioned over recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War, even though one can still see the components of such 
understandings which influence today’s security objectives, such as 
building walls and fences at the borders to counteract vast migration.  
Although it is fair to say that in the post September 11th security 
environment ‘transnational law evaders rather than interstate military 
invaders increasingly drive state border security priorities’ (Adreas, 2003: 
82) and the traditional function of borders has become much less 
important than in the past (Adreas, 2003: 81). 
 
5.2. Concepts of Non-traditional Border Security  
The term ‘non-traditional security’ is used as an opposite concept to 
traditional security in this chapter and study. A non-traditional security 
concept has primarily three key features: first and foremost, it rejects the 
geographically fixed, fortified boundaries to stop threats; second, the 
referent object of security is not only the state itself, but sometimes can 
be other objects, like society/societies; third, it does not emphasize 
traditional military challenges as threats but other types of threats and 
from non-military sectors. 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the view of borders has 
dramatically changed and scholars began to pursue postmodern 
intellectual discourses on the topic. The concept of postmodern is 
understood here as a tendency, which questions the Westphalian state 
system. ‘The postmodern is a post-Westphalian world where states are no 
longer as sovereign as they once were, where transnational actors and 
forces are problematizing domestic/foreign borders, and where 
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transnational media and networks are creating a “global society” (Ó 
Tuathail 1998 : 17). Ó Tuathail and Dalby  (1998: 3,8) posit that in the 
Cold War era border security was classified exclusively as a sub-set of 
national security and failed to consider the state boundary in its broader 
associated fields of social and cultural influences. Especially, in the 
context of border security, this new orientation underlines how the 
geopolitical thinking of the past produces today’s inefficiencies. This 
inefficiency was targeted specifically, in the 1994 United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP): 
it has been related to nation-states more than 
people. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns 
of ordinary people who sought security in their 
daily lives. […]With the dark shadows of the 
Cold War receding, one can see that many 
conflicts are within nations rather than 
between nations. 
 
The UN, here, clearly suggests that state-centric world political system 
and traditional rationale of security systems are not adequate to 
guarantee meaningful security, while highlighting that ordinary people’s 
daily concerns should be paramount. As Dalby suggests ‘It also implies 
that both the causes of insecurity and the possible solutions to security 
problems are to be found only by including actors and institutions beyond 
the ambit of the state system’ (1998: 322).  Kolossov (2012: 624) supports 
this idea and proposes ‘boundary security is now a matter not only of the 
state. It must take into account the interests of local and international 
organisations and actors’, so that non-state actors, specifically ordinary 
people have come to the agenda as a referent object, which creates a 
qualitative difference inevitably. 
 
As pointed out by John Agnew, the collapse of the dialectical politics of 
the Cold War era led to a consciousness of a ‘global visualization’ where 
people can see themselves as a common unit free from the divisive nature 
of the Cold War polarities between democracy and communism (Ó 
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Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 21). In other words, the post-Cold War political 
environment raised consciousness of the greater inter-connections 
between nation-states through trans-boundary flows in what was to be 
known as globalization. ‘In contrast to a modern geopolitical imagination 
dominated by state-centric spatiality (bordered, sovereign, territorially 
delimited states), the postmodern geopolitical imagination grapples with 
borderlessness, state failure, and deterritorialisation’. (Ó Tuathail 1998: 
17). However, there are discussions on the meaning and scope of 
postmodern thoughts. Newman (1998: 4) argues that the changing 
function of boundaries does not mean a ‘borderless’ world. He suggests 
that although some elements of state sovereignty transferred to 
supranational bodies it does not mean the end of territorial sovereignty in 
traditional sense ( Newman1998: 6). ‘It would be more in line with 
postmodern reasoning to describe the boundary changes underway as 
“de-borderings”…what this term suggests is that we currently witness a 
continuing functional differentiation on a worldwide scale, with an 
ensuing incongruence of functional boundaries that cease to overlap on 
one line (the territorial state's boundary)’ (Albert 2007: 62, 63).  Thus, it 
may be more accurate to say that the importance of territoriality is 
shifting rather than simply diminishing (Andreas, 2000: 3).  
 
However, post-Cold War risks are no longer territorially defined clear 
threats; ‘rather post-Cold War risks have become amorphous and 
pervasive dangers’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). With the start of 
globalization, transnational threats are more potent than ever as they 
are ‘amorphous and decentralized, mobile and shifting webs’ that benefit 
from the same technological advancements in transportation and 
communication as societies do (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). Andreas 
(2003: 78) called these threats ‘clandestine transnational actors’ (CTAs), 
defined as non-state actors who operate across national borders in 
violation of state laws and who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts.  
As a result, ‘National security has become a problematic of global 
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security’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 21, 22, 28). Under the pressures of cross-
border threats, this shift led to an expansion in the notion of border. 
Hudson (1998: 95, 96) describes it as ‘extra-territoriality’ and he suggests 
that under the protection and universality principles of International 
Law, a state may legitimately ‘claim jurisdiction’ on activities beyond its 
borders if it were ‘universally viewed as harmful and illegitimate’. This 
provides a basis for expanding the notions of ‘internal security’ outward, 
and thus under such a paradigm, security that is traditionally applied 
only at border checkpoints can be legitimately applied to foreign threats. 
 
Indeed, the idea behind this new orientation is that it is impossible to 
cope with new challenges solely by the use of military, police, or 
paramilitary forces. ‘Even the most powerful armies of the world cannot 
adequately counteract illegal migration, international terrorism, the 
traffic in drugs and weapons, the risk of epidemics, trans-boundary 
pollution, or global environmental disaster’ (Kolossov 2012: 623). Ó 
Tuathail (1998: 28) classifies these threats as: 1) de-territorialised 
threats which were modified traditional national security threats, so-
called 'hard' threats involving weapons and violence posed by 
transnational networks of terrorists and cyber-criminals, or threats posed 
by proliferating weapons of mass destruction and 2) 'global dangers' 
comprised 'softer' less traditional national security threats posed by 
global environmental problems (access to scarce resources, population 
pressures and environmental stress), international migration and violent 
ethnic nationalism. Under the pressure of these threats ‘Cold- war 
institutions have attempted to re-invent themselves by creating new 
bureaucracies, pluralising their understanding of security and developing 
discourses like ‘de-territorialised threats’ and ‘global dangers’ in response 
to late twentieth century world’ (Ó Tuathail 1998: 28). To highlight the 
shift from military based border security concepts, Andreas coins a new 
term, ‘police borders’ and argues that police borders are increasingly 
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important while military and economic borders are much less prominent 
than in the past (2003: 109). 
 
Therefore, as discussed above, many experts are now convinced that 
attempts to provide security by traditional methods, for example by 
strengthening the barrier functions of boundaries, are inefficient. In line 
with this reality, cold- war institutions have tried to re-structure 
themselves by creating new bureaucracies, new legislation and new types 
of border control. 
 
5.3. Locating border security  
Border control and legislation as measures for securitising borders here 
differs in some aspects from traditional boundary security due to the 
changing nature of borders. This change is best captured in Balibar’s 
(2004: 1) words:  
The term border is extremely rich in 
significations […] The borders of new socio-
political entities, in which an attempt is being 
made to preserve all the functions of the 
sovereignty of the state, are no longer entirely 
situated at the outer limit of territories; they 
are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the 
movement of information, people, and things is 
happening and is controlled— for example, in 
cosmopolitan cities.  
This might be a direct result of the nature of border security issues such 
as terrorism, vast migration, organised crime and contagious diseases 
control.  All these issues require cross border solutions because of their 
impact beyond the boundaries of a single society, Balibar (2002: 84) uses 
the term ‘heterogeneity of the borders’ referring to their nature, implying 
that borders are becoming more diffuse in the sense that they no longer 
constitute the sites within nation-states in which politics, culture and 
socioeconomics coincide. Borders are no longer necessarily situated at the 
border. More importantly for Balibar the traditional relationships 
between the state and its supposed territory and (national) identity is 
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changing under the conditions of globalization, leading not to a borderless 
world, but a world in which borders are increasingly reflexive.  As 
Balibar suggests ‘Borders are both multiplied and reduced in their 
localisation and their function…they are being thinned out and doubled, 
becoming border zones, regions, or where one can reside and live.’ (1998: 
220). 
These membrane-like borders are not necessarily confined to the 
territorial limits of the state, or even at other traditional points of entry 
such as train stations and airports (membranes are typically described as 
flexible as well as porous); they are unfixed and mobile, diffused 
throughout, within and outside the state (Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2006; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2008). They are, as Etienne Balibar has stated, 
‘…dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, 
people, and things is happening and is controlled (2004: 1). Thus, 
strikingly, mobility is not simply in terms of immigrants or other goods 
and people crossing the border, but the actual border itself. 
On this logic, the process of bordering becomes 
a kind of mobility management business that is 
located throughout and beyond the state, where 
securitisation and protection does not 
categorically mean ‘closing the door’ but rather 
continued, and indeed, increased focus on 
mobility, categorisation and thus control’ 
(Cooper 2012: 51).  
Indicative of this, Andreas (2003: 78), for example, suggests simply ‘more 
intensive border law enforcement is accompanying the de-militarization 
and economic liberalization of borders’. In other words, ‘a fundamental 
shift to policing has caused a reconfiguration of the border and while it is 
becoming less militarised, it is becoming more a site of stringent law 
enforcement’ (2003: 78). According to Andreas the new goal of policing 
across the border is to ‘selectively deny territorial access’ (2003: 78). 
According to Andreas the reconfiguration of border security involves:  
creating new and more restrictive laws; 
constructing a more expansive policing and 
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surveillance apparatus that increasingly 
reaches beyond physical borderlines; promoting 
greater cross-border police cooperation and use 
of neighbours as buffer zones; deploying more 
sophisticated detection technologies and 
information systems; redefining law 
enforcement concerns as security concerns; and 
converting war-fighting agencies, technologies, 
and strategies to carry out crime fighting 
missions (Andreas, 2003: 107). 
Andreas, here, clearly indicates that border security is not just a law 
enforcement issue or a military issue because securitization of border 
does not necessarily take place at the edge of the territory in the new 
security environment and this engenders a necessity of converting 
traditional agencies into organizations which can deal with new threats. 
While security strategies are adapted to the new security environment, 
security’s spatial, political, and institutional arenas should also be 
reviewed, in alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of 
key actors, thereby further transforming state apparatus. Three thought-
provoking models illustrate the changing spatiality of securitization of 
borders: remote control, citizen-surveillance and juxtaposed borders. 
A strategy, which is at the same time privatisation of border control in a 
sense, often called ‘remote control’ (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2000), requires 
truck drivers to repeatedly check their cargo for illegal immigrants using 
increasingly sophisticated methods commonly found at traditional border 
sites (Walters, 2006: 194), long before reaching and crossing the UK 
borders.   Nick Vaughan-Williams’s conceptualisation of the ‘citizen 
detective’ is another example in that citizens themselves can be said to be 
undertaking border security practices, such as downloading pictures of 
wanted suspects onto mobile phones, or being provided with phone 
numbers to ring if a suspected or suspicious person is identified 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 63).  In similar vein, supermarket checkout 
staff are being trained by MI5 to recognise terrorist activities. Strikingly, 
this example indicates that ‘the supermarket checkout now resembles a 
border crossing or transit point where personal possessions, goods and 
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identities are routinely scrutinised’ (Rumford, 2008: 1), so that the 
techniques and practices regularly employed at the border are being 
introduced to the supermarket. ‘The supermarket checkout has come to 
resemble a border; a border in the midst of society’ (Rumford, 2008: 1). 
The third model is the UK’s strategy known as juxtaposed borders. This 
entails the UK having a border control presence in Brussels and Paris, 
and at the same time the French have a border control presence at St 
Pancras Eurostar terminal in London (Rumford, 2008: 2).  ‘Juxtaposed 
controls in France and Belgium have contributed to a 70 per cent 
reduction in unfounded asylum claims since 2002.’ (Home Office, 2007).  
There are two significant lessons to learn from these examples. First, 
securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at the 
geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone. Second, in connection 
with this, a new form of statehood has emerged. This is important 
because, while traditional security concerns give prominent importance 
to state borders, non-traditional security concepts tend to traverse these 
borders through a re-bordering process. From the non-traditional point of 
view, the most prominent characteristic is to transport particular issues 
from the national level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas 
and in doing so, transform traditional forms of state mechanism.  
This is different from simple internationalisation of security issues based 
on state territory. Bigo (2001), for example, demonstrates how internal 
and external security is increasingly conflated through the extension of 
internal policing practices beyond state borders and the domestic 
deployment of the military. It means dealing with non-traditional 
security issues requires governance to be shifted beyond territorial 
borders and at the same time thinking about the role of non-state 
institutions and changing those of established institutions of the state so 
that non-traditional border security does not simply mean adding new 
threats to a list of security concerns for states whose fundamental nature 
remains unchanged. Rather, by virtue of its cross-border nature, it 
requires a process of state transformation. 
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The relationship between security policies and their socio-political and 
economic context is important here. When shaping, security policy 
professionals who exercise state power should consider the changing 
mind-set of statehood and the interests of society including the resistance 
points. Consequently, this strategy will help to remove potential conflicts 
between state and society across borders and it will serve to rationalize 
and legitimize the traditional methods of security systems based on fixed 
borders. 
The examples demonstrate that the assumption that borders are to be 
found at the edges of a state territory has shifted away from the external 
borders and those borders are becoming dispersed throughout society and 
anywhere outside the country. Therefore, securitisation of borders should 
no longer necessarily take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary 
line or zone. The border has become diffuse and mobile and lost its 
traditional spatiality. Particularly within the dominant discourse around 
the concept of re-bordering (or the formation of new borders) which better 
provides an example of new strategies of securitization.  Success and 
effectiveness of border security strategy relies on this re-bordering of 
borders, compatible with the mobility logic and different from the strict 
geopolitical sense. However, this means that territoriality undergoes a 
constant processes of ‘de and re-territorialisation’, but they are still state 
borders. The question here is whether this dynamic process (de/re-
territorialisation) is an adequate solution for contemporary security 
problems. 
 
5.4. Society, border and border security 
The diffusion of borders throughout society has become a key theme in 
border studies in recent times. The idea that borders are diffused 
throughout society, engenders a strong correlation between the principles 
of societal security and border security, particularly in the context of 
borders where people living on both sides share cultural, ethnic and 
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religious ties, especially in cases where national borders are required to 
be both open for business and closed to terrorists and traffickers. In this 
context, Konrad and Nicol’s idea of ‘a zone of interaction’ is a good 
example: ‘a zone of interaction where people on one side of the border 
share values, beliefs, feelings and expectations with people on the other 
side of the border’(2008: 32). By emphasizing the connectivity of borders, 
this notion is thereby helping shift the discussion of borders away from 
traditional state-centric approach. More importantly perhaps in the 
present context they emphasize that locals do not necessarily see borders 
in the same way as state institutions. For example, Sibley (1995) 
understands borders as societal and notes that groups use borders 
symbolically to further their own ends (e.g. securing socio-spatial/ethnic 
homogeneity). This then signifies that ‘Bordering is a practical activity, 
enacted by ordinary people as well as (nation) states, to make sense of 
and ‘do work’ in the world’ (Cooper and Perkins, 2012: 57).  
For Donnan and Wilson, people ‘impose their own border meanings 
within the borderland’, and borders are both ‘meaning-making’ and 
‘meaning carrying’ entities, forming an integral part of cultural 
landscapes (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 4). Indeed, van Schendel (2005) 
argues that the study of borderlands should be less state centric, because 
borderlands are spaces of interest in their own right. Therefore there is a 
change, away from concentrating on the territorial dividing line of 
traditional understanding, to the way in which people experience borders 
through constructing their own ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, and such a move 
views the border as a space in which these identity dynamics can play 
out.   In this way a useful focus on the social construction of borders 
allows us to explore alternative ways to produce security strategies. In 
these terms the importance of van Schendel’s work on borderlands cannot 
be underestimated. van Schendel argues that ‘borders not only join what 
is different but also divide what is similar’ (2005a: 44). Borderland here is 
described as a ‘zone or region within which lies an international border’, 
more importantly, a borderland society is ‘a social and cultural system 
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straddling that border’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 44). van Schendel is 
particularly interested in illicit (cross border) trade in the context of 
borderlands and in terms of this chapter, there are some very useful 
insights that can be extracted. To sum up in his own words:   
For border landers, the state scale is not 
overarching and does not encompass the more 
‘local’ scales of community, family, the 
household or the body. On the contrary, to 
them it is the state that, in many ways, 
represents the local and the confining, seeking 
to restrict the spatiality of border lander’s 
everyday relations. Scales that most heart 
landers experience as neatly nested within the 
state scale – face-to-face relations of 
production, marketing networks, or community 
identities – are experienced very differently by 
border landers. In their case, these scales are 
often less ‘local’ than the state; they breech the 
confines of that scale, spill over its limits, 
escape its mediating pretensions, and therefore 
set the scene for a specific borderland politics of 
scale (van Schendel, 2005b: 49).   
It is essential to point out here that, for van Schendel, scale politics 
specifically involves the inability of the state scale to prevent clandestine 
(unauthorised) cross border activity.  The state scale, in other words, is 
unable to achieve complete hegemony because it is constantly being 
challenged by the restructuring/rescaling capabilities of border landers, 
or as van Schendel (2005b: 55) described it ‘everyday trans-nationality’. 
In the context of the India/Bangladesh borderland, van Schendel gives a 
few examples such as an arms smuggler who uses the pronoun ‘we’ to 
simultaneously refer to fellow Indian citizens, to other cross-border 
smugglers, and to a regional religious category. 
The significant question here is why sovereign state law enforcement 
regulations include tough border security measures but no solutions to 
the flow of people and goods. The answer lies in van Schendel’s 
suggestion that issues of legality and illegality should not take the state 
as the point of departure (2005b). He makes a distinction between what 
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states consider to be legitimate (legal) and what people involved in 
transnational networks consider to be legitimate. Van Schendel stresses 
that there is a clear line between illicitness and laws of state, ‘state 
definitions of what is illicit are situational’ (2005b: 7). He also argues that 
understanding the nature, pattern, forms and meanings of illegal 
transnational activities remains far from adequate because of variety of 
reasons from the difficulties of conducting research and more importantly  
‘the difficulty of thinking outside the conceptual and material grasp of the 
modern state’ (2005b: 8). What we are particularly interested here is the 
movement across state borders and its impact in relation to the territorial 
security concept. As van Schendel points out: 
Individuals and social groups  that 
systematically contest or bypass state controls 
do not simply flout the letter of the law; with 
repeated transgressions  over time, they bring 
into question the legitimacy of the state itself by 
questioning the state’s ability  to control its own 
territory (van Schendel, 2005b: 14). 
He describes ‘the transnational criminal activities’ as forms of social 
practise that intersect two or more regulatory spaces and violate at least 
one normative or legal rule (van Schendel, 2005b: 15). He also posits that 
something considered illegal in a formal sense [by state] may not be 
considered illicit by the population or even by the law enforcement 
community, by giving the example of Qat (kat) leaves in Yemen and the 
Netherlands decriminalisation the possession of marijuana (2005b: 18), 
van Schendel continues:  
Legal restrictions often come up against socially 
sanctioned practises, and while this may have 
the effect of driving these practises into the 
sphere of formal criminality, it does not 
eliminate them nor does it necessarily force 
them into hiding. Likewise, the absence of the 
law does not imply that all is permissible 
(2005b: 18). 
The discussion above clearly demonstrates that the political limits of the 
state do not always overlap geographic limits, even within the state 
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territory political limits may not reach the geographic limits. ‘The 
political and geographic limits of sovereignty imply the presence of 
competing authorities, whether other states or non-state ideological 
affiliations, and thereby constitute foundational crises of authority’ (van 
Schendel, 2005b: 23). As a result, if the state fails to understand these 
unique interactions and intersections occurring in the borderland it will 
reinforce the securitization of the borders and undoubtedly cause conflicts 
with society. In addition, neighbouring states may have different views 
on illegality.  What is considered illegal on one side of the border may be 
considered legal or not strategically significant on the other. This 
situation also leads to increasing mobility across the borders of the state, 
for example cross-border shopping and cross border gambling. 
To sum up, the ongoing struggle between border enforcement agencies 
and border crossers emerge due to different understandings of legitimacy. 
Breaking a law may not have the same illegitimate implications for 
different communities. Therefore, de/re-territorialisation of security 
without fully comprehending the interests of the various societies of the 
borderland is destined to fail. 
For border problems such as illegal immigration, terrorism and 
trafficking there are a wide range of administrative solutions such as 
hard border controls, more criteria for entry, forward defences within the 
neighbourhood territory, setting up buffer zones or creating economic 
development policies for people to stay in their countries. However, 
successful policy for example to stop hundreds of people dying in the 
Mediterranean is hard to find. Territoriality may be reinforced by 
processes of ‘de and re-territorialisation of borders, but they may 
predominantly be state borders nevertheless. Thus, a wide range of 
factors such as rapid developments in transportation, increasing cross-
border economic activities, kinship, religious and ethnic ties has 
promoted new security strategies. ‘This tactic does not remove the state 
from security analysis, but it does shift it off centre stage: it puts more 
‘national’ back into national security’’ (Waever et al. 1993: 196). It 
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signifies border security is more than boundary protection and not ‘a sub-
set of national security’ any more. It directly relates to how society 
experiences the border.  
 
5.5. Clash of borders and the efficiency of security strategies 
Territorial states and international boundaries are recent phenomena. It 
was during the late Middle ages that the concepts of sovereignty, ‘the 
notion that each state commands a monopoly of legitimate power within 
its own domain’ and of territory, ‘the delineation of that domain around 
self-enclosed, mutually exclusive borders’, merged to create the modern 
territorial state (Brenner et al. 2003: 2). In 1648 the Treaty of 
Westphalia, by recognising the territorial sovereignty of 300 states in 
Europe, marked the consolidation of the concept of the state as we know 
it today (Taylor, 2000: 158). State borders were seen as a barrier against 
assaults from outside and they symbolize territoriality. The 
contemporary realities of interdependence and territorial security, along 
with debates over the meaning and limits of national sovereignty and 
security have made the management of borders an increasingly contested 
concept in recent years. In terms of security, border notions express 
different meanings to the state and to society.  
With close links to territorial (national) security, borders are a means of 
building a nation-state and sustaining national unity with the additional 
benefit of safeguarding the state from external threats. Borders have 
been seen as the markers of the state and ‘the spatial strategy of 
territoriality –the attempt by states to claim complete authority and 
control over social life in a given territory- produces borders  and makes 
them crucial markers of success and limitation of strategy’ (van Schendel, 
2005b: 46). This, indeed, clearly implies that the success of the old notion 
of territorial security might become its weakness at the same time. 
As discussed above, national security, referring to territorial security and 
border control, is the main means of restricting territorial access. 
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Borders, as John Agnew has reminded us, are integral to the making of 
the nation-state (2008). Political spaces, and the borders which contain 
them, used to be given a prominent importance by the institutions of the 
nation state because the indivisibility of national territory and 
maintenance of visible borders are two of the most significant markers of 
sovereignty. John Agnew’s notion of the ‘territorial trap’ is extremely 
useful in trying to understand the different assumptions that are rooted 
in our understanding of the modern nation-state. These assumptions can 
also constitute the weaknesses of territorial state security.  He 
distinguishes three key assumptions. The first is that the modern nation 
state is a clearly bounded territorial space. Secondly and consequently, 
‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs are two entirely different realms. Finally, 
the assumption that boundaries of the state equate to boundaries of 
society (Agnew, 1994: 53).  However, after the Cold War, the ‘lazy 
assumption’ (borrowed from van Schendel) of state and society as 
territorially conterminous has been undermined.  The boundaries of 
society (identity) are different and are determined by language, religion, 
race, and culture, in contrast modern state boundaries were and are 
constituted by territory. A border, therefore, is simply taken to be a 
marker of difference but not impenetrable division. However, a society’s 
borders may represent a fluidity and diffusion beyond state borders. 
This differentiation impacts greatly on security strategies and even on 
the definition of security.  In deconstruction examining the geographical 
borders of a territorial state, the borders of the state constitute ‘us’ and 
‘them’ and thus military is deployed to protect these borders from those 
outside, not like ‘us’. However, as we often see in the Middle East and the 
rest of the world, ‘them’ may not be ‘them’ from a societal perspective. 
This flaw of traditional territorial security is central when growing 
numbers of groups begin to express their identities politically and make 
political demands on the state. As a result, conflicts become inevitable. 
On the other hand, equating state boundaries to societal boundaries 
assumes that inside is homogenous and outside is different. The creation 
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and consolidation of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to the nation-state is 
crucial to its existence. It generates an identity that bounds the concept 
of this socio-spatial entity together. Nevins (2002: 158) explains how 
‘boundaries, emanating from both ideal and material processes, are an 
outgrowth and simultaneously a producer of nationalism, state power, 
and the ability of the state and the nation to shape our collective 
consciousness, and thus practices’. 
With the end of the Cold War, however, this inside/outside dichotomy lost 
its importance.  Bishai gives two reasons for that: 
Territorial boundaries can never contain 
completely pure ‘national’ identities for two 
important reasons. One is that the flow of 
people across the earth’s surface in all 
directions has never ceased and is unlikely to 
ever completely to do so. The other, even more 
imperative, reason is that regardless of 
common language, religion, culture or other 
identity markers, members of a group can 
never maintain identical perspectives, and 
ideological separations will always exist (2000: 
159) 
Just as Agnew (1994: 63) has argued: ‘massive international migrations, 
the emergence of middle level or world-regional 'superpowers' (e.g. India), 
and the de-territorialisation of the communications media combine to 
limit the confinement of ‘Others’ in spatial reservations.’ However, as 
Bishai, (2000: 159) suggests ‘if human collectivities are destined to 
contain multiple identities, then security, defined as ‘keeping the other 
out’, becomes an impossibility’ and further, focusing on borders to keep 
others out for security inevitably creates insecurity. The state borders, in 
other words, could never keep out the external because the outside world 
is already inside at the same time.  ‘The statist presumption of security 
through territoriality allows only for an external location for threat. This 
presumption allowed the state to operate as the describer and provider of 
both security and identity, for majority’ (Bishai, 2000: 161). However, 
when group identity and security is created by the state, the system may 
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create privileges for the most powerful groups who hold the political 
power. As a result, other ethno-cultural groups can feel threatened 
because the group which can best use the state power will merge its 
understanding of national identity and security with the state itself. 
Inevitably, this can create significant threats, such as secessionist 
movements, which are a primary threat to state security. 
‘The primary reason that secession has been seen as both the saviour of 
the threatened minority group and the bane of sovereign states is the 
deeply rooted belief that territory is necessary for security’ (Bishai, 2000: 
167, 168). The reason behind this assumption is explained best by Agnew 
as: 
Security is only possible for a tightly defined 
spatial unit endowed with sovereignty. Hence, 
politics, in the sense of the pursuit of justice 
and virtue, could exist only within territorial 
boundaries. Outside is danger, realpolitik, and 
the use of force. Security is then, by definition, 
the defence of a particular spatial sovereignty 
and the politics within it (Agnew: 1994: 62). 
However, the concept of secession cannot be presented as a solution to a 
conflict or a democratic right because political identity is again attached 
to territory as discussed above. By redrawing territorial boundaries, 
building walls and creating ‘others’ to define themselves, secessionist 
groups become privileged and create underprivileged identities in their 
new territory. To create another territorial state cannot protect people 
who cannot protect themselves.  State borders are based on exclusion 
rather than inclusion. The erection of border walls and fences only 
polarises the differences and enhances the antagonism against the people 
on the other side. This kind of border logic is misleading because state 
borders are incapable of keeping others on the other side. We then fall 
into what Agnew refers to as the ‘territorial trap’.  
However, this does not have to be the case. As Agnew (1994: 53) crucially 
argues: 
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Systems of rule or political organization need 
not be either territorial, where geographical 
boundaries define the scope of membership in a 
polity a priori (for example, in kinship or clan 
systems space is occupied as an extension of 
group membership rather than residence 
within a territory defining group membership 
as in territorial states), or fixed territorially (as 
with nomads)... even when rule is territorial 
and fixed, territory does not necessarily entail 
the practices of total mutual exclusion which 
the dominant understanding of the territorial 
state attributes to it (Agnew:1994:54). 
Since the territorial security framework has proven incapable of 
providing security in today’s highly mobilised world, there is a need for a 
new basis for security that does not depend only upon territoriality. Such 
a new security framework will be both statist and anti-statist. It will be 
statist because it will promote ‘secured identities’ without secessionist 
claims; and it will be anti-statist because it will not depend on a rigid 
territorial sovereignty for the state. For that reason societal security 
gives us a useful tool as it represents a reconceptualization of a duality of 
state and societal security. It can also help to develop some insight into 
the contemporary security problems connected to territoriality. Although 
societies are sometimes closely linked the state, they have independent 
influence in security matters. While societal security sometimes overlaps 
with the traditional concerns of state security, it can also be considered in 
its own right.  
 
5.6. Summary 
Although there is still a prevalent tendency to see borders from the 
territorial perspective of the state, societal security offers the opportunity 
to shift the emphasis in border studies in some important ways. First, 
and the most important shift is the changing spatiality of borders which 
is a key feature of contemporary border security practises. It is crucial to 
recognise that borders are not necessarily at the nation-state frontiers. 
For example, the EU is active in establishing and shifting borders in and 
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outside Europe; and indeed defining where Europe’s border is located. 
The patrols carried out by Frontex, off the coast of Africa operationalise a 
border which is different from traditional territorial border. The ‘Frontex 
border’ is a new sort of flexible border, deployed whenever and wherever 
it is needed and works to constitute the EU border similar to Balibar’s 
construct, that is borders can be found ‘wherever selective controls are to 
be found’ (Balibar, 2002: 84, 85). The inside/outside distinction has lost 
its importance and looking out from the watchtower to the other side to 
look for the enemy will no longer be a valid strategy. Borders now are 
mobile, dispersed throughout society wherever they are needed; they are 
a far from the static territorial borders which are viewed necessary for 
national and territorial identity.  However, fluid, diffuse borders do not 
necessarily exclude traditional forms of borders and their security, and 
new security strategies should beware of dilution through dissemination 
and polarisation by societal groups that in turn has the potential to 
criminalise entire groups. 
The connective nature of the border zones, in terms of society’s ability to 
provide security, engender the need for recognition of the constitutive 
nature of borders in economic, social and political life and hence this 
redefinition will provide useful tools to shape the security environment.  
Borders are not necessarily always working in the service of the state. In 
the logic of territorial security, borders are seen as a number of 
securitised defence lines. However, borders do not always conform to this 
model when people engage in ‘local’ bordering activity designed to 
regulate mobility over the border fences. Securing borders, therefore, is 
now less about securing lines, and not even the transformation or shifting 
of lines. Indeed, securing borders now requires much more emphasis on 
how people experience the borders. 
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CHAPPTER 6  
FROM FEAR OF LOSS OF TERRITORY TO FEAR OF 
CHANGE 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to existing research by 
creating a clear picture of the current border security framework in 
Turkey in the reader’s mind. The chapter comprises two main 
components.  The first, discusses organisational structures which the 
researcher has determined is part of the problem.  The second will focus 
on the politics of security in Turkey to give the reader a clear insight to 
this crucial aspect because it constitutes a major component of this 
complex problem.  
This will provide some useful tools while discussing the traditional and 
contemporary philosophy of border security norms, because Turkish 
policy choices with respect to the external borders are directly related to 
its national security structure and national security policy.  The focus 
will then move to the external and domestic dynamics affecting Turkey’s 
national security choices.  
Turkey has difficulties in providing border security as it is a country 
which has long mountainous land borders on the east and south west and 
has large borders with several countries with unstable regimes such as 
Iraq and Syria.  Internal conflicts, financial difficulties and undemocratic 
behaviours have led many people from neighbouring countries to come to 
Turkey in search of a better life.  It also has long coasts (6530 km) which 
constitute sea borders to the South, North and West. Turkey   represents 
a crossroads between the Middle East, Asia and Europe and this 
geographical location requires a strong border control and safeguarding 
organization. Turkey has a total of 2.949 km. of land borders and a 
rugged land configuration. Borders in the east and southeast lie on 
mountains constituting 65per cent of its land borders in mountainous 
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regions. In addition some border regions suffer from severe climatic 
conditions where harsh, winters may last up to six months.  
Turkey is also strategically on several routes for illegal immigration so 
that people try to reach the EU by passing through Turkey. As a result, 
Turkey is faced with a number of risks and threats such as terrorism, 
human trafficking, drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, and a 
range of unlawful actions by transnational organized criminals.  
In recent years, illegal border crossings, mostly in the form of 
multinational organized crime (smuggling, trafficking and terrorism etc.), 
have created serious difficulties not only for Turkey but also for European 
border management systems. Illegal immigrants are smuggled into 
Turkey and also Europe either across unregulated land, sea or air 
borders or through regulated security check points using 
counterfeit/stolen passports or as concealed cargoes. Turkey is affected by 
these illegal activities due to its position as a ‘bridge’ between east and 
west. Turkey's borders are currently protected by the military at the land 
borders, the General Directorate of Security is responsible for the entry 
and exit of the persons at border gates, the Undersecretariat of Customs 
is responsible for the entry and exit of the goods at border gates, and 
surveillance duties at maritime borders (between the border gates) are 
performed by the Coast Guard Command.  
In line with the EU membership processes the Strategy Paper for the 
Protection of the External Borders in Turkey was adopted in 2003. This 
Strategy Paper recommended that a single authority should be 
responsible for the security of the borders under the auspices of the 
Ministry of the Interior, which would take over the border control 
functions currently performed by the Turkish military and semi-military 
structures. The new authority will be in charge of all border protection 
duties in Turkey and specially trained, professional law-enforcement 
units will perform all functions, in line with EU standards (National 
Action Plan, p.20). The purpose of the Action Plan was to form the basis 
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for institutional reforms and legislative regulations, in order to establish 
a single civilian, non-military, professional body responsible for 
performing all border control and surveillance tasks at the borders.  In 
accordance with the Action Plan, Turkey decided, prior to the 
establishment of a non-military and professional Border Guard 
Organization, to further strengthen the technical and administrative 
capacities of agencies and institutions responsible for the control of the 
borders, to be in line with the EU Member States practices. Turkey is 
now creating a new Border Security Department for European Union 
integration and this department will be responsible for border security. 
In order to map out Turkey’s border security policy, it is necessary to 
scrutinise the Turkish National Security concept because there is no 
separate border security strategy. Border security issues are dispersed 
within the concept of National Security. This provides an opportunity for 
the reader to better understand the criticisms in the following sections 
which discuss the external and domestic dynamics affecting Turkey’s 
transformation process.  
 
6.1. The existing border security framework in Turkey 
Currently in Turkish law, the authority in charge of border security is 
the Ministry of Interior. The Interior Ministry performs this duty with 
the help of governors and district governors. Whilst performing this task, 
a number of organisations were set up alongside governors to ensure 
border security. The military is responsible for the protection and 
surveillance of land and sea borders, and Police and Customs are 
responsible for the check and control of passengers and goods at border 
gates. At the airports, the authority for border security lies under the 
Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for security operations. 
According to the Additional Article 1 of the 5442 Law for Provincial 
Administration, the Ministry fulfils this task via local authorities, police 
forces, private security forces and related public and private institutions 
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and organizations. The Coast Guard Command have law enforcement 
powers although it is a military organization. However, the Land Forces 
General Command which is responsible for the protection of the land 
borders has no law enforcement authority. The criminals apprehended by 
the Land Forces units are immediately delivered to the Gendarmerie or 
Police units for necessary proceedings. 
   
6.1.1. Institutional Framework 
According to Turkish Law, the overall supervision of border security is 
exercised by the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of the Interior 
performs these functions through the deputy governors assigned by the 
Governors according to ‘Provincial Administration Law’. The District 
Governors, who are responsible for co-ordination among the various 
agencies working at the borders and border gates, are the 1st degree 
border authorities, and the Governors are the 2nd degree border 
authorities.  Checking of goods and people at the border gates are carried 
out separately by border protection agencies. 
The present system for Border Management consists of several fully 
autonomous Border Agencies, some are of a military character such as 
Land Forces and the Coast Guard; and others are civilian.    
Border management and controls are currently carried out by the 
following agencies:   
 General Directorate of Security (Police Forces), (duties related to 
the entry and exit of persons at border gates)   
 Under-Secretariat of Customs (duties related to the entry and exit 
of goods at border gates)   
 Land Forces General Command (duties related to the border 
surveillance at land borders)   
 Coast Guard Command (duties related to surveillance of maritime 
borders, no responsibility at border gates)  
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 Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (duties related to 
veterinary and phytosanitary inspections at border gates)  
 Ministry of Health (duties related to human inspections at border 
gates) 
 
There are currently no links between the databases of the different 
border services. Information exchange occurs on an ad-hoc basis and is 
not institutionalized. Cross-border exchange of information between some 
of the border agencies and their counterparts is also carried out on ad-hoc 
basis, as there are currently no laid down formal procedures. 
6.1.2. General Directorate of Security (Police Forces) 
The Turkish Police, which is in charge of checks on people at the Border 
Gates perform the following duties:  
 carrying out exit and entry checks, including registration;  
 checking of visas and travel documents;  
 detecting forged/counterfeit travel documents and taking such 
steps as inadmissibility and initiation of judicial proceedings; 
 deportation procedures; 
 receiving of asylum applications;  
 Other security measures when dealing with the smuggling of 
human beings, as well as performing general law enforcement 
functions.   
 
6.1.3. The Land Forces General Command 
The 3497 Law of Protection and Security of Land Borders designates the 
Turkish Land Forces as the responsible authority for the task of the 
protection and security of land borders. The main duties at the land 
borders are fighting against smuggling, undertaking checks and control 
of forbidden military zones, performing tasks related to illegal entries 
and immigration, and handing over detainees to local law enforcement 
authorities. However, The Land Forces General Command, which is 
142 
 
responsible for the protection of about 91per cent of the land borders, has 
no law enforcement authority. 
The principal responsibility of the TSK (Turkish military) at the borders 
is reconnaissance and surveillance of the neighbouring country within 
the framework of national defence. However, while the TSK units do 
their job related to border security they are in a position to assist the 
Ministry of Interior in border protection, for example by apprehending 
and handing over criminals to the local civilian authorities in the 
borderlands. 
Of specific note, the Gendarmerie, which is a military institution, but 
reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, used to conduct duties related to 
border surveillance in the areas, where other agencies are not able to act 
because of specific geographical and/or political conditions (mainly at the 
border with Iraq).  The Gendarmerie has completely transferred its 
responsibility over these borders latter to the Turkish Land Forces; thus, 
removing a duality over the protection and security of land borders of the 
country. 
 
6.1.4. The Coast Guard Command 
The Coast Guard Command is the principal agency for the enforcement of 
the provisions of all national laws with regard to the maritime zones. The 
Coast Guard fulfils its missions along the sea borders of 6,530 kilometers.  
The main duties of the Coast Guard are 
 to protect and ensure the security of the coastal and territorial 
waters,  
 to prevent and detect all kinds of smuggling carried out at sea,  
 to observe and control the operational status of navigational aids,  
 to perform search and rescue missions within the search and 
rescue area at sea , 
 to assist other security forces to detect crimes different from those 
mentioned above, which originate on land and continue out at sea,  
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 to intervene in such crimes when required, and to deliver the 
detained criminals to the authorized bodies (Public Prosecutors 
and/or Gendarmerie and Police).  
The significant point here is that the Coast Guard Command has no 
responsibilities at the sea border gates and only operates as a law 
enforcement agency within its own area of responsibility, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. 
6.1.5. Customs 
It is noteworthy that the Undersecretariat of Customs reports to the 
Prime Ministry although the Interior Ministry is the primary border 
authority. The competence of the Customs at the border gates include:  
 control of entry and exit of goods, passengers and all types of 
vehicles and vessels;  
 carrying out investigations in regard to all kinds of smuggling 
(including drugs, firearms and cultural property) as an 
Enforcement Unit;  
 taking these cases to judicial proceedings;  
 preventing infringements of Intellectual Property Rights; 
 Assisting the other Law Enforcement Bodies in the prevention of 
human smuggling and cash control.  
The Customs is also empowered to secure and control the land border 
gate areas and to combat trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials 
across the borders. 
6.1.6. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock 
The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the import of plant and 
plant products, as well as animals and animal origin food products. 
The steps for the import inspection are as follows:   
 Application to Quarantine Service  
 Documentary check  
 Identity check  
 Phytosanitary inspection (visual inspection or lab test)  
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In the case of rejection at the entry point, non-complying consignments 
are returned or destroyed and a notification form is sent to the exporting 
country. 
 
6.1.7. Ministry of Health 
While the General Directorate of Primary Health Care Services controls 
issues concerning human health in relation to land borders, the General 
Directorate of Border and Coastal Health undertakes the same task in 
relation to sea borders. 
 
6.2. Attempts for organizational change and the EU impact 
Justice, freedom and security are significant and sensitive subjects of the 
enlargement process. Matters such as border security constitute the main 
criteria which member countries have to meet.  After membership to the 
EU (if granted), as Turkey’s eastern borders will be the external eastern 
borders of the Union, the implementation of border management 
constitutes an important requirement. 
Turkey has been struggling to be a member of the EU for a long time. 
Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to 1959. The critical 
turning point was the Helsinki European Council summit in December 
1999 which granted Turkey candidate status. Relations between Turkey 
and the European Union (EU) entered a new stage in October 2005 when 
the decision to start accession negotiations was finally taken. Among the 
long list of chapters that Turkey has to negotiate is the chapter on 
‘justice, freedom and security’. This is a chapter deals with a wide range 
of issues arising from the removal of internal frontiers within the 
European Union, issues ranging from the Schengen visa regime to the 
evolving common asylum and immigration policy as well as to efforts at 
enhancing police and judicial cooperation among EU member countries. 
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The importance of these issues within the EU has rapidly increased and 
dominated the agenda of the European Union for the last decade because 
of the rise of international terrorism and the attacks on Madrid and 
London. Immigration related issues had already been at the top of the 
agenda for domestic politics in a number of EU member countries, and 
have now also become associated with issues of terrorism and security. 
In this respect Turkey is central to the EU’s efforts to develop and 
implement a common immigration policy because of its critical 
geographical location, in terms of immigration related issues, and its 
unstable neighbours. In addition, Turkey has large numbers of its 
nationals that would constitute immigrant communities within the 
European Union.  There is an apprehension about the potential arrival of 
large number of immigrants from Turkey and about their integration 
within the Union. 
Amongst the bitter debates, the EU adopted its first Accession 
Partnership Strategy (AP) followed by the National Program for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) accepted by the Turkish government. The 
APs were afterwards renewed in 2003, 2006 and 2008. The AP laid out 
the political reforms that Turkey needed to adopt to meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria to start accession negotiations as well as 
the harmonization that Turkey would need to achieve in a wide range of 
policy areas including ‘freedom, security and justice’. It is under this 
section that the EU lays out the task that Turkey has to complete in 
respect to aligning Turkish practice with the EU Acquis. To achieve 
compliance with EU regulations and practices, Turkey set up a Task 
Force for Asylum, Migration and Protection of External Borders under 
the coordination of the Ministry of Interior in 2002. This was composed of 
representatives from the Coast Guard, the Gendarmerie, the Military, 
the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Undersecretary of Customs and the Secretariat General for European 
Union Affairs. In fulfilling this task, The Task Force set out, with the 
help of the Office of European Commission in Ankara, the Strategy Paper 
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on the Protection of the External Borders in Turkey in April 2003. The 
Report drew the broad outlines of the harmonization process.  
For Turkey, the so-called twinning projects play a fundamental role to 
align its legislation and structure with the EU. Some of those are 
‚Support for the development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s 
integrated border management strategy’ (TR02-JH-02); ‘Support for the 
development of an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s asylum and 
migration strategy’ (TR02-JH03); Visa Policy and Practice’ (TR03-JH-05); 
Strengthening the Institutions in the Fight against Trafficking in Human 
Beings’(TR03-JH-03). The projects commonly named as ‘twinnings’ are 
instruments for targeted administrative cooperation to assist candidate 
countries to strengthen their administrative and judicial capacity and to 
implement the EU framework within their national systems. They have 
been practised as the cornerstone of the joint effort by the European 
Union (European Commission and member states) and the candidate 
countries to foster institution-building. These projects are in turn 
expected to lead to the adoption of Action Plans that lay out the 
administrative, infrastructural and legislative steps that Turkey aims to 
take in order to adopt the EU Acquis. 
Enhancement of its border security capability is a significant necessity 
for any country, but it is especially important for Turkey with regards to 
the EU accession process because if Turkey is accepted as a member 
state, then Turkish Borders will form the Union’s Eastern border. Based 
on Article 8 of the Additional Protocol of the Amsterdam Agreement, 
candidate countries are expected to have the capacity to apply the 
Schengen Agreement before becoming a member of the EU, in order to be 
able to execute the provisions of the Agreement after a possible 
membership. Therefore, Turkey must adopt the provisions of the 
Schengen Agreement during its membership process and take the 
necessary precautions with regards to the protection and security of its 
borders. Accordingly, Turkey is aiming to form a system of integrated 
border management, which includes reforms for intra-institutional, inter-
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institutional, and international cooperation in order to facilitate trade 
and traffic across its borders. The Strategy Paper underlined that the EU 
Acquis and the Tampere Council Summit decisions ‚foresees all border 
control to be conducted by a civilian and specialised organization under a 
single authority’ (p.16, 17) and advocated for Turkey the creation of a 
new body, within the Ministry of the Interior, for all border protection 
issues composed of non-military, professional law enforcement officials. 
The strategy equally identified the key legislative and institutional 
amendments, as well as the infrastructure and training programs, 
considered as proper alignment with the Schengen Acquis. The Paper 
also foresaw a twinning project that would culminate in an Action Plan 
and even gave a name for the specialised organization as the ‘Directorate 
General of Border Security’.  
Subsequently, the twinning project was put into place in July 2004 to 
provide support for the development of an Action Plan to implement 
Turkey’s integrated border management strategy.  The Project aimed at 
completing an Action plan setting out the legislative alignment, 
institutional reforms, training and physical infrastructure and equipment 
necessary to implement the border management strategy. The Project 
would also identify the investments that would be needed to put this 
strategy into place to improve the operational capacity for the 
management of borders as well as familiarize Turkish officials with the 
EU Acquis. However, despite some important steps such as setting up the 
Directorate General of Migration Management, it did not go as planned. 
In its 2015 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission states 
that in the area of external borders and Schengen ‘Turkey did not make 
steps towards the establishment of an integrated border management 
system and a single border civilian agency. Coordination and cooperation 
among existing border management agencies needs to be improved’ 
(2015: 70). In the following paragraph the EU commission points out 
that:  
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Despite some steps, land borders continue to be 
managed by land forces, detachments composed 
mainly of conscripts with limited training and 
led by officials who are not encouraged to 
specialise in border management. There are no 
agreed rules and operating procedures for 
individual border authorities undertaking risk 
analysis. Border management authorities 
should be staffed by professionals who are not 
subject to rotation (2015: 71). 
 
6.3. Turkey’s border security policy 
It should be made clear that there is no separate border security doctrine 
in Turkey. Instead, strategies are embedded into the national security 
policy and a generic document which is formally known as the national 
military defence concept. The specifics of national security policy are 
revealed only to a few designated people in the shape of a ‘national 
security policy document’ (the Red Book), which is updated regularly to 
reflect changes in the domestic and global security environment. Due to 
its classified nature, this document becomes accessible only through 
erratic leaks to the media. This has led the researcher to investigate the 
issue in a broader framework of National Security. Before going into the 
politics of national security it is necessary to elucidate some aspects of 
border security policy of Turkey for context. As a starting point, it can be 
argued that although   in a new era which engenders a broadening and 
deepening of many aspects of the security field, state-centric discourses 
remain very powerful, whilst new forms of insecurity, violence and 
conflicts are becoming more destructive and uncontrollable. 
There are currently three significant challenges in terms of Turkey’s 
border security. Firstly, Turkey sits at a critical geographical location in 
terms of immigration related issues. Large numbers of people from 
Turkey’s close perimeter are trying to make it to Turkey and the EU as 
asylum seekers and illegal migrants. The instability, violence and 
economic problems in the region (the Middle East) worsen this situation.  
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Secondly, there are a number of terrorist organisations that have 
emerged in the turmoil of the Middle East. As a result of that Turkey has 
become a neighbour of a number of terrorist organisation such as DAESH 
(the so called Islamic State), and PYD (a branch of PKK operating in 
Syria). This makes the movement of people from this region even more 
sensitive due to the links between terrorist organisations and illegal 
immigration. Thirdly, Turkey’s borders with this region are situated in 
very sizeable and difficult terrain to manage and control. This is further 
complicated by the fact that Turkey has its own concerns in respect of the 
defence and protection of these borders, especially the ones with Iraq and 
Syria.  Both historically and currently these borders are subject to 
infiltrations of PKK terrorists (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party).  
Under these circumstances, inevitably, the priority becomes national 
defence in the narrowest sense of the word, such as preventing 
infiltration and militarily confronting such infiltration, rather than 
broader issues of security. In other words, this situation leads Turkey to 
give priority to border protection in the sense of defence by the military 
rather than border security as a comprehensive concept integrating all 
the assets and capabilities the new security environment requires.  Until 
the Syrian crisis Turkey had adopted a more flexible border policy. With 
the AK Party’s (the Justice and Development Party) coming to power, 
this more flexible border policy had replaced the traditional border 
understanding built around the nation state (Yesiltas, 2015: 15). Yesiltas 
argues that during the period of the ruling AK Party, a zero problem 
policy,  including abolishing visas with neighbouring countries, 
transformed the conventional threat and protection approach centered on 
traditional border understanding. Accordingly, ‘border was redefined to 
pave the way to social mobility by articulating common history discourse 
and by removing obstacles that limit the socio-political and economic 
relation between neighbouring countries’ (2015: 16). 
Under the influence of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who 
previously served as an AKP advisor and then Foreign Minister for many 
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years, Turkey began to pursue an active policy aimed at fostering 
economic relations between itself and its neighbours. Turkey is aware of 
the necessity to foster the linkages between political stability, economic 
welfare and cultural harmony in order to attain sustainable security.  On 
its website, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stresses that; 
the rise of Turkey to such a prominent position 
is also a consequence of Turkey’s solid stance 
that vigorously seeks legitimacy and of the 
belief that its own security and stability can 
only be achieved through the security and 
stability of the region. Behind this stance lies 
intensive efforts and major initiatives intended 
for the creation of an environment of 
sustainable peace, security and tranquility in 
the region and beyond6  
In this period a number of joint ministerial committees meeting with 
neighbouring countries (as in Syria for example) were held and border 
interaction became a top priority (Yesiltas, 2015: 16). However, Arab 
Spring7 and Syrian conflict has created a number of serious border 
security problems such as the increasing activities of terrorist 
organisations and mass migration flows. 
There is no doubt that the most dramatic development in recent years 
regarding border security has been the Syrian civil war. It has led to 
hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the country to save their lives. 
Hundred thousands of people were killed and most of these were 
civilians. The Syrian crisis has affected many neighbouring countries 
such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. Turkey has so far received 
more than 2.5 million Syrians within its borders and this has cost Turkey 
over 8 billion US dollars so far with the sum increasing as the conflict 
                                            
6 (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa, accessed in 
November 2014) 
7 Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that arose independently and spread 
across the Arab world in 2011. The movement originated in Tunisia in December 2010 
and quickly took hold in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and 
Jordan. 
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continues.8 Turkey provides the Syrians with lodging, food, healthcare, 
security, education and religious services in tent cities and container 
cities mostly in Southern part of Turkey. 
Despite the success of Turkish foreign policy over the last decade in 
opening new markets and expanding its reach into the Middle East 
through a policy of ‘zero problems with neighbours’, the Arab Spring 
movements, and particularly the crisis in Syria, has forced Ankara to 
confront the new realities of the region. There were no options for 
Turkish policy makers, except to intervene in the face of the Syrian crises 
due to vast flow of people and increasing terrorist activities across the 
shared border. This meant putting aside the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy which was conservative and inward-focused. However, the 
hesitation of western allies to overthrow President Assad has led to 
serious repercussions for Turkey. The lack of authority has created a 
suitable base for terrorists to flourish and Turkey has been under attack 
by two brutal terrorist organization DAESH9 (IS) and PKK. 
As a result, Turkey began to follow a ‘zero tolerance policy’ (Ozturk, 2015) 
in order to eliminate security risks stemming from Syria border. To 
conduct this policy, a greater number of military personnel were deployed 
to the Syrian border. 
In fact, 50% of the 40,000 military personnel 
currently serving in all the border of Turkey 
are now at Syrian border. On the other hand, to 
prevent their participation in the terrorist 
organization IS, a series of physical measures 
are also implemented. In this context, on the 
border, 365 kilometers trenches were dug, 70 
kilometer embankment was made, 160 
kilometer razor wire was rolled, 13 kilometer 
wall was built, 22 kilometers accordion barrier 
was built, and 145 kilometer wire barriers was 
renovated. In order to improve the operational 
                                            
8 http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/10/30/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-a-haber--
atv-ortak-yayininda-flas-aciklamalar, last accessed in November 2015. 
9 See the website for the acronym: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
27994277 
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performance of the border patrol units and the 
capacity of reconnaissance activities 270 
kilometer section of the border was lit and, 
1,280 -kilometer road have been modified. 
(Ozturk, 2015) 10  
 
On the other hand, the high probability of a new surge of refugees from 
Syria compels Turkey, preferably with international backing, to establish 
a buffer zone and the no-fly zone on Syrian territory to guarantee the 
security of its own southern border as well as the welfare of civilians 
fleeing the conflict. Closing the Syrian border does not seem an option.  If 
Turkey permanently closed its border, this might result in a major 
humanitarian crisis on the Syrian side, which would require an 
international response. In short, with the Russian intervention, the 
consequences of the conflict in Syria for Turkey’s own security interests 
along their shared border are threatening, and the civil war there is 
spiraling into a broader regional conflict. 
It is clear that Turkey’s border security framework is not successful 
enough to cope with the enormous risks and threats it has faced and it 
has become apparent that old ways of doing things do not work anymore.  
In spite of the compelling conditions for a new security environment, 
somethings have remained the same while somethings have changed. For 
example, the militaristic character of the border security framework has 
not yet changed. The question arises as to why Turkey insists on using 
the military to bring security to its people despite the changing nature of 
security. The financial cost the implication? Although a part of the 
answer, it is most likely that political cost outweighs this. Understanding 
the practice of security politics and effective factors will conceivably 
provide answers or at least shed a light on the current situation 
regarding Turkey’s border security framework; and more importantly 
provide a better understanding for the foundations of the fear of change. 
                                            
10 http://setav.org/tr/turkiyenin-suriye-sinir-guvenligi-politikasi/yorum/27085, accessed 
20/09/2015). 
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6.4. From Fear of Loss of Territory to Fear of Change  
Bilgin discusses that the traditional security discourse in Turkey has had 
two major components; ‘a fear of abandonment and fear of loss of 
territory; and an assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ (Bilgin 
2005:187). With regards to the former, its origins lie deep in Ottoman 
history, the Sevr Treaty in 1920 which marked the beginning of the 
partition of, and the ultimate annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. 
Because of this historical legacy, ‘fear of abandonment and fear of loss of 
territory’ has manifested itself in Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and in 
the discussions on application to join the EU. The second major 
component of the traditional security discourse has been the assumption 
of geographical determinism. In the preface to the White Paper, 
Sabahattin Çakmakoglu (then Minister of National Defence) explains the 
significance of this geographical position by noting that ‘Turkey is located 
in the centre of a region full of instabilities and uncertainties, such as the 
Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, where the balances are in a 
process of change’. The assumption of geographical determinism shapes 
not only Turkey’s security policies, but also its political processes in 
general. For example, in response to calls for democratization, Bulent 
Ecevit (then Prime Minister) maintained that ‘Turkey’s special 
geographical conditions require a special type of democracy’ (Aydınlı & 
Taxman 2001: 385).  
With reference to Agnew 1998; Agnew & Corbridge 1995; Dalby 1991; Ó 
Tuathail 1996, Bilgin (2005: 194) argues that ‘the assumption of 
geographical determinism, which such statements are built upon, glosses 
over the essentially political character of conceptualizing security, 
formulating security policies and practicing security’. In other words, this 
approach takes the ‘political’ out of geopolitics. Conceptualizing security, 
however, is a political process: 
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Treating geographical features as determinants 
of security policy is a political act in itself. This, 
in turn, is symptomatic of the unacknowledged 
and unquestioned assumption that geography 
overrides political processes in shaping not only 
security policies, but politics in general (Bilgin 
2005: 194).   
Bilgin’s arguments are consistent with the current situation in the border 
security field because whenever the need for change is expressed, 
objections are based on the difficulties of geographical conditions to 
justify the current system. However, of course, the assumption of 
geographical determinism is not the only factor shaping Turkey’s security 
policies. To contextualize the current situation, it is necessary to go 
through the external and internal influential factors respectively. 
 
6.5. External Factors 
At the turn of the century, the world community witnessed two 
significant milestones in the field of security. These were: firstly, the end 
of the cold war which has brought about new, multidimensional and 
unpredictable challenges like regional conflicts and civil war in Bosnia.  
Secondly, the events of 11 September, 2001. These two very important 
events ‘really affected the foundations of international relations, 
international organizations, as well as the strategies that dealt (till then) 
with the concepts of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ (SAREM 2004, 9–20).  
During the Cold War, threats from both sides were handled by 
superpowers in order to prevent a nuclear conflict. Thus, since the 
superpowers of each camp determined the course of policies, single states 
or regional powers did not need to have a self-contained security policy. 
This might have seemed an easy and cheap way to begin with, however 
there was a bigger price to pay later. Eventually, the end of the Cold War 
has led to regional security issues coming to the forefront as the influence 
of the superpowers either decreased or disappeared in addressing 
security issues or conflicts. In this period Turkey began to recognise the 
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new and unpredictable security risks in the Middle East, the Balkans 
and Southern Caucasus, such as ethnic/intrastate conflicts, migration, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, 
illicit trade of arms and drugs, and energy issues.   
Governments and international organizations have inevitably initiated a 
transformation process to be able to respond to this new and challenging 
environment by adopting new strategic concepts and developing new 
capabilities.  
In the region, the activities for NATO's 
preservation of the Euro-Atlantic ties and for 
attaining a flexible character in its military 
structure, the attempts of the European allies 
for assuming a more visible role in the defense 
field and the subjects of the development in the 
European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI), have become prominent as the 
significant dimensions of the transformation 
process being experienced (White Paper, Part 
One, Section One 2000) 
In May 2002 foreign ministers of NATO reached a conclusion that the 
security threats of this century should be confronted whenever necessary, 
beyond the borders of NATO. At the Reykjavik meeting it was decided 
that ‘to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to 
field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain 
operations over distance and time and achieve their objectives’ (NATO, 
2002). Simultaneously, the EU, in accepting a new Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), and initiating its enlargement process, sought to 
be an effective security actor (Güney 2004, 17, 20).  
It is inevitable that Turkey is affected by these regional security 
problems because of its unique geographical situation and its long-
standing relationship with the West. Thus, it sought to enhance its 
influence, to pursue its interests and in this process it prioritized 
multilateralism and acting within alliances in its foreign policy and 
military strategy. In this regard Turkey’s White Paper says:  
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To contribute with military forces to 
international organizations, alliances and 
related states in accordance with the national 
security and foreign policy of Turkey; 
continuation of providing cooperation, technical 
assistance and training related to military 
subjects constitute the basis of Turkey's 
collective security concept (White Paper, Part 
Four, Section One, 2000).  
After the fall of the Soviet Union followed by the Arab Spring, several 
ethnic and intrastate conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus emerged 
challenging international peace and security. These conflicts provided a 
convenient environment for cross-border security threats such as 
terrorism, human trafficking, illicit trade of arms and drugs, illegal 
immigration, refugees and environmental issues.  Therefore, new policies 
were adopted; for example peace operations mandated by the United 
Nations and undertaken by either the UN or regional organizations 
assumed importance and addressed these challenges. Turkey 
participated in various UN, NATO and EU-led missions. 
Historically, Turkey had adopted a foreign policy upholding the norms of 
territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, towards 
particularly the Middle East. However, Turkey had to revise its policy 
towards Middle Eastern issues with the 1991 Gulf War. ‘It became 
increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue this policy in the face of 
constantly shifting environment in the Middle East after the end of the 
Cold War (Altunısık, 2004: 213). In this new period, the September 11 
attacks and later Madrid and London bombings accelerated efforts for the 
evolution of the new strategies. NATO remained the most important 
actor for Turkey’s defence policy after the Cold War, because of Turkey’s 
geographical closeness to the conflict areas. The fall of the Soviet Union 
may have removed the nuclear threat, but at the same time it created 
many other issues that led to instability. Furthermore, these issues 
required more than maintaining ultimate material capabilities. Thus, 
while Turkey considers NATO as a guarantor with a nuclear option, it 
aims to pursue an active policy in its region, to prevent or alleviate the 
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adverse effects of instability in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and the 
Middle East. 
The European Security Strategy document and NATO’s two strategic 
concepts could be considered as evidence of these efforts. In these 
documents, ‘terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts and failed/failing states’ have been redefined as the new 
security threats of twenty-first century’ (Guney 2004: 17, 20). However, 
there is disagreement on how to fight against these new and 
unpredictable threats. Over the last few years, the EU has preferred to 
remain indifferent to what has been happening in the Middle East, 
despite the air bombardment against DAESH to address issues such as 
terrorism and illegal immigration. We have recently witnessed the new 
use of air forces in the form of what is described as ‘pre-emptive strikes’. 
However, it is clear that this new strategy is far from being pre-emptive.  
 
6.5.1. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 
The international community and certainly the United States responded 
to the events of 9/11 by redefining urgent threats and devised policy 
options to address them. In the rush of waging the “war against terror”, 
multilateralism in decision-making and implementation was mainly 
ignored and unilateral responses gained prominence against urgent 
threats; military measures were prioritized over diplomacy in security 
policy. Immediately after the events of 9/11, the international community 
united in extending support to the United States for the operation in 
Afghanistan. As a member of NATO, Turkey took the command of the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, first between 
June 2002 and February 2003 (ISAF II) and later between February and 
August 2005 (ISAF VII) for a total of 14 months in 3 years. The 
developments and the new international security environment after 9/11 
as well as the foreign and security policy of the United States had severe 
impacts on Turkey. Taking the side of the United States made Turkey 
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the target of two terrorist attacks in November 2003 in Istanbul.  
Moreover, the post-war conflict in Iraq affected Turkish economic and 
domestic security due to terrorist infiltrations from Iraq’s north, and 
decreasing levels of economic activity. The new security environment, in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood, particularly in Iraq and Syria, and its impacts 
on Turkey’s security have recently become more important bringing i 
about a skeptical attitude in  Turkey towards the West in general and the 
westernization process in particular. This new attitude is particularly 
remarkable because westernization had been seen as a security project 
throughout the Turkish Republic’s history. 
 
6.6. The Implications of the New Security Environment 
The policy emphasizing Turkey’s increasing involvement in the old 
Ottoman space, particularly the Middle East has been called ‘neo-
Ottomanism’.  
Although Turkey’s strategic culture has evolved 
towards more activism in the post-Cold War 
era, such an activism in the case of the Middle 
East to a large extent continued to define not as 
Ankara’s own design, but as a reluctant 
involvement forced upon Turkey by the 
circumstances (Altunisik, 2004: 214).  
Altunisik’s position on the issue discussed above because of the 
complexity of the Middle East, finds support amongst the Turkish 
establishment, for example, Turkey had to redefine a range of policies 
culminating in the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern part of 
Iraq which was once described as a threat, a red line. Nowadays, Kurdish 
Regional Government is one of Turkey’s allies. It is fair to say that 
policies in the Middle East have mostly been determined by 
circumstances. 
In the new security conditions of the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s status 
of a flank country in the frontline has changed and Turkey has become an 
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open target of the new security threats mainly emanating from its 
neighbours. According to NATO’s MC-161 Document,  
There are 16 regions which are determined by 
the Alliance as ‘unstable’ and ‘risky’ and 
unfortunately 13 of them are around Turkey. 
Similarly, the 16 potential crisis regions that 
are considered to be affecting European 
security by the EU are also in the vicinity of 
Turkey (Mat, 2003: 100). 
That is why Turkey and the surrounding region have gained a critical 
importance in the current security strategies of the West. Apart from the 
conventional ones the new threats are unpredictable, multidimensional 
and hence more dangerous. Turkey, realizing the new conditions of the 
security environment, has decided to make important changes in its 
defence policy. The new threats to Ankara have been declared as weapons 
of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, drugs, terrorism, political 
and economic instability and regional/ethnic conflicts (Sheffer 2005: 38). 
In the wake of these threat perceptions, Ankara’s military strategy in the 
‘2000 Defence White Paper of Turkey is redefined as deterrence, military 
contributions to crisis management and intervention, forward  defence 
and collective security’ (Sheffer 2005: 32). Interestingly, ‘Both of these 
ideas were then the extensions of the current NATO and American 
strategic vocabulary’ (Sheffer 2005: 31). 
In order to meet the requirements of the new security environment, like 
other Western countries and leading international organizations (for 
example NATO and the EU), Turkey has decided to upgrade its military 
capabilities. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish General Staff, 
whose goal was to realize a Turkish Armed Forces transformation, 
consistent with the new Turkish defence policy, took very important 
measures to realize this military transformation, such as; 50,000 strong 
rapid response force had been developed, 5-6 battalions ready for 
immediate and long range deployment and a submarine deployable over 
15000 miles. The main aim of transforming the Turkish Armed Forces 
was to create a modern but at the same time smaller force with high 
160 
 
deployability and high fire power.  The country’s culture and history has 
played an important role in these transformation efforts to keep up with 
peace-keeping operations from Bosnia to the Sudan.  
6.7. Breaking up 
In a broader perspective, the westernization process in Turkey was set 
into motion as a security strategy aiming at guaranteeing the survival of 
the newly born Turkish Republic (Karaosmanoglu, 2000).  However 
changing conditions after the end of Cold War made it difficult for Turkey 
to view the westernization process as a legitimate security strategy. As 
Oguzlu (2007) points out the changing security conceptualization of the 
United States, and the growing Western demands from Turkey to re-
define its security identity and interests in accordance with the emerging 
security rationale in the West forced Turkey to review the westernization 
process as a legitimate security strategy. 
After the 9/11 attacks, western governments developed a strategy based 
upon promoting democracy in the broader Middle East. They believed 
that there was a direct correlation between the quality of security feeling 
in the West and the way states are run in the so-called developing world 
(Asmus; Diamond; Leonard, 2005: 7, 21).  ‘In this emerging 
understanding, security in the West would be best achieved if the so-
called weak and failed states in non-western geographies were 
transformed into liberal democracies and governed more effectively’ 
(Oguzlu, 2007: 54) to prevent their support of  international terrorism as 
a threat to the West.  
In fact, in spite of the position that merging its security with the West 
was fundamental to Turkey’s security in the first years of the Cold War, 
the collapse of Soviet Union created difficulties in Turkey’s relations with 
the USA, and pressurised Turkish leadership to seek ties with the East 
and with the Arab countries. In this context, according to Oguzlu there 
are three reasons for the considerable deterioration in the security 
relationship between the West and Turkey. First, the security elites, 
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mainly in the military bureaucracy, considered the steps that Turkey 
would have to take in order to join the EU as threatening. They thought 
that fighting against two major threats, the terrorist organization PKK 
and the rise of political Islam, may have been affected in a negative way. 
Second, the EU began to view Turkey at worst as a Middle Eastern 
country, and at best as a buffer zone insulating the European zone of 
peace from the zones of danger around Europe (2007: 51, 52). ‘Turkey’s 
potential membership was considered to be a threat to the EU’s security 
mainly because Turkey was too populous, too different, too poor and too 
close to the Hobbesian security environment of the Middle East’ (Oguzlu, 
2007: 52). Third, differentiation of security priorities such as the terrorist 
organization PKK were creating disaffection between Turkey and the 
United States.  Remarkably in the fight against DAES (IS), PYD (a 
branch of PKK operating in Syria) has become an ally of the West despite 
the fact that the PKK’s name is still formally on the terrorist 
organizations list. 
However, for example Iraq clearly demonstrated the negative 
consequences of an externally imposed democratization process. It has 
produced not only chaos and anarchy inside Iraq but also instability in 
the whole region (M.Hakan Yavuz, & Nihat Ali Özcan, 2006). In the end, 
as US-led initiatives were implemented in a rush, without the liberal 
roots of democratic culture taking hold first, the outcome became the 
opposite of what was expected (Zakaria, 2007). It seems that the US-led 
Iraq war represents a breaking point in the relationship between Turkey 
and the West. The weakening of Iraq, as a result, not only upset the 
distribution of power in Turkey’s region, but also reopened the questions 
of borders with particular emphasis on Kurdish aspirations (Altunisik, 
2004: 213). Udum (2007: 12) argued that while the United States was 
reluctant to fight against the PKK, which shelters in Iraq’s north, it also 
prevented Turkey from carrying out a unilateral cross-border military 
operation to address its security concerns. There were two reasons for 
that: First, the rejection of the March 1st motion in 2003 which would 
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allow US troops to use Turkish territory for a northern front in Iraq, 
caused disappointment on the part of the United States, but also 
dependency on the Kurdish groups in the north. ‘Top United States 
officials commented that had the Turkish front been used, the Sunni 
Iraqi insurgency in Iraq would not have been as strong, and hence a 
smaller number of American lives would have been lost’ (Eligür, 2006: 3) 
Second, the United States wanted to avoid disturbing the relative 
stability in the north by Turkey’s military operation, because it would 
lead to the total failure of the US operation in Iraq. In the 1990s, Turkey 
often carried out cross-border military operations against PKK in 
northern Iraq and the U.S. seemed supporting Turkey for these 
operations. Some analysts argue that after the rejection of the bill, the 
U.S. was forced to ally with the Kurds in northern Iraq, as a result of 
which Turkey seems to have lost some leverage with respect to carrying 
out cross border operations (see Eligur, 2006: 3).The EU authorities also 
warned Turkey against the negative consequences on the accession 
negotiations of any Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq. The 
EU’s attitude on these issues clearly demonstrates that the security 
conceptualizations of the long term allies do not converge with each other 
anymore. 
The establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq 
and the continuing US pressures on Turkey to find a political settlement 
to the PKK terrorism simultaneously caused anxieties in Ankara.  
Given that what the PKK leader, Ocalan, 
understands by politicization is the 
transformation of Turkey into a democratic 
republic where ethnic Turks and Kurds would 
be constitutionally recognized as the two 
constituent nations, the calls for liberal-
democratization do not strike a sympathetic 
chord at this particular moment in Ankara 
(Oguzlu, 2007: 55).   
The crisis in Syria, between forces loyal to the Syrian government and 
those that oppose it, which began on March 15, 2011 has accelerated 
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these anxieties. Protesters want the President to resign. The Syrian army 
is fighting the opposition and this has led to millions of people fleeing the 
country to save their lives. The US government has recently asked the 
Turkish government to support PYD (an arm of terrorist PKK operating 
in Northern Syria) against another terrorist organization, DAESH, 
fighting to hold a Syrian town named Ayn- El Arab. Given the 
implications of the conflict in Syria for Turkey’s own security interests 
along its shared border, Turkey’s border security dilemma is spiraling 
into a broader regional conflict. Turkey has been cautiously monitoring 
the situation in Syria and has been active in the humanitarian relief 
efforts, committing itself to international action to end the conflict. 
Relations with allies and regional policies in the field of security are 
shaped by several variables ranging from military, political and economic 
interests, to regional and social concerns. Turkey is well aware that 
memberships of international organizations and cooperation in order to 
cope with the new security challenges and new security threats require 
multilateral efforts and more than military measures. However, the 
indifference of Western partners to its priorities has forced Turkey to 
balance between its own need to be active and the different threat 
perception of the west in the region. 
 
6.8. Domestic Dynamics  
In April 1997, regressive Islamism (irtica) and Kurdish separatist 
terrorism were identified as major threats to Turkey’s security.  At the 
end of the 1990s, Turkey was targeted by Hezbollah terror together with 
that of the PKK, and as a result, has had to broaden its security agenda. 
This broadening took place in a new security environment with its new 
challenges. After the 1999 decision of the EU (which gives Turkey 
candidate status), a public debate on Turkey’s definition of ‘national 
security’ began. This debate took place between the Eurosceptic and pro-
EU actors and focused on the security implications of some of the reforms 
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demanded by the EU. While neither of the two groups openly oppose 
Turkey joining the EU, the Euro sceptics formulate their drawbacks by 
using ‘security-speak’ when voicing their concerns. For example, the 
following words of Professor Erol Manisalı: 
If it [the EU] is going to take over the market, 
diminish the national industry, govern the 
bureaucracy from Brussels, make demands 
contrary to my national interest on Cyprus, the 
European Army, PKK and Armenian issues, 
and refuse to admit Turkey unless these 
demands are met, I would say ‘Yes, it is in my 
favor if the EU lets me in’ but add that ‘it is 
trying to divide up Turkey and make me 
dependent and is putting forward these 
conditions so as not to admit Turkey (2002: 64–
65). 
Manisalı identified the problems likely to be caused by the adoption of 
EU norms, including an erosion of the Turkish state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence, and maintained that if Turkey carries on 
making the reforms demanded by the EU, ‘in 15 years’ time, not even the 
Turkish Armed Forces would be able to lift a finger’ (2002:65). The 
implication was that the Turkish military’s ability to cope with internal 
and external threats to security would be curbed. On the other hand, the 
pro-EU actors have long taken a position that stresses the economic and 
political dimensions with a tendency to neglect the security dimension 
(Bilgin 2005: 77). Two separate but interrelated developments have 
changed this tendency.  
The first was Mesut Yılmaz’s (then deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
responsible for Turkey–EU relations) public challenge to the Euro 
sceptics on the issue of national security. Speaking at the Congress of the 
Motherland Party in August 2001, Yılmaz maintained that the key 
precondition for change is to re-determine the scope and boundaries of 
the national security concept. Turkey’s integration into the EU is delayed 
by the ‘national security syndrome’ that thwarted changes in Turkey’s 
Constitution and other reforms demanded by the EU. According to 
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Yılmaz, the problem was not only that Turkey’s conceptualization of 
‘national security’ was far too broad compared to its EU counterparts, it 
was also that in Turkey ‘national security’ was defined behind closed 
doors. Mesut Yılmaz maintained that: ‘[National security] is an issue that 
concerns everyone in Turkey, therefore it should be discussed not only by 
the political parties, but by the public as well’11.  The main assumption 
Yilmaz pointed out was that the consensus among the elites was that 
national security is far too important and delicate an issue to be 
discussed outside National Security Council meetings. The Turkish 
General Staff maintained a strong reaction stating that ‘it was more 
appropriate to discuss issues, which is about the prosperity and 
happiness of people, on platforms which are not tainted with political 
interests’ (Bilgin 2005:191). 
Yilmaz’s words have found support among the media and some non-
governmental actors such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and the Organization of Human 
Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUMDER). However, 
not all non-governmental actors agreed. Chairman of the Ankara 
Chamber of Trade (ATO) Sinan Aygun and the Board of Directors of the 
Federation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-Is) both issued statements in 
support of the General Staff’s stance. These  positions  have not changed 
much  for a number of reasons but the most prominent was that ‘the civil 
society in Turkey  is a product of the  ‘national security project’ of the 
state establishment and, therefore, does not always constitute an escape 
from prevailing understandings of security’ (Bilgin 2007: 556).  
The second development was the emergence of a group of pro-EU actors 
who sought to use ‘security speak’ when discussing the issue of Turkey’s 
membership of the EU (Bilgin, 2005: 199). She argues that although  
The state of civil society in Turkey is a product 
of the national security project of the state 
establishment [...] some societal actors claimed 
                                            
11 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/98251.asp, last access 28/09/2015.  
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‘security-speak’ and presented EU membership 
as a possible solution to myriad security 
problems, which, in turn, made the post-1999 
transformation possible (Bilgin, 2007: 557).   
She points out to the success of the strategy ‘as it challenged the state 
establishment’s monopoly over “security-speak” and de-centred existing 
security problems through identifying new ones’ (Bilgin 2007: 556). 
 
6.9. Critics of National Security Strategy: How does the 
Turkish example differ from contemporary trends?   
Turkey’s security strategy has been mainly criticized for its over-reliance 
on military defence. Erguvenc (1999: 46) maintained that national 
security in the twenty-first century should be defined as ‘sustaining 
freedom and development in a ruthlessly competitive environment’. This 
could not be done by relying on the military instrument alone; it has to be 
achieved by producing the educated human capacity and the civilian 
infrastructure to compete in the global arena. The problem, according to 
Erguvenc, was that further investment in the military sector diverted 
valuable resources away from education and research. Erguvenc (1999: 
48, 49) continued to discuss that further investment in the military sector 
could potentially prevent Turkey from achieving national security. 
Turkey’s challenge, according to him, was that although recent 
developments have meant that the military instrument has lost its 
primacy in Turkey’s security policy-making, traditional strategic 
arguments have not yet lost their relevance. 
Ambassador (Ret.) llter Turkmen is another pro-EU actor who has 
expressed the need for a fresh approach to Turkey’s foreign and security 
relations, Turkmen’s broader point was that the  defence budget would 
eventually have to undergo a cutback because ‘it is not economically 
feasible to sustain the current level of defense expenditure’ (2001: 61). He 
argued that joining the EU would eventually transform Turkey’s 
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strategic culture and enhance its security by helping solve the Turkey-
Greek and Cyprus conflicts. 
There is a consensus in scholarly literature on Turkey’s problems 
regarding National Security: it is the broad ‘size’ of its security agenda 
and the solution is to be found in restricting the framing of issues as 
security problems. However, the problem goes beyond the ‘size’ of the 
security agenda or the number of the threats. It is rooted in prevalent 
understandings and practices of ‘national security’ and its relationship to 
‘politics’ (Bilgin 2007). The definition of national security, as defined in 
Turkey’s constitution, is more or less in line with many other states. 
What is particularly problematic are the ways in which the national 
security policy document is prepared and put into effect.  The military is 
naturally the most dominant factor of the process of preparation of the 
national security document and the lack of interest in security issues by 
civilians flaws both the process and output. ‘Over the years, and 
particularly since the 1980 coup, the military’s active involvement in the 
formulation of the national security policy document has translated into a 
security agenda that reflects the military’s threat perceptions’ (Bilgin 
2007: 563).  
Turkmen, just like General Erguvenc, stressed that military dimensions 
of security should be considered in conjunction with other dimensions of 
security, and argued that there were more insecurities affecting Turkey’s 
future than the state establishment chose to stress, and these 
insecurities could be addressed through being admitted to European 
integration.  
In recent years, Turkey has developed certain 
strategic mission concepts that go beyond its 
economic and political reach. This has been 
done in a context shaped by the tendency to see 
the region and the world as an arena of 
incessant conflict. Although there exist many 
conflicts and instability in the region 
surrounding Turkey, not all of these constitute 
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a direct threat to Turkey’s security (Turkmen, 
2001: 61). 
We have to accept that the main dynamic behind these discussions is the 
end of Cold War era. Clearly, the end of the Cold War brought about a 
fundamental changes in security understanding. Whereas security 
during the Cold War was exclusively defined in hard military terms, now 
security widens its scope including economic and social issues, regime 
type, civil disorder, terrorism, communal conflict along ethnic and 
religious lines, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, 
wars of secession, and environmental disasters. It is widely accepted that 
‘the nature of war’ has changed related to the changing nature of security 
environment. 
Turkey’s fight with the terrorist organization PKK for the last thirty 
years conforms to this global trend that intra-state conflicts have 
replaced inter-state wars as the main sources of insecurity. However, 
contrary to the global trends, Turkey has not been able to read the 
changes in the security environment and its idea of security has 
remained fixed on that traditional understanding of the problem. 
According to Cizre it is about Turkey’s democracy deficit.  
With regard to the military’s dominant presence, Cizre (2003: 217) points 
out a major difference between the ways security and defence have been 
understood in the West and Turkey and argued that ‘in the former case 
the security doctrine is rarely applied to internal security’. The main 
reason for that, according to him is that: 
Military doctrine in Western democracies 
recognizes that national security is not an area 
that should be monopolized by military 
considerations. The best guarantee against the 
danger of military subordinating other national 
objectives to national security is the tradition 
in the West of maintaining a clear distinction 
between military and police roles using the 
latter to respond to internal threats while 
restricting the role of the military to external 
defense (Cizre 2003: 217,218). 
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Cizre (2003) maintains that national security understanding in 
Turkey has provided a free entry into policy making for the military. 
‘This is made possible by letting the national security concept 
influence codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-
terrorism, and maintenance of public order, criminalizing certain 
political activities, constraining public debate and expanding 
military jurisdiction over civilians’ (Cizre 2003:217,218). As a result, 
in the August 2001 meeting of the MGK, where the constitutional 
amendments, in line with the EU membership requirements (known 
technically as the Acquis), were on its agenda, the MGK meeting 
ended up with a resolution containing a warning that the 
amendments should be “matured,” meaning that the proposed 
amendments should be further amended and refined in line with the 
objections of the MGK. 
 
6.10. Summary 
The recent events experienced after Arab Spring have posed enormous 
challenges for Turkey's border security framework. In this period, Turkey 
has chosen to take a series of military measures which are mostly 
physical measures to safeguard its security. Turkey’s current border 
security framework is fractured and far from coping with new security 
risks and threats in the region. The restructuring process including the 
establishment of a new Border Security Unit under the Ministry of the 
Interior has not been completed so far and will not be in the foreseeable 
future.  
Turkey's border security framework has a fragmented structure in many 
ways. Each individual agency in the field is different from each other in 
terms of staffing, appointment, training, the chain of command, and 
budget. More importantly, as a result, they are semi-or fully independent 
from one another. Thus, this situation brings about a fragmented 
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administrative structure, conflicts and a sense of competition among the 
agencies. 
In addition, the political instability in the Middle East, new forms of 
terrorism, the institutional and legal infrastructure deficiencies, the lack 
of bureaucratic authority and responsibility, the harsh climate and 
geographical conditions can be listed as major problems. 
In the face of regional turmoil, Turkey has done little to consolidate its 
border security structure. Instead, Turkey has chosen to shore up its 
borders with walls and fences. The primary cause behind this choice was 
that traditional militaristic approach to security which is still thought 
relevant despite recent developments. The challenges Turkey has 
experienced in reforming its current security system go beyond the ‘size’ 
of its security agenda and are rooted in prevalent understandings of 
‘security’ (Bilgin, 2007: 567). Treating the civil-military dynamics and the 
‘size of the security agenda’ as the main concern, engenders a failure to 
discuss the ‘politics of security’.  It is also implicated in by the prevalent 
and unquestioned assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ feeding the 
old notions of national security understanding. 
On the other hand, based on the discussions above, it is difficult to be 
optimistic about the future of Turkey’s long lasting western alliance in 
the coming years. The EU’s and the US’ attitudes on Turkey’s delicate 
security issues, such as the terrorist organisation PKK, or attitudes 
regarding instabilities in the Turkish  region clearly demonstrate that 
the security conceptualizations of the parties do not always converge with 
each other and will not be free of crises in the coming years. For example, 
the US administration is vehemently against Turkey’s current Syrian 
policy. The US government has recently asked the Turkish government to 
support PYD (an arm of terrorist PKK operating in Northern Syria) 
against another terrorist organisation, DAESH (IS), fighting to hold a 
Syrian town named Ayn- El Arab.  
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CHAPTER 7 
RESEARCH FINDINGS  
INTRODUCTION 
To support the findings of the research, in this chapter, an analysis of 
how border and border security have been defined by security 
professionals in the field will be discussed in order to highlight not only 
how the issue is understood, but also the ways in which borders create 
exclusion. Hence, the reader will first find the common problematic areas 
and possible suggestions of the professionals to solve these problems from 
their different positions in the border security field. This is important 
because, by conducting interviews with a variety of security 
professionals, the researcher has tried to understand not only the 
practical problems and solutions in the border security field but also their 
perspectives to assess possible future implications.  The researcher then 
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assesses the extent to which the National Strategy Paper (which is 
supposed to transform Turkey’ border security framework) will make any 
meaningful changes to Turkey’s security. This will illustrate for the 
reader the foundation of why Turkey’s current border security framework 
is a security problem. 
This chapter initially presents the findings from the interviews and later 
findings from archival research. Respondents identified a number of 
areas as being of particular concern. They are grouped under the 
headings of: coordination; institutional qualification; legal deficiencies; 
budget; civil governance; geography; kinship, and terror.   
Coordination is defined as: the organization of the different elements of a 
complex body or activity so as to enable them to work together effectively 
External coordination is defined as: working together with other states, 
governments and state institutions.  
Institutional qualification is defined as: problems regarding the lack of 
professional structures regarding border security. This includes lacking 
enough experience while performing border security duties, including the 
use of conscripts for securing borders rather than relying on law 
enforcement structures. 
Legal deficiencies are defined as: problems regarding the lack of laws, 
regulations, decrees, directives, and circulars in the area of border 
security. 
Civil governance is defined as: challenging points regarding the doubts 
and question marks in establishing a civil body for border security as an 
alternative to the strong presence of military. 
Geography is defined as: problems regarding geographical challenges 
such as rugged, mountainous terrain and harsh climate conditions, as 
well as unstable neighbourhood and historical conflicts. 
Budget is defined as: finance problems regarding establishing a single 
and professional border security unit. 
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Terror is defined as: problems regarding mostly the activities of terrorist 
organisation PKK. 
Kinship is defined as: problems or consequences attributed to the divided 
communities when the border lines was drawn. 
 
7.1. Respondents’ concerns about border security 
The relative significance assigned to these topics is explained in Figure 
3.1
 
Figure 3.1: problem areas 
 
First, 19 out of 27 interviewees see the current border system as 
fragmented and lacking an integrated approach in terms of cooperation 
and coordination mechanisms as well as professional structures. 
Respondents said that there was a common perception that coordination 
between the different institutions involved in border security in Turkey is 
not sufficient. This leads to inefficiency and ineffectiveness whilst 
performing their duties as well as in the use of resources. 
A striking example was given by M01, a senior official from the Interior 
Ministry who said that: 
In the event of an international meeting 
regarding border security issues, only one 
person comes to the meeting as a 
representative of that organisation responsible 
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for border security issues such as protecting 
land, sea borders, border gates, passport 
control and so on. To be able to discuss these 
issues with him, we sit [at] the table, ten people 
representing ten different organisations 
against that one person. Everybody’s business, 
no-one’s business! 
M18, a high-ranking Customs official argued that:  
There are some contradictions about who will 
do a certain job. Sometimes, another law 
enforcement organisation might take action to 
do that certain job which is, in fact, under the 
responsibility of Customs…in specific areas 
requiring collaboration, [often there are] 
controversies and as a result, arguments may 
emerge.  
The reluctance of security agencies to cooperate or share information is a 
significant problem for state security, as each agency tries to protect its 
own turf and tries to grasp any success for its own organisation. With 
regard to this crucial issue Deputy Undersecretary in National Defence 
Ministry Faruk Ozlu (now minister of Science, Industry and Technology) 
said, ‘Each one is a castle and they do not appreciate each other. They do 
not share information properly’. Thus, authorities that hold specific data 
are anxious to retain control over that data. Therefore, rivalry between 
security agencies competing to collect information and exclude other 
actors flaws the whole system because it is evident that data exchange 
increases the state’s power. In the same vein, M21, a high ranking 
military officer from the coast guard command questioned ‘why have you 
not appointed a contact person from Coast Guard in the Interior 
Ministry’.  Similarly, Suleyman Tapsiz, Governor of Kilis (a province at 
Turkey’s Syrian border) said ‘even for the simplest things, even such 
things regarding providing finance, you have to resort to many different 
work of places to sort it out’.  
Most strikingly an interviewee suggested that the lack of authority held 
by governors is the reason for lack of coordination and said:  
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For example you found out that some terrorists 
had violated your borders at the ‘Esendere 
border gate’ at Iranian border. It was [reported] 
that [the] terrorists are disguised as ordinary 
travellers. Regarding this problem, there are 
some measures to take by land forces, 
gendarmerie, police and customs. Although the 
governors and district governors are in 
[a]coordinator position, they are not powerful 
enough. Why? Because [the] military does not 
report to governors…if I were a commander of a 
border brigade, [the] governor and district 
governor [would come] second after my own 
commander and if they ordered [me] to open 
the gates I [would] not, because my own 
commander is required to [give me the]order. 
In this respect, it is important to remember that district governors and 
governors are responsible for borders in the first and second degree by 
law respectively. However, they have no power over the military despite 
being responsible by law. 
As demonstrated in figure 3.1, most of the interviewees perceived the 
current state of border structures in Turkey as flawed. One of the main 
reasons suggested for this perception is that the current system is shaped 
and formed by militarist views including military threats, defending or 
attacking perspective rather than acknowledging border security as a law 
enforcement issue. The other one is that the military is responsible for 
the protection of land borders and mainly relies on conscripts. 
To be more specific, as argued by M10, Turkey has   
A militarist approach on the issue (border 
security). In military schools we are provided 
with a totally warlike education including 
dying and killing. After school, at the borders, 
we [meet] other administrative and judicial 
authorities that we have to collaborate [with]; 
we have direct relations with people. However, 
we have not been educated for this kind of job. 
We sit down and read books then.   
 
M10 continued to argue that 
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Smugglers have been there for their life time, 
born and grown up there. He possibly learned it 
[smuggling] in his mother’s womb. However, 
75-80% of our border brigades consist of 
conscripts performing their duties temporarily 
for their compulsory military service, the rest 
perhaps 25% are professional. Conscripts are 
doing that job there for only eight, nine, maybe 
ten months   
The context here is that as there is no special branch of border security in 
military these 25% of professionals might quite possibly be reassigned to 
a totally different post to perform different jobs other than border 
security throughout their careers, therefore the conscripts have little or 
no experienced professional support. 
To support this claim a senior police officer M14 argued:  
As conscripts serve for only one year, you have 
to teach all the things to new recruits  over and 
over again. Unless you become professional, 
this vicious cycle will go on. I have some 
reservations personally that you can benefit 
from such a system.    
M04 from the Interior Ministry has supported this view by saying  
It does not matter that you have tanks, heavy, 
armoured weaponry while fighting against 
illegal immigration, and smuggling or 
smugglers.  The current structure does not 
allow efficiency and effectiveness in using hi-
tech thermal cameras and other technology 
that we buy for border surveillance. 
Thus, for policy development border security issues must be analysed in  
context  using the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies, their 
strategies and practices, as these are determinant factors in 
understanding how to tackle of the security issues. 
M05, an experienced district governor on border issues, has taken a 
different approach and said:  
Military authorities are not law enforcement 
agencies. They do not have enough knowledge 
on such international criminal organisations 
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and do not have records of such organisations. 
The military has no mission to know who the 
criminals are, which criminal organisation they 
belong to, how they organise in Istanbul and 
they do not have appropriate structure[s] for 
this kind of job. When they apprehend 
criminals they deliver them to the police or 
gendarmerie. However the police and the 
gendarmerie are also incompetent and see 
border crimes as an ordinary, daily part of their 
job. This situation and lack of coordination 
encourages the international criminal 
organisations.  
 
Thus, institutional incompetence is not just about the military, as 
discussed above, some interviewees think that the police, the 
gendarmerie and the customs protection are also lacking in the 
qualifications and experience required for protecting the borders. M18, a 
high ranking official from customs confessed, ‘we are a law enforcement 
agency but we do not have enough equipment and education 100%. This 
area is different and requires long experience and education at the same 
time.’ 
Legal gaps were also mainly considered a major problematic area by the 
interviewees. While talking about the legal gaps they highlighted the 
military’s lack of law enforcement authority in the forbidden military 
zones and security areas at the border zones, and argued this legislation 
was not enough to combat border crimes. According to law no. 2565, first 
degree and second degree forbidden military zones are set up to prevent 
smuggling and the acts which constitute offences. The first degree 
forbidden military zones cover from zero point to up to 30 -600 m and 
second degree starts from the first degree forbidden military zones to 5-
10 km. Legal proceedings are different in each zones and it has no 
legislative authority in border areas outside the border strip and customs 
gates. 
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In a specific illustration of a glaring legal gap, and a significant indicator 
of the traditional security concept which always looks outside for the 
enemy, M10 from the military argued: 
If the movement is from inside to outside, land 
forces have no authority to apprehend, detain 
or ask for an ID. In 2003 and 2007 the Council 
of Ministers had narrowed the first degree 
forbidden military zones at the borders of 
Georgia, Armenia, Nahcivan, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Syria to 30-100m.  
A retired general M09 contributed that ‘when terrorists and illegal 
immigrants enter from the first degree and flee to the second degree, the 
engagement rules are changing and the gendarmerie is required to deal 
with it.’ In the face of this chaos, jurisdiction is impossible to determine. 
The lack of a central authority responsible for defining and enforcing 
standards is also one of the most important problems of Turkey’s border 
security framework. District governor M07 summarized by saying ‘how, 
in what way and by whom the borders will be protected has not been 
specified’, adding ‘in customs areas there is conflicting legislation.’ Police 
chief M15 argued strikingly that ‘we try to sell the duties to each other.’  
Governor Tapsiz, summarized the situation and said:  
The presence of multiple authorities in the area 
creates chaos and confusion. Due to this 
fragmented structure, some of the jobs to do 
might remain undone. While one of the 
authorities says ‘it is your responsibility’ other 
says ‘no, it is not mine, it is another 
institution’. This situation prevents decision 
making either on time or to be practical. If 
there was one authority responsible for border 
security, it would enable us to make speedy 
decisions and conduct fast operations. 
When it comes to the sea borders, the position is not very different. M21 
from the Coast Guard argued that:  
The biggest problem here is the restriction of 
your power to the sea as a law enforcement 
authority and not to be able to conduct duties 
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on the land. Current legislation requires us to 
deliver apprehended persons and evidence to 
the police or the gendarmerie in cases where 
the crime starts on the land. Even if you 
coordinate you cannot manage to go to the very 
end. Which is more logical? To prosecute a 
crime by one authority or three different 
authorities?  
Thus, it seems that legislation gaps and coordination problems create a 
cause and outcome situation. 
M21 continued 
There is also a problem of transferring 
international agreements to national law. After 
parliament’s ratification decision, there is no 
answer to how this legislation is put into effect, 
how the police, the gendarmerie or the coast 
guard is going to enforce it, no details. 
According to the Turkish constitution, when an international agreement 
has been ratified, it becomes an internal part of the national legal system 
and can directly be enforced.  
To support the claims above, M08, the district governor responsible for a 
border gate said ‘governors have very limited power over the duties 
regarding security issues at the border gates.’ In this respect, a new 
authority for border security should logically be based on law 
enforcement, which in turn requires adopting a more civilian approach. 
In other words, Turkey’s current traditional, military style approach to 
border security should be replaced by a civilian perspective. 
As M05 argued ‘if you were like Switzerland, a country with no border 
threats from neighbouring countries, you might not have had to set up a 
system based on military’, Governor Tapsiz supported the idea and said: 
‘Turkey is in a unique position in the midst of a fire circle’. A high 
ranking police chief M13 argued ‘problems stemming from geography 
make it difficult to control all our borders.’ In this vein, M11 from the 
military gave an example: ‘Anatolia corresponds to a swarthy horse. If 
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you do not ride it properly, it will throw you off. That is why this 
geography requires military power’. 
In addition to discussions above, some interviewees pointed out the lack 
of civil governance in the security sector including the border security 
area. M01 argued that 
There is no proper coordination between the 
military and governors as first and second 
degree border authorities. However, 
coordination is not enough, there should be 
some kind of relationship beyond coordination. 
Basically, a country’s security vision and future 
articulation should not be left to security 
bureaucracy only. Determining security policy 
is completely a civil job. 
In contrast to this view, a retired general M09 said: ‘I wish civilians 
would control all the things and military would return to its own job’. 
Interestingly, M22 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs said ‘if you ask me 
civilian or military? It does not matter. How it is protected and to whom 
the account is given is important.’  
One recurrent and important subject that interviewees particularly 
highlighted was the finance problem. It is important because finance 
problems have the potential to influence the direction of the 
transformation. M15 summarized: 
Ultimately, when you withdraw the military 
from border protection, in case of setting up a 
new body, you need to establish an organisation 
larger than the police, because it requires a 
huge number of personnel.  The military 
somehow conduct this job with the help of 
battalions and squads. If you counted up the 
number of people who are doing this job, a 
tremendous number would surface.  
M14 said: ‘this is a really expensive job and not easy’. M12, a high 
ranking police chief in decision making, said: ‘if it was taken over by a 
civilian body, how many personnel it would need and how much would it 
cost to budget… it is hard to say.’ M13 from the police anti-terrorist 
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department pointed to Turkey’s mountainous south east where most of 
the terrorist activities has occurred and said ‘there are problems 
stemming from geography and it is hard to take measures in a strict 
sense. It is too high cost.’ 
Terrorist infiltration to Turkish territory from the mountainous 
southeast border is seen as the main element that problematizes the 
transformation process. M18 argued that  
There might have been some setbacks, 
problems or needs to meet with regards to the 
military. Until they are sorted out, at least 
under current conditions [terrorist activities of 
the PKK], I am of the opinion that the military 
should continue to protect borders. As I said, 
until conditions at both western and eastern 
borders are equalized, I do not think it will 
create positive results if another institution 
takes over border protection from the military.  
A top official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M22 said: ‘at some 
certain points, you are obliged to the military, I do not know anybody that 
can use artillery when ISIS militants come’. District governor M05 
supported the idea and said: ‘the dilemma that Turkey has faced is: how 
can you conduct liberal policies under the influence of internal and 
external threats.’ 
 The rise of regional conflicts in the 1990s and the lack of central 
authority have facilitated the movement of terrorists across borders. The 
recent military actions in Iraq, Libya and Syria have left a large path 
without border controls. Terrorists can separate into smaller groups and 
regroup in adjoining territories, rebuilding their financial resources 
through the drug trade and securing unrestricted access to a large range 
of countries lacking adequate border security.   
However, to prevent terrorist activities requires multifaceted strategies. 
Enhancing physical controls is only part of the strategy. Likewise, the 
movement of the terrorists is only one component of the terrorist 
activities. They need materials, transport, arms and the raw components 
182 
 
for bomb making.  Therefore, they need necessary links to other crime 
groups as they seek to move their cargos. In addition, terrorist 
organisations require financing to maintain terrorist cells and run their 
actions. According to the police authorities, the activity which most often 
funds terrorist activities is the drug trade. Thus, the control of potential 
terrorists, materials and the sources of terrorist financing are all needed 
if one is to successfully fight against terrorism. In addition, terrorism is 
important but only one factor in a complexity of border security issues. It 
does not seem fair to put such burden on the back of the military which 
does not have an appropriate structure and knowledge to accomplish the 
job. 
The implementation of an effective fight against terrorism requires major 
structural changes in the border security area including new forms of 
training, institutional change and greater reliance on intelligence. Often 
those serving on the border are conscripts and together with law 
enforcement personnel, they do not have the education or the experience 
to understand and react to the problems that they face on the border.  
Some interviewees pointed out the kinship links among people living in 
the south and south-eastern border zone. District governor M07 argued:  
When the border was drawn, relatives had been 
divided. Think of Nusaybin [a border town at 
the Syrian border], they had divided the town 
in two parts including the villages. The 
relationship between the two sides are strong 
and this is being utilised for smuggling.  I saw 
many examples of it related to human 
smuggling, weapon smuggling and drug 
trafficking. We captured hundreds of weapons, 
drugs and other goods as well as suicide 
bombers.  
M14 extended the argument and said ‘once you fortified your borders, you 
would face some accusations that you divide relatives and the mass of 
people and disrupt the relationship between these people. Politicians may 
have some reservations in their minds just because of this issue’. M22 
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took the argument forward, pointed out the instability in Syria and 
argued  
After DAESH, smuggling has increased with 
help of the tribes. There has always been the 
phenomenon of smuggling at the Syrian border 
and it is just because of divided families. Big 
families and tribes in the middle-east do not 
accept these boundaries. 
These historically divided communities make it difficult to sustain the 
traditional understanding of fortified borders, these have led to the 
emergence of ‘the other’.  In this respect, it should be asked, what is ‘the 
other’ for Turkey? Taking kinship at the borders into consideration, it is 
not viable for Turkey to sustain the current border security practices, the 
practice of traditional security thinking must be left behind because 
current border security practice excludes the other, and at the same time 
excludes the possibility of alternative politics. It is equally important not 
to overlook that these kinship relations provide a strong cover for 
organised criminals. When law enforcement authorities wage war against 
organised criminal groups, they simultaneously wage a war against the 
local people. And of course this may have serious consequences including 
manipulation by the terrorist organisation PKK. 
In addition, a large number of interviewees (including civilians) viewed 
the geographical situation of Turkey as a determinant factor in the 
current border security framework with regard to the strong military 
presence. To sum up, Turkey is situated in a very important geographic 
zone where it has long borders with unstable countries and therefore 
Turkey is at the crossroads of illegal flows of goods and people and 
subjected to terrorist attacks. Mountainous areas at the border zone 
make it easier for terrorists, smugglers and illegal immigrants to 
penetrate into the country. According to the interviewees, as a result of 
these penetrations, no other institution other than the military can 
protect the borders properly. 
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7.2. Interviewees’ solutions for identified problems 
The interviewees mainly view Institutional or administrative measures, 
such as setting up a professional body and better infrastructure, as 
necessary to secure the territory. M01:  
What I would like to recommend is 
transformation of the ministry of the interior 
into a homeland security ministry because in 
our region, security will be the main priority for 
many years ahead. The Americans have a say 
related to border security: there would be no 
trade where there is no security. Hence, for a 
secure and peaceful community, you need to 
create a secured environment first and it needs 
to start from the boundaries of the country. 
Thus, national security starts from territorial 
borders. 
What is striking here is the pointed connection between border security 
and national security. According to M01 national security starts from 
territorial boundaries. Almost all the interviewees’ recommendations 
converge at the point that fixed and reinforced borders of walls and 
fences are essential to stop the illegal flows. M10: ‘To protect borders, I 
would first build all of the roads. Second, in relation to stop and 
prevention, I would put a wall, fence or something at the borders’. M22: 
‘in terms of the fight against terrorism, I am in favour of enhancing 
physical protection measures at the boundaries. The PKK or any other 
terrorist organisation can be stopped by a set of physical protection 
measures. Hence, these measures should be taken throughout the 
territorial boundaries in a similar effective manner.’ 
The sole exception is Faruk Ozlu, Deputy Undersecretary of 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. He says:  
High stone walls are out of date, no need to talk 
about it. We cannot declare our neighbours as 
enemies even though we may have some 
problems with them. They are our friends. My 
desire is to protect our boundaries by 
technology such as high-tech surveillance 
systems, radar systems and drones.  You 
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cannot build high walls on the Iraqi border. As 
the geographical conditions are very different 
throughout the borders, there should be a 
technology based border protection system. 
Alternatively, M15 points out the corrupt personnel and 
recommends a surveillance system for them instead of the territorial 
boundaries which is quite thought provoking and insightful. 
M11 brought a different approach to the issue and said:  
Turkey’s aim is to be a virtuous power. You can 
be a global power but being a virtuous power is 
different. It is about power, rule of law, 
equality, and justice. In doing so, you can stop 
the threat in an effective way. Thus, the 
important thing is to be present where the 
source of the threat is with your virtuous power 
to be able to stop it in advance. Hence, moving 
on from there, stopping threats in a soft and 
humanitarian way. 
With connection to setting up a new body, Faruk Ozlu suggested an 
integrated approach beginning from territorial borders and said:  
People go across borders to the Gendarmerie 
area and from there to city centres, police 
areas. Hence, I would create a fully integrated 
and operational body that is able to follow 
illegal crossings. I am in favour of an 
integrated system from boundaries to city 
centres, separate from the military because it is 
for defence. Deputy Ministry of Homeland 
Security is more suitable. 
However, M21 has some reservations on the issue of a new organisation. 
He says:  
Setting up a body to coordinate the border 
management is a right direction, however, it 
should not mean closing the coast guard, or 
taking some from the gendarmerie, some from 
the police, throw into a pool and say we set up a 
new organisation. How could a body possibly 
stand against three different types of blood? As 
the coast guard, we have an institutional 
culture different from the police and the 
gendarmerie, even naval forces. Thus, there 
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should be a coordination body in which all the 
parties are represented, just like FRONTEX. I 
would establish a new body which enables us to 
share data. In addition, this process [border 
protection] requires international collaboration. 
States cannot cope with it on their own. We 
should go to the source. 
In the same vein, M08 suggested: ‘it takes too long to set up a new 
institutionalised and effective body in the field. I would rather make 
some adjustments instead of changing the whole system.’ M05 had a 
different view on the coordination body. He said: ‘Turkey cannot establish 
a ‘UK border agency’ like organisation as the dynamics and location are 
different. Turkey still has threats against state and its territorial 
indivisibility’. 
This traditional territory based security understanding is widespread 
among the interviewees and based on state sovereignty. M22 best 
represents this idea by pointing out the political limits: ‘You are required 
to go to the source of the threat, but it should be in your sovereign 
territory. Your sovereignty begins from territorial boundaries.’ Indeed, as 
understood from this assessment, the main difficulty is not being able to 
think outside the conceptual and material grip of the modern state. 
Governor Suleyman Tapsiz:  
My recommendation is to make the 
gendarmerie a totally civil authority and 
connect it to the Ministry of Interior in every 
meaning, and give the duty of border protection 
to the Gendarmerie. Before the Land Forces, 
the gendarmerie used to be responsible for 
border protection. As an organisation it has 
some natural advantages such as close 
connection with other law enforcement 
authorities and border authorities. A second 
option is to set up a new body. 
Interviewees’ reservations on a civil professional body responsible for 
border security are mainly about the terrorist activities of the PKK and 
geographical conditions particularly in the south eastern part of Turkey. 
For example, M13 said ‘I have some hesitation on whether a civil body 
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can provide security in the south eastern sector. However, a civil 
authority must decide on the security issues.’  
To sum up, professionals discussing border security in Turkey tend to 
focus on the anti-terrorist elements of ‘internal security’ because of the 
consequences of PKK terrorism. Discussions have been continuing 
around reinforcing territorial borders by means of walls and fences and 
high-tech surveillance systems to prevent terrorist attacks within Turkey 
and reduce vulnerability to terrorism. Civil and military elites are less 
receptive to radical breaks with traditional thinking and are far more 
inclined to support efforts to protect the homeland by fixed borders, and 
far less concerned with the context of  Turkey’s own national experience  
of terror. 
In addition, as is clear from the main stream media rhetoric about 
‘broken borders’, by referring specifically to the south and south-east 
borders, traditional images of the borders of the state still exercise   a 
major influence on the territorial security of the state. Even though 
airports, for example, may well be major sites for the arrival of possible 
terrorists, the most popular idea is that of they are penetrating land and 
sea borders by running or by boat. This powerful image of the secure 
border as a guardian of state security in recent years has led to a security 
fence just like those around one’s garden. Of course, this is totally 
misleading because the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks have 
involved local citizens. 
In terms of terrorism and smuggling, the continuing experiences of 
Turkey have proved that current understandings focus on the actor 
rather than the activity. Due to this tendency physical barriers such as 
concrete walls and fences gain importance and success is measured by 
the number of terrorists killed. In addition, and more importantly, too 
much focus on such physical infrastructure makes the south eastern 
borders ungoverned areas because it is not possible to keep same 
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standards throughout the borders due to the harsh geographical 
conditions.  
The broader picture of high-tech surveillance systems and ‘smart border’ 
initiatives have had many supporters and will continue to do so. In spite 
of the extreme cost of maintenance, new systems and technologies have 
proliferated as countries increasingly seek to monitor and control the flow 
of people and goods across national boundaries. There is a wide range of 
innovative technology which provides increasingly sensitive and 
sophisticated solutions. However, before setting up such solutions, it is 
imperative that more attention be given to better implementation and the 
increased effectiveness of such technology. Most importantly, it should 
stimulate policymaking to encompass that technology and it should not 
let the acquisition of tools drive policy rather than the other way around. 
The result could be a collection of impressive technologic assets, but a 
distinct and damaging lack of strategic coherence. The acquisition of 
these technological assets tend to fall outside the jurisdiction of political 
decision makers, however their consequences can cause political fallout. 
Surveillance technology installed without a detailed awareness of the 
local risk environment is unlikely to fulfil expectations and could create 
new and unforeseen security risks. On the other hand, by reinforcing 
surveillance over a specific groups, even if the state is able to consolidate 
its hold over its territory, can create feelings of insecurity by causing 
revolts, hunger strikes and so on, by the people excluded or under 
surveillance.  
It is important that lessons are learned from past experiences which 
proved that reinforcing fixed border strategies are destined to fail. 
Fragmentation and division of security agencies and resources has not 
worked therefore one of the Turkey’s priorities should be an oversight of 
whole mechanism, before an institutional and technological restructure 
in the border security field. In other words, border security needs to be 
seen and contemplated not as a separate and independent issue, but 
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should be a comprehensive framework closely associated with the broader 
debate concerning national security.  
 
7.3. How Do Interview Findings Describe the Current 
Parameters?  
There is a strong tendency among the interviewees to reaffirm old 
explanations by integrating some new aspects into them. However, a new 
border security understanding implies that territoriality as an organizing 
principle of the border security is no longer viable. 
Border security understanding in Turkey is based on geography, border 
lines, border trespass and the connection between territory and 
sovereignty of the nation state. Borders are perceived as a concrete and 
tangible phenomena in the landscape by almost all the interviewees.  
Border security is reduced to an inviolability of the territorial borders 
and hence strategy is set up to stop undesirable outsiders at the borders. 
As a result of this typically Cold War strategy, concrete walls and fences 
come to the agenda as a recurrent solution. The sacrosanct character of 
the borders are emphasized at every military border base with the motto, 
‘boundary is my honour’.  However, border security is different from 
boundary protection. The latter means the protection of a line or narrow 
zone while the former has a deeper meaning, rejecting fixed border 
understandings and the state as the sole bordering actor.  
Having considered the mind-set of interviewees with regard to border 
security, it is difficult to posit that Cold War thinking in the area of 
border security has diminished. The new developments in the area of 
security have not considerably influenced Turkey’s security 
understanding. Therefore, setting an agenda or determining the 
priorities or policies is still influenced by traditional thinking and is 
shaped, to a significant extent, by territorial protection, and military 
preferences and interests. The practical and mental traditions and 
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practices prevent the seeing and imagining of ‘border’ in a different way 
and impede understanding of the scale of the problem. 
Almost all of the interviewees see the border as a fixed line and this 
attitude flaws not only its fight against PKK terrorism and trafficking 
but also Turkey’s national security as a whole. Their views on border 
security call for barriers such as walls and fences to keep the 
undesirables out. It follows then that, due to this territorial mentality, 
the physical barrier is reinforcing the state’s external borders, which is 
the primary means of being protected from outside threats. Therefore, the 
implied solution is to eliminate the threats with the help of fortified 
borders. The source of threats are always perceived to be outside. Hence, 
a common rhetoric that borders are vulnerable and needs to be fortified 
and protected against terrorists and smugglers is widespread.  However, 
as we have become aware of the risks and threats of the new security 
environment, fortifying borders with walls or fences is not a solution, but 
a problem. While today’s risks and threats require collaboration, border 
fences and concrete walls create others as well as constitute an 
impediment to being aware of what is going on the other side. In other 
words, there is no other side in today’s world. 
It was, therefore, important to review the opinions of experts who are 
working in the field and those dealing with the transformation of the 
Turkish border security system to ensure cognisance of the current and 
future implications of contemporary risks and threats. Thus, interview 
findings in the present study are important to shed light on the evolution 
of the current Turkish border security system and its future prospects 
with regards to the European Union integration process. 
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Figure 3.2: Traditional approaches 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the number of references made by 
interviewees who believe that the military should play a pivotal role in 
the evolving border security framework of Turkey is clearly high as is the 
number of those suggested fortified borders for better protection. Thus, it 
can be argued that interviewees have highlighted the importance of Cold 
War era parameters in Turkey’s current border security understanding.  
It is in this sense that the territory based ‘state-centric’ label can be 
applied. It is important, here, to clarify the ‘state-centric’ label in this 
discussion of Turkey’s border security policy. Traditionally, state-
centrism has referred to an exclusive focus on state-based military 
threats to the security of the state. As M09 argued: ‘the defence of 
homeland starts from the border, so the military at the border not only 
protect the border, but set off the defence from that front. In case of a 
danger or threat, the defence line starts from zero point.’ Of course that 
zero point would be a boundary.  Similarly, police chief M16 argued that 
‘the point of border security is, in fact, security of the borders.’ 
However, security thinking has moved beyond traditional definitions to 
cover a range of non-state, non-military, local, regional and cross-border 
security threats and future risks. Nevertheless, these are still viewed 
through the lens of military security as threats to the security of the state 
according to the great majority of interviewee comments, which is 
significant. This is a consequence mainly stemming from confusion of the 
difference between the meanings of ‘defence’ and of ‘security’. Most of the 
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interviewees did not have clear visions of military defence and of security 
as a civil approach, as M22 argued ‘if it requires weapons to protect your 
borders, you will set up an armed unit. If then, what difference 
functionally? Can you name an armed unit as civilian?’ 
There is another difficulty about the military presence at the borders 
were a civil, professional body to take over the job. Most of the 
interviewees do not think it an option that military and a professional 
body responsible for border security can coexist at the border whilst 
conducting different duties. As M05 argued:  
When you charge the military with external 
security, you cannot isolate them from the 
borders. In other words, it is natural. For 
example, you cannot tell the police go away or 
do not stop by, once you hand over a duty of 
public order. Why cannot Turkey set up a 
border agency just like in UK? Because the 
dynamics and geographical location are 
different. Turkey still has some threats against 
its state and territorial unity. 
The most important exception from this state centric philosophy 
exemplified in the words of the Secretary General of National Security 
Council. Secretary General Hacimuftuoglu argued that 
Our constitutional order is state, country and 
society respectively. All our vows and rituals 
begin with the preservation of the existence 
and independence of the state, territorial 
integrity, and indivisibility of the country and 
the maintenance of peace and security of the 
society. In other words, first state, second 
country and last society. However, providing 
happiness to society is only possible if you put 
people first. Accordingly, the order should be 
society, country and state. 
 
193 
 
 
Figure 3.3: EU Contribution 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the respective size of rectangles in 
Graph 3, the EU influence or EU projects have very few positive visible 
results on Turkey’s border security capabilities. Most interviewees think 
that it has a negative influence rather than a positive. M04 argued: 
The EU’s securitisation policy has had a 
negative influence on Turkey as it is not a 
member state yet. After the EU’s efforts to 
enhance the level of security at the borders, 
some illegal immigrants have begun to see 
Turkey as a target country. 
M22, similarly, argued: 
The EU cannot stop foreign fighters coming 
towards us to go to fight along with terrorist 
organisations. It means the EU’s system does 
not work. Thus, under these circumstances, 
how applicable its recommendations are to 
Turkey is a question mark. 
M21 pointed out the positive effects of the European Union policies and 
argued ‘the EU projects such as risk analysis projects and providing 
Turkey with coast guard boats help Turkey to enhance its capacity in the 
border security area. However, it is only for its own good.’ 
Having considered the interpretations of professionals, it is clear that 
border security is now accepted as an isolated phenomenon and a sub-set 
of national security which is focused on territorial boundaries for 
protection. Most of the interviewees demand the reinforcement of the 
barrier role of the state borders against terrorists in the name of border 
security even if everybody knows that it is impossible to seal the borders 
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completely.  Hence, Turkey is at a place which is a product of cold war 
thinking which fails to recognize the requirements of the new security 
environment. 
Today security can no longer be conceived of as protection behind borders. 
And although a number of implementations throughout the world 
maintain the vision of a fortified border, border security is no longer 
related to a territory. You cannot keep this traditional form of border 
security framework because threats today are not typically territorial. 
The conceptions of borders and security are changing. Turkey has to take 
a broader approach and change its position. Current border security 
systems, based on Cold War thinking, restricts Turkey’s capacity to 
enhance its influence beyond its borders and it appears that this is the 
only way to tackle security problems in the new world. 
 
7.4. Findings obtained from archival research 
The Strategy Paper for the Protection of the External Borders in Turkey 
was adopted in 2003. This Strategy Paper recommended that a single 
authority should be responsible for the security of the borders under the 
auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, which would take over the border 
control function currently performed by the Turkish military. The new 
authority will be in charge of all border protection duties in Turkey and 
especially trained, professional law-enforcement units will perform all 
functions, in line with EU standards. 
The Directorate of the IBM Project Implementation was established in 
2004 and is responsible for the planning and preparation of the EU 
projects within the scope of IBM. This Directorate, in collaboration with a 
French-UK Consortium, were tasked with implementing the Twinning 
Project ‘Support for the Development of an Action Plan to Implement 
Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy’. The IBM Action Plan 
was subsequently approved by the Prime Minister in 2006.  The purpose 
of the Action Plan was to form the base for the institutional reforms and 
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the legislative regulations in order to establish a single civilian, non-
military, professional body responsible for performing all border control 
and surveillance tasks at the borders.  In accordance with the Action 
Plan, Turkey decided to implement the ‘border police system’ gradually 
(2006: 21) and prior to the establishment of a non-military and 
professional Border Guard Organization, to further strengthen the 
technical and administrative capacities of agencies and institutions 
responsible for the control of the borders (2006: 53). This is confusing 
because there should be no need to strengthen current agencies if a new 
body is going to be set up. 
In 2008, the Directorate of the IBM Project Implementation was replaced 
by a newly established Development and Implementation Bureau for 
Border Management Legislation and Administrative Capacity (the 
Bureau), within the Ministry of the Interior. The Bureau’s responsibility 
is to carry out studies for the legislative and administrative structure of 
IBM, to prepare an assessment and needs analysis on IBM, to implement 
IBM projects and to work on the establishment of a new Border Security 
Unit. Additionally, the External Border Task Force (the Task Force) 
comprising of representatives of the agencies was established to work out 
the Draft Road Map on IBM for 2010-2014. Later the Bureau has been 
converted to a department and carry on business at the disposal of 
General Directorate of Province Administration within the Interior 
Ministry. 
The new single authority responsible for the security of the borders is 
planned to be affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior. Interior Minister 
Efkan Ala later confirmed this and said ‘there are plans to establish a 
professional armed border security department aimed at placing the 
country's borders under civilian control in line with EU standards.’12 
However, as discussed in the interview findings even the civilians in the 
decision making mechanism in the field still hold militaristic views on 
                                            
12 http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/12/21/border-security-to-be-placed-under-
civilian-control-says-minister-ala, last accessed December 2016. 
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border security. They share exactly the same mind-set with the military.  
So what the contribution of ‘civilian control’ will be is a big question 
mark.  In addition, certain major issues, such as personnel requirements 
and delivering the appropriate training for the staff working for the new 
authority, should be addressed well before the materialisation of the 
transfer. It takes time as Interior Minister Ala pointed out13 and in the 
absence of the appropriate approach the current border security 
understandings remain in place. 
It is thought that setting up a new agency will eliminate the coordination 
problems which are the primary concern among policy makers. However, 
it is clear that it is not a solution. The drafting of new Border Security 
Agency Law is just an initial step, although the existing legislation in 
Turkey needs to be reviewed and amended in order to facilitate the 
establishment of an effective mechanism in line with the IBM Action 
Plan including coordination and communication procedures between the 
existing agencies, orientation and approach should be reviewed first.  
According to Turkish Law, the overall supervision of Border Management 
is exercised by the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior 
performs these functions through the deputy governors assigned by the 
Governors. The District Governors, who are responsible for co-ordination 
among the various agencies working at the borders and Border Gates, are 
the 1st degree border authorities, and the Governors are the 2nd degree 
border authorities.  However, there are no formalized procedures or 
standardized instructions for inter-agency cooperation and information 
exchange. Co-operation between the border management agencies at 
central and regional level takes place through Provincial 
Governors/Deputy Governors and Local Administrators, according to 
‘Provincial Administration Law’, which sets the communication and 
information exchange procedures. However, this legislation falls short for 
                                            
13 Interior minister Ala said “There are two things here. Firstly, in the short term we 
need to establish our strong civil coordination mechanism. Secondly, the civil 
organization. Sure it takes a little time. http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/efkan-ala-
guvenlik-icin-buyuk-bir-teskilat-kurulacak-2367267, last accessed December 2015. 
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appropriate information exchange and direct horizontal cooperation both 
at local and central level. There are currently no links between the 
databases of the different border services. Information exchange occurs 
on an ad-hoc basis and is not institutionalized. 
The present system for Border Management consists of several fully 
autonomous agencies each with their own budgets and mainly under the 
responsibility of the Interior Ministry. Some are of a military character 
such as the Land Forces, without law enforcement power, and the Coast 
Guard, a law enforcement agency, which is formally under the Ministry 
of the Interior, and others are civilian such as Customs. However, in 
reality the Ministry of the Interior has no jurisdiction on these agencies 
in terms of human resources, budget and any policy making. For 
example, governors and district governors as 1st and 2nd degree border 
authorities have no administrative power over Land Forces14, inevitably 
creating a huge gap in terms of coordination and efficiency.  In other 
words, these agencies ostensibly report to the Interior Ministry, while the 
Interior Ministry ostensibly holds executive power over them.  It should 
be noted that Customs is exempted from integration by the national 
action plan. As a result, coordination is in reality a pretence. 
In parallel with the interview findings there is strong emphasis on 
geographic structure as a problem in the plan (2006: 15, 21, 51). The plan 
took the geographical situation of Turkey as determinant factor for the 
strong military presence. Mountainous areas at the border zone 
necessitate that the military continue to conduct protection of land 
borders ‘in highly critical regions’ (2006:54), namely the east and south 
east sectors. Moreover, political instability in the neighbouring countries 
is considered an important complication for border security (2006: 16). 
The likelihood of a great financial burden is also cited in the action plan 
                                            
14 See the article 13 of Law 3497. The 3497 Law of Protection and Security of Land 
Borders designates the Turkish Land Forces as the responsible authority for the task of 
the protection and security of land borders. 
198 
 
and considered an excuse to ‘gradually implement a border police system’ 
(2006: 21). 
In its 2015 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission states 
that ‘Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and 
security. There was some progress in the past year, in a difficult 
environment’ (p. 68).  The Schengen and external borders Commission 
says that ‘Turkey did not make steps towards the establishment of an 
integrated border management system and a single border civilian 
agency. Coordination and cooperation among existing border 
management agencies needs to be improved.’ (p. 70, 71).  The report also 
suggests enhancing information exchange and operational cooperation 
with Member States’ immigration liaison officers deployed in Turkey. Of 
note, the cross-border exchange of information between some of the 
border agencies and their counterparts is still carried out on ad-hoc basis, 
as there are currently no laid down formal procedures. Although 
projected in the National Strategy Plan, Joint Centres are not yet in 
place, due again to a lack of appropriate legislation.   
Land borders are assessed as problematic in the report:  ‘land borders 
continue to be managed by land forces detachments composed mainly by 
conscripts with limited training and led by officials who are not 
encouraged to specialise on border management.’ (p. 71). It also suggests 
that border management authorities should be staffed by professionals 
who are not subject to rotation. 
The Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has announced the Action Plan of 
2016 of 64th Government15. It consists a wide range of reforms to be 
implemented including reforms of border security. On page 41 the Prime 
Minister pledges to set up a professional border security agency under 
the authority of the Interior Ministry in line with the EU Acquis. Based 
on Article 8 of the Additional Protocol of the Amsterdam Agreement, 
                                            
15 http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/64.hukumet-eylem-plani-
kitap.pdf, last accessed December 2015. 
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candidate countries are expected to have the capacity to apply the 
Schengen Agreement before becoming a member of the EU, in order to be 
able to execute the provisions of the Agreement after a possible 
membership. The plan states that agencies responsible for border 
protection will be syndicated. The deadline was declared as 15 December 
2016. 
It is clear that the existence of more than one agency, which is 
responsible for passport and goods checks at border crossings, and for 
supervising the sea and land borders of the country makes inter-agency 
coordination rather difficult. Furthermore, IBM is not only about 
coordination, it also requires the rebuilding of infrastructure such as 
physical barriers, and equipping border forces with thermal and video 
cameras, radars, sensors, satellite monitoring, and unmanned air 
vehicles.16 All of these measures are targeting the protection of a 
boundary line which is no longer the primary signifier. However, it is not 
clear whether uniting all the agencies can bring the expected solution. 
And the question here is: is Turkey prioritizing the most significant and 
appropriate steps?  
The documents cited above bear evidence that border security was a high 
priority for Turkey.  Turkey recognizes the possible consequences of IBM 
in its security context and has devoted significant government resources 
to the issue.  These documents also trace the development of the 
implementation of IBM at a policy level.  Finally, they make it clear that 
Turkey was committed to addressing border issues within the context of 
Turkey’s national security policy.   
In sum, the core of the findings from primary and secondary resources 
above imply that current border security strategies are meant to deter 
the entry of illegal or threatening people and goods. As a result of the old 
notion of deterrence logic, an obsession with easily guarded boundaries 
                                            
16 “Türkiye’nin Entegre Sınır Yönetimi Stratejisinin Uygulanmasına Yönelik Ulusal 
Eylem Planı,” [National Action Plan towards the Application of Turkey’s Integrated 
Border Management Strategy], 2006, p. 72, 73. 
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has become the characteristic of current border security thinking. 
Therefore, achieving operational control over boundaries and the threats 
they present becomes more of an issue. Turkey still takes border security 
as a sub-set of national security; and the current organization and 
practices of border security were shaped by the particular geopolitical 
and technical requirements of the Cold War. As a result of that, border 
security’s itself becomes a security problem and produces insecurity for 
both society and the state. Therefore, Turkey must effect a new 
paradigm. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8  
ANALYSIS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Defending against cross-border risks and threats requires a more radical 
and holistic approach to security. Therefore, the core purpose of this 
chapter is twofold. First, it will argue that the current border security 
framework and its practices create exclusions and therefore increases the 
danger to national security. In other words, this chapter will analyse the 
current securitisation of the state border and the ability of the security 
agencies to protect national (state) security. Furthermore, while 
traditional understandings of security focus upon the protection and 
integrity of a sovereign territory against the outside enemies, this thesis 
will suggest that  insecurity is prevalent within the Turkish territory and 
the mechanisms that are used to ‘secure’ can actually create insecurity. 
Thus looking at the other side for enemies behind reinforced border lines 
does not work out. Secondly, the chapter will argue that border security 
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should not be taken as a sub-set of national security but a comprehensive 
framework that can lead and transform the old notion of national 
security. The new security environment invalidates the analyses of 
border security as an isolated phenomenon.  In other words, border 
security needs to be seen and contemplated not as a separate and 
independent issue, but as a comprehensive framework closely associated 
with the broader debate concerning national security. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss how the concept of societal security could 
be considered as a means of better security for Turkey. In other words, 
border security must be embedded in a larger notion of ‘societal security.’ 
Today, security depends not only on territorial integrity, but also on 
securing the delicate web of values, connections, and infrastructure 
which characterizes a society. Therefore, while we try to improve border 
security, and hence national security, we must not break the central 
elements of societal security because securing borders is less about 
securing lines or narrow zones and more about transformation or shifting 
of lines and we have to put more emphasis on how people experience the 
borders or interpret them. This approach can create a more useful 
context for border security and lead to a transformation of the current 
national security system. 
Therefore, based on the conceptual debates the researcher will discuss 
possible answers for two core questions primarily: How might Turkey 
increase its border security? And what insights ‘Societal Security’ might 
offer to this question. Secondarily, the researcher will discuss: whether 
current border security practices in Turkey do provide security for both 
state and society, or quite the opposite and is the transformation strategy 
an added value to the existing framework, in terms of efficiency and 
enhancement of security, in the security field? 
In the modern era we have witnessed two key interrelated conceptual 
transformations: first, mobility of the borders and second the changing 
nature of security. Security is no longer an issue which can be solely 
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defined in terms of the security of a state, it also, and increasingly, 
concerns identity and therefore society. The notion of security has also 
been expanded beyond the physical border itself and by deterritorializing 
the issue of security the need for the protection of physical boundaries is 
undermined. As a result of this rationale, some territories beyond the 
border need to be securitized as if they were part of the national border. 
In other words, securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily 
take place at the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone. 
However, Turkey’s security understanding is highly traditional and 
based on territorial defense. As a result of that an obsession with easily 
guarded land borders is the characteristic of current border thinking in 
Turkey. In addition the state is seen as the sole actor who implements 
bordering practices at the edges of state territory. However, there are 
other actors who are powerful and capable of bordering along with the 
state, such as society, the private sector, even cross-border illegal groups. 
The State’s bordering practices do not always correspond with societies 
and this creates contradictions and conflicts between society and the 
state. To stop these conflicts, the state applies complete closure strategies 
which deepen the contradictions because a traditional territorial security 
concept does not allow security professionals think about alternative 
ways to counter the challenges of the new security environment. 
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(c)  Kilis Governorate 2014 
 
Turkey’s 9479 km long boundary is subjected to a historical burden and 
still gives rise to passionate feelings, both positive and negative. Today, 
contrary to popular belief, our common borders are less of a problem and 
more of an opportunity. Positive and mutual opportunities come not only 
through the likely economic benefits or the increased trade, but also 
through more encounters and meetings between people. These kinds of 
encounters will hopefully help us to gain a better understanding of not 
only our neighbours, but of ourselves as well – and the history behind, 
and the future ahead of our long common borders. 
In this chapter the desperate pressure for change in the new security 
environment will be examined first and closely related, the impact of the 
changing conditions on the security agencies will be scrutinised. Finally 
the chapter will pursue the arguments and recommendations regarding 
measures which Turkey could implement to increase security, based on 
the conceptual framework of this thesis. 
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8.1. Why is it essential to change? 
The current organization and practices of border security were shaped by 
the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the Cold War 
and hence are more fitted to its relatively stable climate. Clearly, the 
change in the security environment and the nature of the ‘new’ threats 
has created some major difficulties for traditional approaches to border 
security. In order to better understand these difficulties, this section first 
looks at the ‘old’ conception of problems and how they were dealt with; 
and then focuses on the nature of the ‘new’ challenges. However, it does 
not mean that the discontinuities between the Cold War and post-Cold 
War environments are as clear-cut as the separation between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ implies. 
 
8.1.1. The Old: Certain and predictable  
The clear and straightforward parameters of the Cold War threat can be 
designated as a sense of certainty and calculability. It implies that to 
identify the level of threat, the material capabilities such as number of 
the aircrafts and tanks or potential of the enemy along with its intention, 
were analysed and compared to one’s own power level. This 
understanding of security only allows the external location of threats. 
With good information and analysis the location of threats was possible. 
The monitoring and surveillance of the enemy, resulted in the targeted 
movement of people and supplies, changes in aircraft deployments and 
increases in communications. In addition, there was a belief that it was 
possible to defeat the threat and achieve security through deterrence 
which means becoming a risk for the enemy in a sense. 
This old security thinking is territory-based, externally directed, 
military-dominated, and state centric. To defend its territory, the state 
reinforces the fixed external borders as its main tool for protection. These 
barrier like borders operate like anti-flow apparatus and target the 
protection of a narrow line. Border security is seen as an isolated 
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phenomenon or a sub-set of national security. However, borders and 
territory, and the security practices organised around them are very 
much in question in a world of turbulent financial flows, instantaneous 
telecommunications, and cross-border and intra-border dangers. In 
addition, this logic of exclusion always includes the risk of potential 
conflict as well as a barrier that prevents us seeing the other side 
properly. Above all, the developments after the Cold War have 
demonstrated that states are less capable  of  providing security on their 
own. Although they have resorted to military alliances or collective 
security organizations to cope with threats of a military nature, today’s 
security challenges are different in nature and require more than 
traditional means. An increasingly mobile world with its dislocated 
identities and blurred boundaries does not easily allow territory-based 
solutions.  
The end of the Cold War brought about not only the end of a relatively 
stable bipolar world order but also the end of the predictability of threats. 
The new security environment is dominated by threats whose 
characteristics are complex, uncertain and difficult to locate in the 
geographical sense. Revolutions in technology, changing demographics 
because of ethnic conflicts, and global economic activities are driving 
forces behind this transformation. These forces have created a more 
connected world than ever seen in the past. However, such a connected 
world has become increasingly vulnerable to challenges and uncertainties 
which are unpredictable in nature and geopolitics. 
Turkey is not immune to these changes of course. However, it has not yet 
managed to adapt its systems to intervene effectively in the security 
problems of the new security environment. Recent terrorist activities, 
even in the capital, with hundreds of killings in the streets of the country 
by these attacks, are strong indicators of Turkey’s position in the face of 
this change. ‘Many of today’s principal analytic problems arise from 
continued reliance on analytic tools, methodologies, and processes that 
were appropriate to the static and hierarchical nature of the Soviet threat 
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during the Cold War’ (Cooper, 2005: 23). As the organizations and 
practices of security were shaped by the particular geopolitical and 
technical requirements of the Cold War, there is a constantly increasing 
pressure on the whole system. 
8.1.2. The new: uncertain and unpredictable 
We have witnessed the emergence of a new world and a new security 
landscape. The breakdown of the bipolar world order led to a collapse of 
previous assumptions and perspectives. Whilst, in the past, most threats 
came from outside, mostly from other states, today, intra-state security 
risks and threats relating to non-state actors have increasingly occupied 
the minds of policy makers. In the new security landscape, open 
economies and open societies have improved economic welfare but have 
also made it difficult to provide security. As economies globalize and 
societies are fused and split up at the same time by transnational 
migration, the relationship based on territory between nation, state, 
society, and economy crumbles and the modern territorial system itself is 
being transformed. This transformation has two key interrelated 
consequences in common: a changing understanding of security including 
the new risks and threats; and the changing nature of sovereignty.  
The security risks and threats such as terrorism, organized crime, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cybercrime, or illegal 
migration, are cross-border and intra-border that originate within or 
beyond states, and involve non-state actors that have a clear tendency to 
use violence and weapons. They are within and without borders and are 
unpredictable. With the help of advanced technology, ‘International 
borders are becoming so porous that they no longer fulfil their historical 
role as barriers to the movement of goods, ideas, and people, and as 
markers of the extent and power of the state’ (Wilson&Donnan 1998: 1). 
As a result, control of territory is no longer the most important priority. 
The main consequence emerging from the new security environment is 
the changing ‘referent object of security’ as the marker of the new world. 
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The state is no longer seen as the primary object of security though it is 
still an important one. The emergent new security threats are generally 
aimed at society in the first instance and threaten the social contract 
instead of the state’s ability to govern. Restricting the definition of 
security to the traditional meaning with territorial protection of the state 
would inevitably exclude threats to the social fabric of the society.  Thus, 
threats can no longer be disaggregated into the capabilities and 
intentions of oppositional states; primacy can no longer be attributed to 
the state as either agent or object (Snyder 1991). In addition, the capacity 
of the modern state as provider of security in the eyes of its citizens is 
weakened. As a result, society has come to the agenda as a security 
provider alongside the state. 
The concept of state sovereignty has also been transformed by the rapid 
developments in communication and transportation technology. As UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1992) formulated: ‘The time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never 
matched by reality.’ Hence, borders cannot be seen as simple lines where 
one sovereignty ends and another starts. More importantly, border 
security can no longer be based on a fixed line on a map. An 
understanding of this reconceptualisation would help to overcome the 
traditional distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ security concerns, 
which are becoming increasingly blurred. 
As a result of those dramatic changes after the end of Cold War, the scope 
of border security has expanded to a critical point which is crucial for 
national security. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998: 3,8) posit that ‘the Cold 
War has classified border security exclusively as a sub-set of national 
security and failed to consider the state boundary in its broader 
associated fields of social and cultural influences.’ Therefore, all these 
transformations force a reconsideration of the concept of border security, 
its link with the notion of defence, and the role which armies can play 
with regard to other sectors of security (military, civil, economic, 
environmental, internal or societal).   In other words, securing borders, is 
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now less about securing lines, on the contrary border security is a 
comprehensive framework to coordinate and determine all assets to 
achieve security. 
Although the traditional way of security thinking is challenged by the 
new security environment, it is clear from the interviews that in Turkey 
it is very much alive as the determinant concept. This results in a 
blocking of the consideration of alternative ways to deal with border 
security issues effectively, hence its border security understanding and 
the security structure’s itself becomes a security problem.  
Just like Moises Naim suggested in the case of drug smugglers, ‘borders 
are a boon for traffickers and a nightmare for law-enforcement agencies’ 
(Naim, 2005, 62–3), because of the lack of cooperation. While policing 
remains national, ‘traffickers are most effective when operating across 
borders — which makes them in many ways better suited to today’s 
world’ (Naim, 2005, 63).  Coordination is necessarily minimal in the 
traditional view of security, because it is limited to periods of war when 
national territory is attacked by external enemies. Claiming coordination 
at other times is just a sham. However, we are in a constant war with 
terrorists, organised criminals, traffickers and other challenges 
disrupting societies’ very daily life. Therefore, Turkey should construct a 
new paradigm which enables it to find a way to lower the fences and 
walls and to give a chance to change in line with the contemporary norms 
of border security.  
Despite the general tendency towards traditional thinking, there is a 
growing section of the security community that has realized that the 
changing context has significant consequences for strategic methods of 
achieving security. Sometimes policy makers and high ranking officials 
emphasize the new risks and threats. For instance, the commander of 
Land Forces Akar (now Chief of General Staff) said: ‘In today’s security 
environment the range of threats has expanded. While Turkey's 
geostrategic position provides countless opportunities and possibilities for 
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our country, it also accumulates many uncertainties, risks and threats 
within.’17  However, even though the techniques of alternative analysis 
have been around for many years, they have not yet led to proper 
organizational and behavioural reforms in the Turkish security sector. 
On a conceptual basis, the need for change stems from the limitations of 
the traditional approach. These limitations mainly are:  the privileged 
position of the military sector and the fact that other potential threats 
are excluded; and thus, unless an environmental, economic or social 
problem disrupts the military sector, it does not become part of a state's 
security analysis. For example, an environmental disaster would not be 
considered a national security concern unless the state’s interests were 
threatened. Another limitation is that the traditional perspective 
assumes that the greatest threats to national security are external ones 
and thus, does not recognize intrastate conflict as being a source of 
insecurity, so the potential separatist movements do not qualify as a 
national security threat (Ayoob, 1997). Even if the state somehow views it 
as a national security threat it inevitably uses military force to suppress 
the secessionist movement. 
In short, border, space, and security must be relieved of the burdens of 
the Cold War in order to have a possibility for a change (Booth, 1998). In 
this context, to stop the area of border security from being a nightmare of 
border security agencies, there is a major challenge that need to be 
addressed. Decision makers must change their border perception and 
determine whether border security practices will be extended outwards 
and simultaneously pulled together at home. 
 
8.1.3 Mobility of the boundaries 
In the context of spatiality, according to the traditional view, borderlines 
symbolize ‘the difference’ between ‘we’ and ‘other’, inside and outside; and 
                                            
17 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/orgeneral-akar-ates-cemberinin-ortasindayiz-her-an-
harbe-hazir-olmaliyiz-27379265 
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a tool for states to survive. As it focuses on the state, the border is 
understood as a constituent of stability and sovereignty which enables 
state to organise the political space to maintain its political order. As the 
threat is somewhere outside, walls are heightened for protection because 
borders have long been associated with the military defence of the 
national territory against external aggression of neighbouring armies.  In 
this respect, it seems that nothing much has changed with regards to 
Turkey’s border security framework after the end of Cold War. The 
security border keeps excluding the other, and the possibility of 
alternative politics is denied (Latinen 2001)18. However, in a world full of 
uncertainties, border security issues are interlinked and it is hard to 
locate the source of insecurity because ‘Post-Cold War risks are no longer 
adequately represented and stabilised as territorial threats from 
recognizable enemies; rather post-Cold War risks have become 
amorphous and pervasive dangers’ (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 28).  
Having considered the interviewee’s approach to border security and the 
findings of the archival research, the internal/external dichotomy is 
common and border security is seen as a part of internal security as  
emphasised by governor Tapsiz: ‘border security is definitely a part of 
internal security.’ However, what will Turkey do if internal security is 
not only from the ‘inside’, if it goes beyond the border and if the inside 
challenger is coming from outside? It is hard to say which is internal and 
which is external because of the changing nature of risks and threats. As 
a result of this dramatic change, police, customs, gendarmes, intelligence 
agencies and the army are now fighting against same enemies:  terrorists 
and their supporting countries, organized crime and drugs trafficking, 
human trafficking, illegal immigration and  ethnic conflicts which are 
directly linked to the terrorist organisations. 
For a long time the military forces have been in charge of the surveillance 
of the borders and looking for ‘infiltrating enemies’. During the 1990s at 
                                            
18 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_2/Laitinen.htm, accessed August 2015 
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the height of the fight against terrorism it was thought that the more 
deserted the borderline, the easier it will be to do surveillance across the 
east and the south-east boundaries of Turkey and as a result, some 
villagers were forced to migrate deep into the country. However, 
terrorists were already inside, not only in the rural areas but also the 
suburbs of cities. It implies that border security extends beyond 
organisational concerns of territorial defence which the agencies in the 
field in Turkey focus upon. 
A series of examples suggest that today we are witnessing a 
“delocalization” of the border. Borders are no longer a line which 
determine the territorial authority’s ends. Rather, they are expanding in 
time and space. The development of transport, international trade and 
communications create boundaries deep within the state territory, for 
instance, around international airports, and special customs or free 
economic zones. The transformation is not limited to entry points, as 
Balibar stated ‘they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the 
movement of information, people, and things is happening and is 
controlled— for example, in cosmopolitan cities.’ (2004: 1). Therefore, the 
concept of border now embraces not only the area along the boundary, but 
internal regions. 
In parallel with the conceptual transformation above, although border 
security activities were previously concentrated in this specific place, it is 
argued that currently there is a disaggregation of border functions away 
from the border (Bigo, 2002: 77; Salter, 2004: 76). This is evident in the 
case of the UK and the EU security policies embodied in the form of 
‘remote control’, ‘citizen-surveillance’ and ‘juxtaposed borders’ focusing on 
the ‘pre-emptive’ character of new border security. In the past, borders 
were places where people were inspected while crossing. Now, different 
forms of pre-assessment methods are used by states to decide on 
admissibility before travellers depart their country of origin. And some 
state agencies are now deployed and work beyond their territories.   
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It implies that border security cannot be reduced to the national territory 
and securitisation of borders should no longer necessarily take place at 
the geopolitical or territorial boundary line or zone.   It can extend 
beyond the national territory while it must deal with the security issues 
inside the territory. As Bigo (2000:187) argues: 
Security checks are no longer necessarily done 
at the border on a systematic and egalitarian 
basis, but can be carried out further 
downstream, within the territory, within the 
border zone or even upstream with police 
collaboration in the home country of the 
immigrants, through visa-granting systems and 
through readmission agreements.  
There are some lessons to learn from this extension in time and space. 
First, borders are no longer necessarily situated at the border (Balibar, 
2002: 84). They are unfixed and mobile, diffused throughout, within and 
outside the state.  As we have seen in the ‘citizen detective’ concept in 
chapter 3, citizens themselves are undertaking bordering practices, such 
as downloading pictures of wanted suspects onto mobile phones, or being 
provided with phone numbers to ring if a suspected or suspicious person 
is identified (Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 63).  In similar vein, when 
supermarket checkout staff are trained by MI5 to recognise terrorist 
activities, ‘the supermarket checkout now resembles a border crossing or 
transit point in the midst of society’ (Rumford, 2008: 1). Thus, strikingly, 
mobility is not just about criminals, migrants or other goods crossing the 
border, but the actual border itself. 
Second, closely connected with the first, the notion of security has been 
expanded beyond the physical border itself and by deterritorializing the 
issue of security, the need for protection of the physical boundaries is 
undermined. As a result of this rationale, some territories beyond the 
border need to be securitized as if they were part of the national border. 
The question whether the source of a threat is inside or outside is 
therefore becoming irrelevant. 
213 
 
However, an obsession with easily guarded land borders is the 
characteristic of current border thinking in Turkey. Border security is 
thought of in terms of a narrow zone, the border is, for Turkish personnel, 
a place of work. For these agencies, the concept of border security is 
securitization of a closed territory which should be protected by the help 
of insuperable borders. Their vision of security seems to be influenced by 
the old Cold War thinking and at the same time lacks means against the 
terrorists, traffickers and the flow of immigrants.  
As it is clear from the main stream media rhetoric about ‘broken borders’, 
referring  specifically to Turkey’s south and south-east borders, the 
traditional image of the borders of the state still exercises a major 
influence on the territorial security of the state. This powerful image of 
the secure border as a guardian of state security led to a security fence 
just like a prison wall. In this respect, Turkey ‘intensified its security 
measures with the construction of bazooka-proof walls on the Turkish-
Syrian border.’19 However, with regard to Turkey’s border security 
practises, it represents a paradox, indeed. There is a dual process of 
opening national borders based mainly on Turkey’s new foreign policy 
and the creation of new security walls because of instabilities in Syria 
and Iraq. When Turkey adopts an open border policy and wants to define 
a new paradigm to resolve the insecurity created by the conflicts in the 
Middle East, the scope of security is expanding, however, it narrows 
when you build a wall at the border to stop unintended consequences.  
The construction of a concrete wall not only symbolises the barrier 
function of the border but it also prevents us from seeing what is taking 
place on the other side of the border. As such, the other side becomes 
invisible and unknown, and obscures the opportunity to act within the 
environment and shape it. In addition, the removal of the wall or the 
fence does not only symbolize the coming together of peoples or groups 
which were previously prevented from being in contact with each other, 
                                            
19 http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/07/30/turkey-builds-rocket-proof-walls-on-
syrian-border, last accessed in December 2015. 
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but also changes our perception of the border from a barrier to an 
interface, and from a no-man’s land to a transition zone. 
The realities of the new security environment prevail, and the intention 
to control a certain territory by traditional means has very much been 
challenged, therefore, the dominant ideology of security must be 
reviewed.  In the context of border security, inside/outside or 
internal/external divisions can hardly be relevant any longer. Such 
implications are moving Turkey in a direction which does not encourage 
strategies to manage the current border problems and leaves the military 
doing police work. 
 
8.2. What kind of border security is in the making? 
Turkey has been struggling to create a new border security department 
in line with the European Union integration process and this department 
will be responsible for border security. For this purpose, the Strategy 
Paper for the Protection of External Borders was issued on April 14, 
2003. Parallel with the Strategy paper a National Action Plan was 
prepared to reform the border security framework. Recently, the Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has announced in the Action Plan of 2016 
that government will set up a professional border security agency under 
the authority of the Interior Ministry in line with the EU Acquis.20  
However, there is a question as to the kind of border security Turkey is 
creating. It is a version of the old geographical security vision of the Cold 
War era. Ultimately, the question is: Can a predominantly traditional 
border security framework play a productive and leading role in national 
security? The National Action Plan and the Strategy Paper will be 
scrutinised in this section to shed light on this ambivalence.  
The Strategy Paper for the Protection of External Borders in Turkey 
emphasizes ‘preventive’ and ‘deterrent’ activities to combat trafficking 
                                            
20 http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/64.hukumet-eylem-plani-
kitap.pdf, last accessed December 2015. 
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and illegal crossing and the security of border gates and borders. The 
terminology (prevent, deter) used by the strategy document is militaristic 
and focus is on the border lines and zones to make them visible and 
thereby deterrent. The footprints of this conceptualisation were visible at 
every stage during the interviews. 
The National Action plan was adopted in 2006 to reform Turkey’s border 
security framework. The purpose of the Action Plan was to form the basis 
for institutional reforms and legislative regulations in order to establish a 
single civilian, non-military, professional body responsible for performing 
all border control and surveillance tasks at the borders.  In accordance 
with the Action Plan, Turkey decided, prior to the establishment of a non-
military and professional Border Guard Organization, to further 
strengthen technical and administrative capacities of agencies and 
institutions responsible for the control of the borders to be in line with 
the EU Member States practices. In the plan ‘Border Security’ is defined 
as ‘[…] all active and passive measures taken at land, sea, and air 
borders to prevent all types of illegal crossings’ (2006: 12). This definition 
and the following descriptions demonstrate that border security is 
discussed in the document as security of border line or border zone. 
Throughout, the plan emphasises how difficult it is to control Turkey’s 
eastern borders because of geographical features, climate and 
instabilities in neighbouring countries — a strong indicator of a 
traditional security understanding. According to the plan, these special 
conditions require a special perspective. More importantly, the document 
validates an unwillingness to change citing geographic structure, harsh 
climate and the cost. For example due to the mountainously steep land 
borders ‘the physical barrier system cannot be put in place, thus these 
regions must be monitored and controlled by satellite systems’ which is 
beyond the financial capability of Turkey (2006: 15). Along with the other 
factors, financial cost is referred as an excuse to drag the feet. 
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In fact, mountainous areas and harsh climate conditions and the cost of 
the investment are realities in Turkey, however, the interesting thing 
here is that policy-makers act as if fortified borders are the only choice to 
provide security. Indeed, the state prevents us from imagining any other 
possible security space (Walker 1990). In other words, traditional 
thinking is creating barriers to thinking about alternative solutions. In 
addition, the plan points out the neighbouring countries in the east and 
southeast as a challenge, as they do not consider border security as an 
important issue. It implies how difficult it is to coordinate with other 
states. In fact, it is an indicator of how Turkey is dependent on state to 
state relationships to sustain security. 
The languages of ‘control’ and ‘protection’ are the reflection of old security 
understandings which take the border as a line and border security as 
the security of this narrow line.  Geographic and climatic conditions are 
emphasized often because the conventional border security 
understandings require fences, walls, more personnel and more guns to 
control the flows. In other words, visibility and hence deterrence cannot 
be provided due to the geographic conditions. It is fair to say that it is not 
easy in such geographic conditions to conduct duties. The question here is 
‘is visibility a necessity?’ Putting aside terrorism , can illegal immigrants 
who cross the borders at the expense of their own and their  loved ones’ 
lives, as often seen in the Mediterranean recently, be deterred?  In 
today’s highly mobile world it is hard to establish a connection between 
providing security and border crossing. 
In this respect, therefore, starting restructuring from the western borders 
is suggested by the plan (2006: 50). From traditional point of view, it is 
an obligation because building walls and fences and protecting them is 
impossible at Turkey’s south-east borders (Iraq borders) because of highly 
seep geography and harsh climate. This suggestion implies that eastern 
borders are more important than western borders mainly due to the 
terrorist activities. However, the idea of mobility defined by flows and 
networks downplays the importance of territorial bordering and the 
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political priorities which are based on some borders being more important 
than others. In addition, in the face of eastern and south-eastern borders, 
western borders promulgate nothing in terms of border security 
problems. Even using traditional territorial border security logic, the 
direction of the flows are from east to west. Hence, taking measures at 
the western borders means nothing and leaves it too late to face threats. 
The plan also emphasizes that ‘in critical regions (east and south-east) 
the army (land forces) will continue to assume border protection tasks on 
behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, until the conditions are suitable for 
such a transfer’ (2006: 54). It is not clear what ‘on behalf of’ means and 
there is a vague time schedule to transfer the duties to the Interior 
Ministry.  On page 56, the period needed to transfer the duties is 
envisaged as a ‘reasonable transition period.’  
As a solution, the National Action Plan suggests that all these conditions 
(geographic structure, climate, terrorist activities) make it necessary to 
continue  with existing practice  on the east and south-east land borders 
for a while (2006: 72). In other words, it implies that nothing will change 
on the eastern borders in particular, and hence the whole system will 
remain unchanged in general. It constitutes an irony because the 
national action plan is supposed to change Turkey’s border security 
framework. Thus, Turkey’s border security framework will continue to be 
a security problem and produce insecurity for society. 
The plan suggests that the EU takes two key points very seriously. First, 
human trafficking; second, a single professional authority to be 
responsible for border management (2006: 16, 17). It seems that to be 
able to expand its external governance networks successfully the EU has 
to rely on compatible administrative structures and expertise in the 
partner countries. Hence, the EU authorities are looking for a single 
counterpart to negotiate illegal migration issues as this has long been the 
most important problem for the EU and it prioritises its interests 
accordingly.  However, the plan suggest that border protection and 
control duties in Turkey are not limited to illegal immigration and 
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identifying asylum seekers. Along with those problems, terrorist 
activities are the main objectives of ‘border protection.’ It implies that 
Turkey’s borders are different from the EU borders not only in terms of 
geographic structure but also in terms of border problems. The 
asymmetry of interests between Turkey and the EU does flaw 
cooperation in the border security field (Albert, Jacobson, Lapid, 2001: 
31).  
In addition, strikingly, the plan exempts Customs from integration as a 
result of institutional competition. This competition is fed by the feeling 
of anxiety of losing power. It suggests that its duties cover the control of 
goods and vehicles similar to customs organisations in Europe. However, 
it is impossible to separate illegal flows of goods and vehicles from illegal 
flows of people. It is undeniable that illegal flows of people and goods feed 
off each other. Thus, it seems that the National Action Plan does not 
modify the security understandings of Customs. As the whole focus is on 
the transport of goods, there is little place for questions of the drug 
traffickers or infiltrations of organised crime and terrorists. In addition, 
the border is viewed in the plan, as a place of work. Hence, border is 
defined in terms of a zone which may be infiltrated by illegal goods.  
Anxieties based on losing power or recognised position are common 
among the agencies in the field, it is essential to address this in order to 
engender a successful transformation. One important element fuelling 
this anxiety is the responsibility which has been given to the Ministry of 
the Interior. Unfortunately, other organisations who have responsibilities 
in the border security field see the Interior Ministry as a rival and they 
feel they are losing  authority to their rival and this results in a natural 
resistance  to the reform efforts. 
 
8.3. Changing Roles and Institutional Anxieties in the Field 
The dividing line, which has long been porous, between the forces in 
charge of security within the territory (police and gendarmerie) and those 
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responsible for defending the territory itself (military), is now becoming 
more and more uncertain. Although the changes that are afoot have 
reached organisational consciousness, it seems that the Cold War-way of 
doing things still dominates the thoughts of people and the institutional 
practices in the current security framework. 
Turkey is attempting to deal with new global challenges using Cold War 
institutions which are destined to fail due to the changing nature of the 
new security environment. However, the requirements of today’s security 
environment is not an option that one can choose or reject. They cannot 
be dealt under the old institutionalised standards. The uncertainties of 
the new age have a deep impact on the organisations and agencies in the 
security field, such as the  military, the police, the gendarmerie and 
customs which find themselves positioned in the interface between these 
two worlds, old and new or traditional and non-traditional. During the 
interviews, it was clear that these bodies consider the challenges of this 
uncertain age as an attack on their professional identity, and they are 
anxious about their future. Along with these anxieties, some such as the 
police, consider these transformation processes an opportunity to occupy 
a larger and higher position amongst the agencies which specialise in 
security. As a result of this intention, the police set up an institution in 
the Police Academy to specialise in border security.  Similarly, military is 
in the process of making special border units, which some view as 
professionalization21.  
The police consider that it has been prepared for decades for these kinds 
of missions in border security.  The gendarmerie, with its military status, 
considers itself a master in both a civilian and a military context and 
pretends knowing not to transform its opponent into an enemy like their 
colleagues in the army.  The military considers that it possesses an 
advantage over other institutions due to its defence role and power in its 
soldiers and use of military means. Even some civilians agree that the 
                                            
21 http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/sinir-birlikleri-de-profesyonellesiyor-264960 last 
accessed in June 2015. 
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military are well adapted to low intensity conflicts, whose extent exceeds 
the regular bounds of national police actions and thus, it is more able to 
respond than the other institutions. 
Although these agencies have expatiating discourse on the cross-border 
dimension of the ‘new threats’, and on their specific knowledge, they are, 
in fact, marginal in this new age. They are marginal because security 
today, with its multidimensional nature, is more than defence and law 
enforcement (enforcing the criminal laws in their jurisdiction). Their 
discourse belongs to a former era with their institutional arenas and 
institutional structure in the face of the new security environment 
because these institutions have a defence perspective on territorial 
spatiality they do not embrace the new security perspectives. Indeed, 
law-enforcement policy makers typically focus on domestic crimes, while 
defence implies the fight against aggression of an enemy. This philosophy 
is a determinant factor on their structure and practices. However, they do 
not see that this has the effect of marginalising them in today’s fast 
changing environment. This is why, to a certain extent, their mission 
mentality allows them to be present where the police dare not to 
intervene  in a crisis situation, and where the military do not want to, or 
do not know how to intervene the opponent to control it without killing 
the enemy.22 
To their way of thinking, the concept of border security is that of a closed 
narrow territory protected by insuperable border walls and fences. They 
favour a border security analysis encompassing cross border networks, 
securitization and the monitoring of territorial borders. Their vision of 
security seems trapped by the territoriality. They think that security at 
the borders is necessarily cross-border and is ensured by the 
international collaboration of the security agencies. However, traditional 
alliance mechanisms or state to state relationships are inadequate to the 
                                            
22 Columnist O.Muderrisoglu wrote about the news on the objection of general Akar 
(chief of general staff) about military’s intervention in terrorist activities in cities. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2015/10/10/terorle-mucadele-ve-askerin-
sistemdeki-rolu, accessed in October 2015. 
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challenge of globally operating criminal networks. This type of 
perspective is based on the traditional concepts of territory, national 
sovereignty and objective threats to collective security.  
On the other hand, there is a clear contradiction that traditional security 
agencies themselves, such as police and gendarmerie, are more concerned 
with what is going on beyond the national territory. They are getting 
more interested in security beyond the border and that is leading to a 
greater focus inside the border. Thus, it implies that border security as a 
concept is inconsistent with the traditional activities of the national 
police, as it widens its geographical sphere of activities. If border security 
extends beyond the national territory, why insist on maintaining 
traditional activities of the police and gendarmerie to bring about 
security? Is it because it is the only tool available? 
The military also no longer know what their duties are. What should the 
military be used for? They are returning to the national territory, deep in 
the cities and emphasising the role of ‘internal security’, despite the fact 
that the role of the military was for a long time defined as the protection 
of the borders against the external enemies. However, now we question 
the place of borders. What will the military’s role if the borders are not at 
the edge of state territory any more. What if the main threats largely 
stem from inside the territory such as identity conflicts deep inside the 
cities? How can one expect the military trained for killing external 
enemies to police its own society? If the military functions similarly to the 
police are the military necessary or vice versa? These are painful 
questions with practical consequences. 
Unfortunately, all of the agencies above have a vision which is structured 
around the concepts of the physical borders of the state, territorial 
security and military defence. Indeed, none of these agencies, alone or 
altogether, even with perfect coordination,  have the structural capability 
to cope with the challenges of today’s security environment which is not 
about guns, high-tech surveillance systems, liaison officers, risk analysis 
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units and so on, but is about a deeper understanding of what is going on 
in the field of border security. This is about the changing way of 
statehood. As discussed earlier in chapters 2 and 3, traditional 
approaches to security are based on ‘total defence’ and focus on 
mobilising society’s whole resources to support the military in case of a 
traditional conflict with a foreign enemy.  Today’s challenge is the 
reverse: instead of mobilizing civil society to support the military in the 
face of external attack, the military is now one element to be mobilized as 
part of an overall response to major societal insecurities, including 
terrorism. 
During the Cold War, determining threats and risks was the monopoly of 
an establishment community of defence intellectuals, mainly 
professionals from the military. However, the monopoly of Cold War 
professionals over 'national security' has been profoundly challenged. It is 
virtually impossible for Cold War institutions to conceptualise today’s 
security problems by using only the conceptual imagination provided by 
traditional understanding because threats are not territorial any more. 
It is important to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit 
of border security because military intervention in a complex global 
security environment characterized by asymmetric risks, actors with 
technological power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels 
which can generate significant negative repercussions.  Military action 
could lead to unintended outcomes that create more risk and insecurity. 
In fact, as Williams argues, ‘the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself 
becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from 
the effects of a decision inevitably leads to a loss of control’ (Williams, 
2012: 64.). It contains a serious risk criminalising the whole society and 
damaging the cohesion among the people. 
Equally important, ‘Long term preoccupation with domestic threats not 
only corrupts and politicises the armed forces, but can also skew their 
training and attitude in ways that ill- suited them for external conflict’ 
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(Waever et al. 1993: 48). Furthermore, Weaver et al. point out other 
repercussions:  
If societies are at odds with the state that 
contain them, then mass participation 
strategies of territorial defence become 
dangerous to implement. As the Yugoslav case 
illustrates all too vividly, arming and training a 
dissident population to meet external threats is 
an invitation to civil war when the sources of 
societal insecurity are within the state itself 
(Waever et al. 1993: 48). 
In summary, security is today less about national security only. The 
activities of traditional security agencies have expanded beyond the 
borders and no longer respect sovereign borders. State borders are 
challenged by freedom of movement of goods, ideas, and people; and 
thus inside and outside are merging. Once freedom of movement has 
been accepted, the construct of traditional security is no longer 
adequate.  Traditional guidelines and beliefs concerning tasks and 
missions have more or less disappeared. The old notion of border 
lines and so the lines of the inside and the outside in security 
practices are fading away. Internal and external security discourses 
dissolve in the account of the ‘enemy within’. As a result, there 
emerges a significant pressure on the traditional security 
organisations. To ease this pressure Turkey must adapt the war-
fighting agencies (military) and crime-fighting agencies (police and 
gendarmerie). A reworking of old perspectives is primarily required 
which is precisely the aim of this project. 
 
8.4. What should or should not Turkey do? The insights 
‘Societal Security’ might offer to this question. 
Debates over border security in Turkey have been closely linked to the 
reliability and capability of the security institutions, particularly 
intelligence agencies. Therefore, this debate should be embedded in a 
broader debate over national security, and the capacity of the government 
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to implement the administrative measures necessary to secure Turkish 
borders against terrorists, illegal migrants, smugglers and other 
organised criminal elements. The policy debates have so far been entered 
on two rationales. First, a country that could not determine who had 
entered its territory could not be said to control its borders: a key 
dimension of sovereignty. Second, legal provisions that lack the 
administrative capacity to ‘deter’ or prevent organised criminals and are 
constantly under discussion. Besides, the threat of terrorist elements of 
the PKK and their scattered sympathisers in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and 
Syria led to the reinforcement of militaristic solutions. 
Fortunately, very few countries have experienced the kinds of terrorist 
incidents that have shaken Turkey. In this context, the application of 
Waever's two-dimensional concept of societal security to Turkey reveals 
the complexity of current border security matters such as terrorism, 
smuggling and the inherent contradictions between the interests of the 
state in relation to society. There are, broadly speaking, three key 
dimensions in the application of this concept. First, for the Turkish state, 
terrorist movements have been posing a security threat to the 
maintenance of existing boundaries. Second, the survival of a 'Turkish 
society' based on a common history, culture and tradition has also been 
threatened by the potential separation. Third, on the logic of societal 
security, there is no single Kurdish society. It consists of at least two 
different societies with diametrically opposed identities: one nationalist 
and the other separatist. While, on the one hand, from the perspective of 
separatists: the Turkish state continues to stifle, and thereby threaten, 
the development of Kurdish identity, on the other hand, a great majority 
of Kurdish people are in favour of Turkish society against the claims of 
sovereignty for the entire south-east region23. In other words, they have 
                                            
23 “A recent survey conducted by the market research company Objective Research 
Centre (ORC) has revealed that 78.9 percent of Turkey's Kurdish population is against a 
proposed "self-governance" or decentralized system which would offer an element of 
regional autonomy to Turkey's Kurds, as proposed by the Peoples' Democratic Party 
(HDP) and PKK terrorist organization.” http://www.dailysabah.com/kurdish-
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become divided into two ideologically rival camps, and each side looks at 
the other with suspicion. 
Along with the key dimensions above, Turkey’s border security strategies 
should be evaluated in terms of two crucial aspects: Firstly, Turkey’s 
national borders are increasingly mobile and diffused throughout society 
because of socio-economic conditions at the border zones; and thus such 
borders are not fixed in the way territorial borders are, rather they have 
been lessened due to the new foreign policy and kinship relations 
especially in south-east part of Turkey. Thus, Turkey’s borders are 
dissolved in a sense because ‘These boundaries were products of a 
platform which disregard economic needs, the labor movement and 
market relations as well as ruling out the ethnic and religious structure.’ 
(Tekin 2014: 33). Secondly, due to a paradigm shift in foreign policy and 
the movements based on kinship networks especially across the east and 
south east boundaries there have been more encounters and meetings 
between people. As a result, new spaces have emerged. The creation of 
new spaces has brought new opportunities along to shape the security 
environment. So, Turkey should be centrally concerned with the 
construction of new spaces. Only in this way Turkey can deploy its own 
solutions to the security challenges. 
Turkish politicians have had to find new roles as leaders of a state which 
differs from the previous ones in terms of its foreign and security policy 
(see chapter 5). Turkish foreign and security policy used to adopt a realist 
conception of international relations based on the idea that the state can 
rely only on self-help in an anarchic environment. Consequently, any 
foreign policy choice should take the preservation of national security and 
territorial integrity into consideration. However, the dramatic changes of 
the early 1990s created significant imperatives for Turkey, re-defining its 
identity and its role in the Middle East. The relations with other 
countries in the region are of crucial importance to the redefinition of this 
                                                                                                                           
issue/2016/01/14/nearly-80-percent-of-turkeys-kurds-against-self-governance, accessed 
in January 2016. 
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new identity. Indeed, it is not wrong to claim that the search for security 
is in fact the search for identity or vice versa. There is also a strong 
correlation between interests and identities, and so the process of 
defining a new foreign policy is inevitably connected with the quest for a 
new security identity. 
The tremendous global changes that have taken place since the early 
1990s – including the end of the cold war which had limited Turkey to 
security relationships with the EU and the USA and the acceleration of 
the globalisation process driven by the revolution in transportation and 
communications technology – have led Turkey to discuss visions of its 
own future in a transformed world. 
Finding itself partly outside Western alliance after the end of the Cold 
War has impelled Turkey to search for new security policies in pursuit of 
a new identity. The Turkish people and state elites have traditionally had 
mixed feelings about the West because of the events during the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic. The new identity was formulated by Prime Minister Davutoglu 
as ‘central country’ and the main framework of Turkish foreign policy has 
changed. Turkey’s aims were: 1) granting national and regional stability 
through a balance between security and democracy; 2) elevating its own 
position as regional power and relevant international intermediary; 3) 
protecting and promoting Turkish economic interests in the world in the 
face of the changes and challenges of the global economy (Davutoglu, 
2012). 
Turkey’s new security and foreign policy has created significant 
developments. ‘Especially in recent years Turkey, who interacts with its 
neighbors and with the closed environment by reviving religious, 
cultural, and historical ties and by activating the Ottoman heritage, has 
conducted a new border policy.’ (Tekin 2014: 107). Due to the shift of 
paradigm in relations with neighbours and the abolition of visas has led 
to emerging new spaces. The new visa policy has enhanced Turkey’s links 
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with the rest of Middle East. For an individual, Turkish national borders 
may not be the most difficult to cross. Thus while on the one hand, 
Turkey’s borders, in particular with the countries in the Middle East, 
were unmounted as being a part of security, it has now entered a new 
period of socio-political and economic interaction (Yesiltas, 2015: 17).  In 
the course of these developments (open border policy, abolishing visas) re 
(de)-bordering takes place but Turkey does not lose its specific 
boundaries. It has also become obvious that these new borders do not 
necessarily overlap along territorial lines. As a result, these 
developments open up new spaces which enables new forms of cohesion 
and new forms of organisational solidarity can and do emerge. In 
addition, the patterns of movement, trade and exchange that characterize 
illegal traffic in the south-eastern part of Turkey have been long standing 
and built on ethnic-kinship networks that have been in existence for 
centuries. People living across the eastern and south-eastern borders 
benefit from the advantages of two territorial systems of regulations and 
avoid their disadvantages. Different market regulations offer cheaper 
goods, trade and capital for local people. 
However, the newly emerging spaces are not sufficiently understood in 
terms of their dynamics and potential. Most importantly, these newly 
emerging spaces cannot be reduced to the interrelationship of previously 
existing places or accumulations of societies in a certain space. Indeed, 
trans-border flows create new horizontal spaces connecting the 
territories. Therefore, these changes in the configuration of spaces and 
borders have created an urgent need for a unique form of security 
governance which is not based on territory. So, rather than being 
primarily concerned with setting up the new institutional structures 
(which are important of course), Turkey should be centrally concerned 
with the construction of new spaces. Only in this way Turkey can deploy 
its own solutions to border security problems. 
My view was that too much emphasis had been placed on the enemy 
(terrorists, smugglers, illegal immigrants) and not enough on the 
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population and understanding the environment.  It is surprising how 
little was understood about the people who inhabited the border areas. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand first, for example, the importance 
of illegal trading in the lives of local people because the state can only 
maintain order not through law but through obedience (De Caroli, 2007: 
56). What meanings do they attach to it and what identities do they build 
around it?  Tekin (2014: 218) points out that in each case of Turkey’s 
boundaries, speaking and writing on security and terror is a very familiar 
situation. On the other hand, there is no reference to these cities, towns 
and villages’ social, cultural, economic and historic ties with the other 
side. In Tekin’s book, for example, an old man’s words from Derecik town 
reflect the perspective: 
We are relatives of the villagers on the other 
side, from the same tribe. There was no 
boundary before 80, 90 years here. British came 
and divided us for their own interests. Some of 
us stayed this side (Turkey), some stayed other 
side (Iraq). However, we have not lost our ties 
to each other. We see ourselves more closer to 
those on the other side in comparison to 
Hakkari or Yuksekova 24(Tekin 2014: 232). 
It is clear that, for local people, the state perspective is not overarching 
and it does not respect their perspective. ‘Sometimes boundaries drawn 
on the land may not be fully equivalent to those in the human mind or 
culture. In this case, geographical borders are substantially ineffective 
but insomuch as that is hurtful.’ (Tekin 2014: 13). He adds that 
‘Boundary [Tukey-Iraq] divided the Gerdi tribe in two. However, this did 
not ever cause them see each other primarily as citizens of two nation-
states.’ (Tekin 2014: 241). Therefore, cross border ethnic and cultural 
affinities should be considered by the evolving border security regimes of 
Turkey. For the people living across the borders, the question of 
sovereignty is not necessarily, or yet, identical to control at the border.  
                                            
24 Hakkari is a province of Turkey and Yuksekova is a town in that province, both are 
located at the south east edge of Turkey at cross section of Turkey, Iraq and Iran border. 
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In addition, when we discuss the de-bordering of local economies which is 
being associated with the situation in south-east part of Turkey, we 
should discuss the de-bordering of societies as well. Thus, it is clear that 
the increasing multidimensional interaction along the borders, despite 
the border barriers (as commonly seen in the south-east part of Turkey) 
is necessary for the social and economic development of the local people. 
‘These activities are also made not only for commercial purposes. Most of 
the people living in the Derecik region obtain a large part of the goods 
they need (food, clothing, fuel, construction, etc.) in this way’ (Tekin, 
2014: 230). 
However, some of the markets have been defined as illegal and the trade 
flows are criminalised and punished by the state. ‘Whereas smuggling [in 
the example of Hakkari province] exist[ed] before boundaries were drawn 
up and did not disappear after borders; and it was an economic necessity 
which was not taken into account’ (Tekin, 2014: 197). As a result, people 
are reacting to the ‘top-down’ imposition of state borders because the 
patterns of movement, trade and exchange that characterize illegal traffic 
in the south-eastern part of Turkey is often long standing and built on 
ethnic-kinship networks that have been in existence for centuries.  
Evidence of how local people react when a state decides to escalate border 
surveillance to disrupt an illegal flow is discussed by various 
commentators, Van Schendel gives an example of the US military 
engagement with Colombian drug traffickers where drugs were classified 
as a ‘national security threat’ and reaches a conclusion that ‘it did not 
deter drug importations but it did powerfully influence the location, 
methods and organisation of drug smuggling’ (2005b: 53). Similarly, 
Besikci suggested that mining the borders led to a situation that 
benefited only sovereign elites because of their close relationship with 
bureaucracy (1992:272, cited in Tekin 2014: 200). It means even mines 
did not stop smuggling. In addition, this may create a very suitable base 
for terrorists to act, just like the southeast border of Turkey. Focusing too 
much on territorial borders has led to a feeling of being neglected in 
230 
 
favour of state amongst those insiders living in borderlands. This 
negative feeling is then strengthened by the manipulation of terrorists. 
Military personnel tasked with border protection often come face to face 
with smugglers and local people because of kinship relations. In line with 
the research findings and by attributing a so-called official report, 
columnist Ozturk (2015) cites that:  
With the manipulation of the terrorist 
organisation PKK, people in the villages where 
the smuggling is the main source of income, 
resist the military personnel, block the roads, 
attack them with stones and molotov cocktails, 
and cause serious injuries. They try to prevent 
the law enforcement activities of state agents 
when military personnel try to arrest or catch 
the suspects. They hinder the state agents from 
getting the evidence at the scene.25 
Most notably, the terrorist organisation PKK, intentionally manipulates 
situations to try to create a perception that legal law enforcement 
practices are illegal and oppress local people. ‘Even the basic military 
supply facilities are reflected as oppressing operations in the social 
media’ (Ozturk, 2015).26 During the interviews in the field this researcher 
clearly saw that this strategy works. Military personnel are daunted, 
weary and dispirited as this kind of warfare is not what they are trained 
for. A significant result, is that it brings the legitimacy of the state itself 
into dispute by questioning the state’s ability to control its own territory. 
The erosion of state authority heralds the emergence of new authority 
structures and the growing importance of other forms of governance such 
as the declaration of so called self-governance and PKK courts.27 
If the state does not develop true strategies in accordance with the 
realities of the new security environment, complete closure strategies or 
higher levels of surveillance will continue. In response to these Cold War 
                                            
25 http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/askerlere-gore-kalkismanin-
merkezi-840168 
26 http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/askerlere-gore-kalkismanin-
merkezi-840168. 
27 http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/pkk-mahkeme-kurup-harac-kesti-2175641 
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strategies, illegal organisations will strengthen their organisational and 
technological capabilities to keep the borders porous. ‘Often, this means 
not only the emergence of more complex, better armed, and more violent 
organisations – as well as their deeper entrenchment  in borderland 
society on either side of the border’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 54). Thus, the 
state should be careful about its strategies and their consequences when 
attempting the regulation of borders because  
Such state regulation turns borderland 
societies into landscapes of control and fear, 
without necessarily achieving its goal of 
blocking illegal entry. If measures are 
draconian enough they can stop cross-border 
flows at least for a while, but few states have 
been able , or willing to go to such length (van 
Schendel, 2005b: 53).  
It is important also to consider that the permeability of borders is forever 
changing. The power of neighbouring states may contribute to its 
permeability and the relationship between them is always in flux. At the 
border, changing interstate relations and migration policies combining 
with the demands of local people for cheaper goods or labour can produce 
a complexity, and strategies and continuing need for modification. For 
example in the most problematic south-east border of Turkey, basic 
economic activity was based on the sheep trade until 1980s. Sheep are 
usually taken from the Turkish side, and tea, kerosene, dress fabrics, 
shoes, etc. were brought in return. However, today trade is not based on 
swap but cash. The other change is that there are no goods from the 
Turkish side sold on the other side, however, almost all goods come from 
the other side. The main ones are petrol products (gasoline and diesel), 
tea, tobacco, rice, dress fabrics and small electronic artefacts (Tekin, 
2014: 229). According to Tekin, from the mid1990s, public welfare has 
increased because of the state permission for cross-border trade and 
obtaining autonomy for Kurds on the other side (Tekin 2014: 229). This 
should have created a suitable ground for trade and increased in their 
welfare.  
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While socio-cultural and socio-economic relations are very strong on the 
both sides of border, if the state’s bordering practices determine local 
people's relatives as ‘the other’, it may inevitably makes its own society 
‘the other’. As a result of that, the secessionist movements are reinforced 
and ultimately a section of society is pushed towards the ranks of the 
terrorist organisations.  
New ways to tell people clearly that secession cannot be a solution to a 
conflict or cannot be considered as a democratic right must be found 
because political identity is still intertwined with territory. By redrawing 
territorial boundaries, building walls and creating ‘others’ to define 
themselves, secessionist groups become privileged and create 
underprivileged identities in their new territory which has been clearly 
stated by a newly elected MP of HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party, a pro-
separatist political party). Speaking in an election celebration held on 7th 
June 2015, MP Lawyer Burcu Çelik Özkan has targeted the temporary 
and voluntary village guards28 protecting their families against terrorist 
attacks and said:  ‘you are going to be forced out of this land’29, a strong 
indicator that those temporary and voluntary village guards (around 65 
thousand in number) and their families are ‘the other’ in the secessionist 
movement in Turkey along with the Turks. Besides, it is a clear reality 
that a great majority of Kurdish people, who represent ‘the other’, are in 
favour of Turkish society against the claims of sovereignty for the entire 
south-east region.  
Indeed, to create another territorial state cannot protect people who 
cannot protect themselves. State borders are based on exclusion rather 
than inclusion. The erection of border walls and fences only polarises the 
                                            
28 Temporary and voluntary village guards are paramilitaries. Originally they were set 
up and funded by the Turkish state in the mid-1980s. Their stated purpose was to act as 
a local militia in towns and villages, protecting against attacks of PKK. The rationale 
behind the set up of the system was that it would be helpful to the Turkish military to 
have an additional force of people who knew the region, and the language in order to 
assist in military operations against the PKK. 
29 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hdp-li-burcu-celik-ozkan-o-kelesi-size-mus-yerelhaber-
829416 
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differences and enhances the antagonism of the people on the other side. 
This kind of border logic is misleading because communities are destined 
to contain multiple identities and state borders are incapable of keeping 
others at the other side, and so may fall into what Agnew refers to as the 
‘territorial trap’.  
Obsession with easily guarded land borders is a major characteristic of 
current border thinking in Turkey. As long as the state’s practices focus 
on the issue of territorial bordering, they will be ignored by the people 
who live in the borderlands as their cognitive spatiality and border notion 
does not coincide with that of the state. They are going to actively sustain 
cross border ethnic and family networks; religious communities, 
marketing and trade routes and even political connections. As a result, 
clashes are created between state agents and local people and these  
could cause unexpected results. In addition, a heavily guarded border can 
easily be infiltrated by illegal flows as border guards can easily be 
tempted to profit from cross border trade. For example, in Izmir, a 
western province, a Turkish gendarmerie commander has been arrested 
for taking bribes to turn a blind eye to the smuggling of migrants seeking 
to land on the EU coast, according to a local media report30. The question 
here is why do people just ignore the state bordering regulations? 
Reasons are various. 
First, the difference in the perception of what is legitimate  and what is 
not, for example as a part of this case study during this researcher’s visit 
to Kilis, a south-eastern province once known as the capital city of 
smuggling, it became apparent that smuggling cigarettes and fuel is 
really the most important source of income in the town. The villagers do 
not see anything wrong with it and it is a matter of survival. ‘We do not 
call it smuggling,’ said one man. ‘It is trade’. In parallel, Tekin also points 
out that except for officials or military authorities nobody  designates 
diesel or gasoline as smuggled (or illegitimate), instead it is designated as 
                                            
30 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/insan-kacakcilarindan-rusvet-alip-kacakciliga-musaade-
eden-komutan-tutuklandi-40044220, last accessed in January 2016. 
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‘Iranian gasoline’ or ‘Iranian diesel’ (Tekin 2014: 203). It implies that 
there is a clear distinction between illicitness and the laws of state. They 
are not overlapping conceptions. There is clear difference between what 
states consider to be illicit and what people understand from illicit.  
Second, for these villagers, ethnic and family ties supersede political 
boundaries. ‘Half my family is on the Syrian side,’ said one villager. 
People living across both sides of the border share the same lives, 
memories and kinship with the people involved in illegal flows. Their 
experiences throughout their personal history makes it impossible for 
them to understand modern state territoriality and the notion of state 
border. ‘For them, the world of states is problematic and so is the idea 
that the interest of “national community of citizens” should take 
precedence over all others. They cannot restrict their imagination to the 
territory of a single state’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 54). Loyalty is 
increasingly given to religion, social groups, and political communities 
other than the nation-state (Williams 2007). ‘Hence, these boundaries 
(Iraq-Turkey) cut and aggregate not only the material (commercial) and 
tribal ties but also the religious and spiritual ties’ (Tekin, 2014: 216). 
Therefore, tangible and meaningful borders can only be constructed and 
maintained through a bottom-up approach. This philosophy renders the 
state only one of the actors capable of bordering. Rumford’s idea of 
“borderwork” (2008: 6) is a useful example to understand how non-state 
actors actually do borders as well. Rumford (2008) argues that citizens 
and indeed non-citizens are commonly observed to be able to utilize 
borders to their own advantage – drug smugglers, tourists, as well as 
affirming borders via nationalist tendencies. In other words, ‘Citizens, as 
well as states have the ability to shape bordering and re-bordering’ 
(Rumford 2006: 165). Therefore, the important point here is that non-
state actors, for example, citizens/non-citizens, NGO’s, and 
entrepreneurs, are also able to take part in tangible and meaningful 
bordering activities along with the state. Rumford (2008: 4) also points 
out the importance of the local cultures found in borderlands (the 
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territory on both sides of a border) and discusses that ‘local cultures can 
either work to reinforce state-defining borders or they can work to 
subvert them.’ Rumford (2008: 6) terms this situation as ‘everyday fear’.  
An increased perception of threats such as illegal immigrants, terrorists, 
climate change, epidemics, crime and violence on the street and so on 
may lead to a view that traditional nation state borders are struggling, 
and indeed failing, to provide security.  As a result, citizens create their 
own borders within their own communities. In other words, ‘citizens are 
taking matters into their own hands and attempting to create an 
experience of security which they no longer look to the state to provide’ 
(Rumford, 2008: 6). Just as in the example of the significant news from 
Hakkari, a province at the south-east edge of Turkey, about people who 
demonstrated that they were fed up with PKK terrorists; ‘citizens living 
in the area reacted strongly to the terrorists building barricades in the 
streets, chased them with stones and sticks.’31 Tekin, likewise, points out 
increasing rivalry between local people (Gerdi and Herki tribes) and the 
PKK because of loyalties to Barzani’s KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party). 
He suggested that clashes between the state and the PKK militarized the 
borderland and this situation affects the relationships between Barzanis 
and Kurds in Turkey in general; and Gerdi and Herki tribes in particular 
(2014: 224). As a result, these tribes chose to become village guard to be 
able to protect their territory. 
Equally important, Rumford (2008) suggests that “borderwork” rarely 
takes place at the territorial periphery of states, but rather is more likely 
to be dispersed throughout society, becoming, for many, an everyday 
practice. This is highly valid for Turkey as a vast majority of its citizens 
from borderlands migrated to bigger cities such as Istanbul and they 
maintain their strong kinship relations. Tekin (2014: 203) suggested that 
in the 1990s smuggled diesel was mainly sold in western cities of Turkey 
                                            
31 http://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/vatandas-pkklilari-tas-ve-sopalarla-kovaladi-
2066059?type=2&refid=2336383, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1148857-
vatandaslar-eylemcileri-tas-ve-sopalarla-kovaladi. 
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and increasing advertising of cheap diesel across Turkey was a direct 
consequence of these kinship relations.   
Confirming the discussions above Donnan and Wilson (1999: 53) suggest 
that local cultures are not necessarily passive entities. Rumford (2008:4) 
argues that ‘local cultures may extend beyond the state boundary (for 
historical reasons, or because of shared ethnicity, for example)’. He puts 
forward the expression of ‘people power’ to point out the de/rebordering 
process of global civil society, ‘Transnational networking which is at the 
heart of global civil society is bound to provide greater opportunities for 
eroding or remaking borders’ (2008: 7).  Here, certain global civil society 
actors seek to reinforce borders or create new ones, while other actors 
seek to abolish (state) borders altogether, such as ‘No Borders’ or ‘Brides 
without Borders’. Thus, borderwork shows the ability of citizens and non-
state actors to construct, maintain and dismantle borders, and become an 
authority in the process. In short, these arguments indicate that state is 
no longer the only security provider and society can be a security provider 
in its own right; and equally important, contrary to traditional approach, 
societal security is not wandering off to look for a threat inside or outside 
the territory, instead it should aim to shape it.  
In the context of Turkey, we are well aware that national boundaries are 
rather impotent in the face of terrorists, drug smugglers and traffickers 
or indeed preventing members of a community from leaving despite their 
high-tech, highly securitised nature. People particularly in the east and 
south-east are able to transform the meaning of the state’s border 
through crossing and re-crossing for the purposes of shopping, smuggling 
or visiting relatives, but they have no ability to determine the location of 
the border in the geographical meaning. A traditional approach to 
security has led to a state monopolization of bordering practices at the 
territorial borders and a militaristic dimension has had primary focus. 
This understanding has also led to an assessment of borders as fortified 
lines against today’s networked threats from outside. As a reflection, 
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fencing, building walls and high-tech surveillance systems are the most 
common state bordering practices in Turkey. 
The structures that were built for safeguarding Turkey’s national 
security during the Cold War were based on the idea of total defence. 
Borders used to be the main means of defence. At the time, this was the 
overall concept of how the country’s coordinated resources could best be 
mobilized to meet the threat of total war. However, the Cold War ended 
long ago and Turkey is now trying to cope with new security challenges in 
some of the world’s most dangerous geography. Taking into consideration 
the conditions of the new security environment, Turkish border 
authorities should seriously consider changing border practice in the 
following ways. 
First, border security is not an isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of a 
national security strategy. On the contrary, border security is a 
comprehensive framework for leading national security. The job is too 
huge to be the responsibility of any individual institution but requires a 
network model because ‘it takes networks to fight networks’ (Arquilla and 
Rondfelt, 1996: 81). For example, the UK border agency has an 
international presence based on the hub and spoke model, with about 80 
decision-making hubs and 250 visa application centres (Bourne, 2014: 
264). Qualitatively, fighting against today’s risks and threats is beyond 
one institution and also the Ministry of the Interior which is in charge at 
the moment. Therefore, giving the responsibility to the Interior Ministry 
should be assessed in terms of two aspects: the institutional capacity of 
the Ministry and the risk of turning the border security problem into an 
internal security problem not compatible with the realities of the new 
security environment. 
Under current conditions it is clear from the interviews and from the 
researcher's personal experiences that the Ministry of the Interior does 
not have the purview to cope with such a huge job. There are two reasons 
for that; first, it creates resistance among the other organisations as 
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discussed above (the section of institutional anxieties); second, the 
professionals see the borders as narrow lines and border security as the 
securitization of that narrow area. The   most advanced view identified 
within the Ministry is that border security is an internal security matter 
that is a process of fortifying the borders by any means such as walls and 
fences as well as surveillance technology. 
Second, borders are often seen as spatial fixtures, lines in the landscape, 
separators of societies, passive and pre-given places on which events take 
place. However, with the new concepts challenging state territoriality, 
borders have taken on new shapes. ‘In short, borders must be understood 
as dynamic sites of transnational reconfiguration’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 
46). Thus, border security strategies based on spatially rooted, solid and 
durable entities such as walls and fences fixed to landscape inevitably 
create weakness in the face of illegal flows which are highly mobile and 
unpredictable, often managing to find new routes. Hence, fighting against 
illegal flows of people and goods cannot be pinned down geographically. 
But some countries such as the USA still demand the reinforcement of 
the barrier role of the state borders against terrorists in the name of 
border security even though it is known that it is impossible to seal the 
borders completely.32 In addition, an important note to Turkey's security 
problems ‘the Northern Syria Corridor’ in the process of being built at the 
hands of the PYD (the branch of PKK)33 with the help of the USA, will 
cut Turkey’s ties with neighbours and the wider Middle East. If Turkey 
continues to build concrete walls, erect razor fences, plant mine fields and 
dig ditches as has been done for some time it will inevitably create the 
same impact without fulfilling its expected duty. 
Third, border security cannot be taken as passive and reactive in the face 
of contemporary threats that are highly mobile and unpredictable. 
Reactive border security strategies based on spatially fixed landscape 
                                            
32  http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/12/02/turkey-us-to-consult-on-how-to-
close-syrian-turkish-border-kerry, last accessed in December 2015. 
33 See Karagul, http://www.yenisafak.com/en/columns/ibrahimkaragul/new-solidarity-
line-we-are-both-seljuk-and-ottoman-2023495 
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inevitably creates weakness against today’s risks and threats. Instead, 
new methods should be employed while taking the societal security 
dimension into consideration. However, Turkey should be careful about 
the kind of pre-emptive international violence which takes the form of 
intrusive, authoritarianism, based on large numbers of personnel and 
weapons as this cannot be a solution, for example militarily damaging the 
boats that the EU is planning to use to cope with illegal immigration or 
gunning down the mules which have been used for smuggling in Sirnak, 
a south-east province at Turkey’s Iraqi border.  
This authoritative image of a modern state fighting against organised 
criminal networks from terrorism to smugglers is too simplistic and 
isolated to provide solutions. It creates more illegal behaviour. For 
example, one villager says ‘The army killed my mules and I will not leave 
my children to starve. Even if they kill all my mules, I will buy others, 
and I will keep smuggling’.34 Securing borders, therefore, is now less 
about securing lines, and not even about the transformation or shifting of 
lines. Securing borders, indeed, is about giving much more emphasis on 
how people experience the borders. 
The State should carefully consider that its own border security practises 
might provide a useful means for terrorists to undermine societal 
cohesion and hence state security. For success in the face of terrorism it 
is important to gain a better understanding about how the mechanism 
works. It is the fact that today ‘New wars are fought in the name of 
identity (ethnic, religious or tribal)… [And] identity politics is constructed 
through war. Thus political mobilisation around identity is the aim of 
war rather than an instrument of war, as was the case in ‘old wars” 
(Kaldor, 2013)35. Therefore, the success of the fight against terrorism 
should not be measured by body count.  Body count as a corrupt 
measurement of success by numbers of terrorists killed must be 
                                            
34 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-32554496 
35 In Defence of New Wars in International Journal of Security and Development Vol.2, 
Issue 1. 
http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.at/ 
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discarded. Influencing the population should be the target and the 
ultimate prize. Turkey should embed ‘influence’ into all of its thinking, 
planning and execution. As security expert Mete Yarar significantly 
states: ‘This country does not lose land but we are losing something even 
more important than land, it is our emotional ties to each other.’36 Thus, 
the point is, as Bigo (2001: 136) argued: ‘Management of territories is 
disappearing in favour of management of people.’   
Fourth, border security professionals should change their target thinking 
in the face of cross border illegal networks. There is big difference 
between them from the standpoint of target. Cross border criminal 
organisations do not aim at the border itself but deep inside the national 
heartland beyond. For them, border is just a staging post. However, 
border enforcement authorities’ primary concern is the border itself.  
Fifth, security professionals should rethink on the state as primary 
borderer and the state territorial borders as primary borders due to their 
barrier-like and divisionary nature. Indeed, borders are everywhere 
beyond or within the country diffused deep into society with non-state 
actors from society to the private sector, such as private insurance, 
private companies providing cyber security and risk assessment systems, 
also implementing bordering in their own right. Thus, the whole country 
can be thought of as a borderland, a zone of transition and mobility 
without territorial fixity. The most crucial thing here is law enforcement 
authorities should avoid criminalisation of the entire population in the 
face of enforcement practices, identity checks and so on. 
Finally, externalization of border security practices primarily requires 
risk analysis. They operate on the basis of collecting, analysing and 
acting on information from a range of sources such as data on economic 
transactions, surveillance and biometric data (Bigo 2001, Vaughan- 
Williams 2009). However, intelligence collection and risk analysis work is 
                                            
36 http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/izzet-capa_503/3-dunya-savasi-coktan-basladi-ama-
ulkeler-bayrak-sallamiyor_40016953, last accessed November 2015. 
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a serious burden which should be conducted inside and outside the 
country. For this kind of task, it is necessary to deploy various sorts of 
liaison personnel from police, customs and immigration officers and 
delegates to international/regional organisations.  At the same time the 
conduct of secret operations to intercept organised criminals outside the 
country require an organisation that will work globally; and a massive 
managerial capacity and staff to coordinate strategies, policies and 
activities.  
What this long list above provides is evidence that border security cannot 
be done by one institution. Therefore, while setting up a professional, 
civil body responsible for border security, as the EU demands, is 
important, it is not enough to cope with all the issues above. Turkey has 
to have a more holistic and radical approach. Considering border security 
as a separate area of action and anticipating that having a civil, 
professional body will solve the problem is being naive and can only add 
to the coordination problem, and worsen the situation37.  
Turkey faces a different range of threats from organised crime to 
terrorism with an unprecedented level of virulence, sophistication and 
variety. The determination and capability of such groups are greater than 
ever before and the potential consequences are more serious. After the 
brutal terrorist attacks in Paris a BBC correspondent asks ‘how do you 
protect every bar and restaurant?’38  This is the kind of security question 
which reflects a territorial mentality. It suggests a necessity to secure 
external boundaries for protection. This thinking leaves restaurants, bars 
and concert halls and so on insecure because you cannot treat every place 
with fences and insuperable walls, and put some guards in front. This 
traditional security perspective is based on a focus on the enemy outside, 
instead of activity.  
                                            
37 Interior Minister Ala said there are plans to establish a professional armed border 
security department aimed to place the control of the country's borders under civilian 
control in line with EU standards. http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/12/21/border-
security-to-be-placed-under-civilian-control-says-minister-ala, last accessed December 
2015. 
38 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34816071 
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The objective is clear: freedom from the fear of threats and pressures of 
any criminal groups in the daily life of society, whether illegal migration, 
organised crime, terrorism, or attacks on the tax base. The scale of the 
task is considerable. Achieving this objective requires more than just a 
fortified border. It requires a range of tools, applied in a coherent way.  It 
is actually about how the state can be most efficiently and effectively 
structured. This is significant because, while traditional security 
concerns give prominent importance to the state borders, a non-
traditional security concept tends to traverse these borders through a re-
bordering process. From the non-traditional point of view, the most 
prominent characteristic is to transport particular issues from a national 
level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas and in doing so, 
transform the traditional form of state apparatuses. This is different from 
simply internationalisation of security issues based on state territory. 
While security strategies are adapted to the new security environment, 
security’s spatial, political, and institutional arenas are also supposed to 
be reviewed in alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of 
key actors, thereby further transforming state apparatuses. It means 
dealing with non-traditional security issues it requires their governance 
to be shifted beyond territorial borders and it requires thinking outside 
the established institutions of the state because security today is not just 
defence or law enforcement. 
Therefore, the challenge to border security, for Turkey, in this century 
demands a far more radical and holistic approach than has been 
suggested so far. Such an approach has the potential to transform how a 
state manages national security and it could bring together separate 
parts of the system. In addition, reorganising the security sector around a 
revised concept of national security will force departments and agencies 
to adapt to new structures and working cultures. This also would be 
helpful to remove the rivalry among the contesting institutions and 
present a valuable opportunity to shape the whole system. However, the 
government does not think of border security as a comprehensive 
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framework to lead the national security. Security policies are not 
determined by the nature of the challenges, but by the nature of the tools 
available.  
Now, especially after the end of Cold War, as a traditional external 
security agency, the military is looking inside the borders in search of an 
enemy from outside. They talk about ‘cross-border threats’ and are in 
search of new tactics to cope with them. Law enforcement agencies such 
as police forces, the gendarmerie and customs are in pursuit of criminals 
beyond the borders and talk about the external links of terrorists and 
traffickers. Police, customs, gendarmerie, the army and intelligence 
agencies all share the same enemies. They have been playing in the same 
field for some time.  This convergence of duties of security agencies 
related to new threats and risks can be considered the main justification 
for a new structure based on new thinking different from the past. Thus, 
consideration of border security issues determines a necessity for new 
thinking about security issues in general. Turkey must reorganise the 
whole security architecture on the basis that border security is a 
comprehensive framework to coordinate and steer national security. 
 
8.5. The Need for Structural Reform: Does current security 
architecture fit the purpose? 
After the 7th June 2015 election Turkey witnessed a high volume of 
statements from ministers over the issue of ‘public order’ against the 
increasing terrorist activities across the country. This was followed by 
new legislation broadening police powers. It is clear from the experiences 
that the increase in legislation has made no impact on security as there 
has been an inadequate, ineffective security structure and ineffective 
administrators to run the services which ultimately provide the overall 
result. The capability of the current structure is questioned by a number 
of academicians and by media firestorms demanding public reassurance 
after each terrorist attack has occurred. 
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To provide effectiveness, columnist A. Selvi wrote, with reference to the 
Prime Minister that:  
The Prime Minister had created a unit of 
security reporting directly to him. In the new 
government, three separate structures will be 
built in the form of “mini- cabinet” for economy, 
security and reforms. Prime Minister, now aims 
to transfer the achievements in security to the 
economy and reforms. This is a new system. 
The important point here is that the Prime 
Minister brings both military and civilian 
bureaucrats together.39 
Indeed, this is not a new system. These are temporary measures which 
detract from a real solution. It seems the Prime Minister detects that 
there is something wrong. However, the Turkish government lacks a 
clear and coherent view of the nature and priority of the risks that the 
national security architecture has produced. The national security 
architecture is flawed in its design. The security governance remains 
structured around functions and services with separate budgets for 
defence, foreign affairs, intelligence, gendarmerie and police forces and so 
on. These departments that make up the security architecture have 
changed very little in the past decades. This situation is a significant 
consequence of a classic bureaucratic and organisational laziness, where 
policy is not determined by the nature of the challenge, but by the nature 
of the tools available. 
Things changed but things also stayed very much the same. Turkey still 
stands for the old ways of providing security and its current security 
architecture may have suited the security environment of the Cold War 
where threats are territorial and predictable. However, today’s complex 
and uncertain security environment demands a fundamental review of 
how a national security structure is organised. This is especially crucial if 
government wants to respond to terrorist attacks effectively. Therefore, 
one of the main arguments of this thesis is that the new concept of border 
                                            
39http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/ekonominin-patronu-kim-olacak-
2022945, last accessed November 2015. 
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security can serve a vital pivotal role, as a principle for organising a 
national security architecture. Its core argument is that  whilst the 
Turkish government has been able to struggle with creating new units 
within departments, merge teams and allocate more resources for 
agencies to expand, the present and future security environment urgently 
demands a more integrated and strategic approach. Long-term success 
requires a more inclusive, open and holistic approach to national security. 
The government’s approach can mostly be explained by the fact that its 
perceptions tend to be at odds with the real nature of the risk. 
Immediately after the Ankara bombings, it was reported by the press 
that Prime Minister Davutoglu called for a security summit, questioned 
the bureaucrats and demanded an overview on the security concept40. 
Although it is an encouraging sign, it is still not clear that the need for a 
radical change has been understood properly.  
The national security architecture has not adapted to the new security 
environment yet. Turkey could not demonstrate a comprehensive 
systematic approach to learning from the deaths of the last three 
decades. Existing practices of the security notion and existing institutions 
remain powerfully conditioned by the concept of territorial security of the 
nation state that has dominated the security field for a long time. The 
current security structures and processes were designed for a world that 
was more stable and simple than at present, the Cold War era.  
Ministers and high ranking officials in the security field sometimes 
recognise the complexity of the current security environment such as 
Minister Omer Celik who said:  
Indeed, the basic principle is the abolition of 
asymmetric threats threatening the security of 
the people. Now the possibility of war with 
other states has weakened. Asymmetric threat 
groups have emerged. National security policy 
should also be extended against the vandals 
                                            
40 http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/basbakanin-aciklamadigi-eylem-
neydi-2022373 
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occupying the streets, who spoiled the people's 
daily life along with the known ones.41 
The words of president Erdogan summarize the situation very well 
and set out the current picture:  
The closing doors against the face of hundreds 
of millions of Syrians and Iraqis just struggling 
to survive and getting hold of life will 
exacerbate the problem. The way to security 
and peace, is going through owning and 
embracing them, not to kick refugees, not to 
stab and submerge boats filled with people and 
being a deaf ear to the cries. Everyone needs to 
see that we could not stay out of trouble by 
hiding behind barbed wires and high walls. 
Likewise, we have to accept that islamophobia, 
racist and xenophobic reactions will deepen the 
problem more profoundly.42 
However, they have not yet been able to respond to it properly. There 
might be some important reasons for this. The first is that the 
government might not want to take the risk to change the status quo and 
want to maintain stability in their term. Otherwise there is a political 
price to pay. To avoid this price, they prefer to ignore the best strategy. 
Governments customarily seek to reduce a problem to its constituent 
parts43 and in some cases this method causes more problems along the 
way. In today’s complex and interconnected security environment, 
societal insecurities, terror, narcotics, trafficking and illegal migration 
cannot be separated from each other. This is partly explained by the need 
for simple explanations to understand and solve the problem. ‘It is a 
typical reflex of the public administration in Turkey to turn to packaged 
solutions without thinking of drastic measures against major social 
events’ (Muderrisoglu, 2015)44. However, above all, this is a dangerous 
                                            
41 http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2014/11/08/devletin-guvenligi-mi-
halkin-guvenligi-mi, last accessed October 2015. 
42 http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/erdogan-sadece-kendi-guvenligimizi-koruyoruz-
2346733, last accessed December 2015. 
43 http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/01/04/terorle-mucadelede-master-plani (master 
plan against terrorism) last accessed in January 2016. 
44 http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2015/11/21/kuresel-terorun-hedef-
aldigi-din-islam, last accessed November 2015 
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tendency which prevents us from seeing the real picture and from 
understanding the actual scale of the problem. 
This is further worsened by the assumption that national security is a 
sacrosanct area and the issues relating to it should remain a subject for a 
small group of individuals in the field. The common perception is that 
individuals working in the area of national security have an expertise 
over the other civil servants or members of public. Therefore, it has been 
rare to question the national security architecture, whether it is fit for 
purpose and what reforms may be necessary. Recent reviews of the 
capacity of the security architecture have largely resulted in more 
personnel and extra resources for the security agencies rather than 
necessary reform in light of the new security environment. 
The constitution and other legislation provides a high-level statements on 
the conduct of National Security, however, these statements have not 
been turned into a detailed working strategy including relevant 
departments. This means there is no single mechanism in the Prime 
Ministry, or anywhere else, whose role, responsibility and accountability 
is predetermined. For example, the duties of the Secretariat-General of 
the NSC are described as only ‘To provide secretariat services to the 
National Security Council’. It has no mandate to coordinate and ensure 
effective implementation of council of ministers decisions. Departments 
are still focused on their own policies and their own ways of doing things. 
It is not yet evident that senior level officials in the Military, Ministries 
and other departments genuinely accept the need for change and take 
responsibility for making that change. 
Turkish Law No. 2945 describes the duties of the National Security 
Council as follows: ‘[…] advisory decisions on issues concerning the 
identification, formulation, and implementation of the national security 
policy of the State, and formulate opinion on ensuring the necessary 
coordination’. However there is no explanation how the NSC is going to 
do it.  There is no clear legislation and institutional framework to ensure 
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coherence between departments; no mandate for the Secretariat General 
of National Security Council or any institutional body to provide this 
coordination and leadership.  
Within the current system, the main responsibility belongs to the council 
of ministers. The Prime Minister may assign a Deputy Prime Minister 
with the task of coordinating and monitoring the implementation of these 
advisory decisions, but there is no mechanism that will support him to do 
the job. There is no office in the Prime Ministry that is capable of 
supporting the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. This results in a 
failure of understanding of the real scale of the problem. Thus, the lack of 
leadership and accountability in the security field greatly weakens the 
ability of governments to respond to the security challenges.   
One of the most serious criticisms levelled at the Turkish government is 
the lack of capability to provide security and the failures of intelligence 
following increasing terrorist attacks. Even the terrorists attacks in 
Ankara and Istanbul, which killed hundreds of people, was a clear 
indicator for the desperate need for a permanent unit to coordinate 
security services. Just after the bombing a list of 21 suspects was 
reported by the press and shortly later it was found that one of two 
suicide bombers was on that list. It clearly shows that contrary to the 
common belief that we have too little information, we have too much. The 
problem is about classifying and analysing the information we already 
have. However, it does not mean that every threat can be thwarted 
because we live in an age of uncertainty and unpredictability.  Turkey 
needs to build partnerships with all domestic and external departments, 
academics, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector, in order to create a 
clearer picture of the new security environment. It needs a maestro to 
help reshape the inter-relationships of relevant departments and create a 
national capability for coherent action for better security. 
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8.5.1. Societal Security as a Tool  
Today’s world offers a radically different landscape in terms of national 
security than the previous period of Cold War.  The underlying factor is 
the lack of a clearly articulated account of what national security is and 
the value it creates for individuals and society in general. There is no 
shared framework for high ranking military personnel and civil servants 
as well as politicians to contemplate the long-term strategic targets that 
are required for national security.  Abdulkadir Selvi, a well-known 
columnist with his links to government, wrote that President Erdogan 
said that “the responsibility for the nation’s security rests with society as 
much as state institutions”45. Despite the fact that this is a very 
significant statement which reflects the core dynamics of the new 
security environment, it has still not been evident that the requirements 
of these statements is properly understood. If the national security 
structure is going to change effectively it must be understood in the 
context of its external and internal dimensions. Societal security has the 
potential to transform the way Turkey manages national security. 
Since the territorial security framework has proven incapable of 
providing security in contemporary mobilised world, there is a need for 
new perspective which does not depend only on territoriality. Such a new 
approach will be both statist and anti-statist. It will be statist because it 
will promote ‘secured identities’ without secessionist claims; and it will be 
anti-statist because it will not depend on a rigid territorial sovereignty 
for the state. Therefore, societal security proffers a useful tool to develop 
some insight into contemporary security problems connected to 
territoriality. Although societies are sometimes closely linked to the 
state, they have independent influence in security matters. While societal 
security sometimes overlaps with the traditional concerns of state 
security, it can sometimes be considered in its own right. 
                                            
45 http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/abdulkadirselvi/cumhurbaskani-kanaat-
onderleriyle-ne-konustu-2022529 
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Societal security as a tool offers new operational objectives for national 
security policy such as increased legitimacy alongside conventional goals. 
Notionally, it guarantees, that the actions of state are more likely to meet 
the expectations of the citizens. It should ensure that departments and 
agencies can be trusted, more accountable and, at least in principle, 
capable of preventing problems. Most importantly, this produces new 
forms of data and evidence that decision-makers and the public alike can 
use to validate their decisions/beliefs. In this new information-rich 
paradigm, the old security structure inevitably will have to give way to 
better security. In short, lessening the contradictions between the state 
and societal security, which as Waever (1993: 57) argued is a 
precondition for successful ‘national security policy’.  
The basic structure of security in Turkey has remained strangely stable 
despite the period of dramatic and rapid change in the security 
environment after the Cold War. Turkey has attempted to respond to the 
emerging complexities of the new security environment with traditional 
structures and failed. The new security environment demands a different 
approach and new thinking on how national security governance is 
designed and how it operates. However, Turkey’s national security 
architecture remains closed to experimentation and reform. Instead, 
Turkey still seems to be in favour of tinkering with the current system 
without applying a more critical approach to adapting the national 
security architecture to the requirements of the new security climate. In 
sum, 
If society rather than the state is made the 
central focus of security analysis, then a new 
policy agenda and a new set of casual dynamics 
come clearly into view. This tactic does not 
remove the state from security analysis, but it 
does shift it off centre stage: it puts more 
‘national’ back into national security (Waever 
et al. 1993: 196). 
Turkey can transform its national security structure in response to the 
new security challenges on the basis of two essential principles: 
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 a transformation of the national security architecture based on the 
principles of societal security 
 a system- based holistic approach to national security which allows 
not only security agencies but also private sector, NGOs and wider 
public to join the decision making process and see overall structure 
and cycles in the system, rather than specific events. 
In the light of the principles above, the role of a national security strategy 
should be: 
 to integrate all the means available in order to shape the 
environment; and anticipate and ready to respond to security risks 
and threats to the society. 
In order to achieve this enormous role, the main reform should be 
adapting the role of the Prime Ministry. This implies bringing some 
strategic departments to the centre. This approach might be fiercely 
contested by some senior civil servants and military. However what is 
quite clear is that the Prime Minister’s Office has executive 
responsibility, but no directive power and capability to look at the way in 
which the whole structure is working. The current national security 
structure operates in a system for which departmental ministers, 
permanent secretaries and director generals have executive 
responsibility. Counterintuitively, the Prime Minister’s Office has no 
control over those ministers, secretaries and so on. 
 
8.5.2. The first Step 
The development of a new national security strategy for Turkey has the 
potential to transform the traditional approach to national security. The 
first step to ensure a strategic approach to national security should be the 
creation of a national security secretariat based in the Prime Minister’s 
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Office46. A national security secretariat must have the authority and 
enough resources to develop, direct and evaluate national security 
policies from the centre. To avoid the overlapping policies and 
institutions the current Secretariat General of National Security Council 
could be revised and strengthened.  This would be a major step forward 
for government and would be seen as a threat to the power and authority 
of individual departments. However a coherent approach to national 
security and border security is a must for Turkey.  
Arguably, this change would deliver positive results. First, the National 
Security Strategy would be under the direction of the prime minister and 
council of ministers, together with key departments and agencies in the 
field. In other words, legislation and reality would not contradict any 
more. In doing so, the new secretariat would not only evaluate and 
coordinate but also will direct and lead the security process. It would 
collapse walls between departments and agencies, providing 
opportunities for new ways of sharing information across the system 
which would naturally build trust in society, arguably, the most valuable 
role of a newly created national security secretariat would be its role in 
measuring and evaluating the performance of the national security 
architecture and existing policies. For example, on behalf of the prime 
minister and council of ministers, with support from relevant 
departments, it could be tasked with evaluating the every single 
department’s approach to terrorism. 
In summary; Turkey’s national security architecture has proved 
incapable in the new security environment.  Traditional notions of 
‘defence’ are becoming increasingly redundant in today’s security 
environment because the current structure narrows the area of 
government and disrupts the government's capability to govern. This 
archaic and compartmentalised system also acts as a barrier to 
                                            
46 There has been an ongoing discussions and work within the parliament for while to 
amend the Turkish constitution to create a stronger presidency. If happens, it then 
requires to give the national security secretariat under the disposal of president. 
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collaborative endeavours across the security field. Coordination is 
minimal, because it is limited to periods of war when national territory is 
attacked by external enemies. Claiming coordination at other times is 
just a sham. However, Turkey is in a constant war with terrorists, 
traffickers and other organised criminals. 
In addition, the government does not view its border security as a 
comprehensive approach that will lead the national security policy. 
Instead it is seen as a sub-set of the National Security Strategy. 
However, the new security environment invalidates the analysis of 
border security as an isolated phenomenon. This mentality cannot create 
security for society and the state. Instead it creates insecurity and 
threatens the state itself. To adapt security strategies to the new security 
environment requires qualitative changes in security’s spatial, political, 
and institutional arenas; and more attention to the interests, strategies, 
and ideologies of key actors. In other words, new risks and threats 
require their governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and the 
established institutions of the state.  Change is inevitable. 
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION  
OVERTURNING TRADITION 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent terrorist attacks have proved once more that Turkey is not 
immune to international or domestic terrorism. The Ankara bombing 
that killed more than 100 people was a defining moment in Turkey’s 
history. Nothing illustrates the need to restore the border security 
framework than these attacks. After 7th June 2015 election, the extreme 
ferocity and impact of terrorist attacks forced Turkey to address these 
very real and grave threats to its national security. Terrorists are no 
longer in the hinterlands. They are deep inside Turkey’s cities 
threatening the land and the society that occupies it. It is clear from the 
security literature that the primary responsibility of any national 
government is to protect its society. Turkey’s response to these attacks 
was to make considerable efforts to protect Turkish society. 
One of the aims of this thesis was to demonstrate how Turkey’s response 
revealed that it needed to overhaul its national security strategy. The 
thesis has shown that a central feature of Turkey's response to border 
security issues was a focus on the security of the external boundaries. As 
a result, the primary policy response has been to fortify the boundaries by 
any means just as it always has done. However, traditional notions of 
‘defence’ are becoming increasingly irrelevant in modernity. Security 
policies are not determined by the nature of the challenges, but by the 
nature of the tools available. This approach cannot create security for 
society. Instead it creates insecurity and threatens the state itself. 
This research argues that a ‘radical’ review of collective thinking about 
border security policy is essential for the security needs of the Turkish 
people; a ‘human-centric’ rather than a ‘state-centric’ approach. Hence, 
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the general aim of this project was twofold: first, to explore the new 
security agenda both in terms of policy and intellectual questions as they 
have developed since the end of the Cold War; and second, to critically 
investigate, on the basis of a case study, how societal security concept 
could be implemented as a tool to strengthen the current border security 
framework in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, was to 
provide a conceptually-novel starting point for future reviews and 
research. 
The question of security cannot be explained any more by national 
security discourse and even less by the traditional defence mentality. 
Security has reached beyond the traditional defence domain to include 
the economic, political, ecological, and societal sectors. Security is 
enlarged in a way that Buzan and Waever have tried to conceptualize 
with the notion of societal security. However, one will have seen here that 
old habits die hard and two different faces of security are still operative, 
national and state security on the one hand, and societal and identity 
security on the other hand. 
An obsession with easily guarded land borders is characteristic of current 
border thinking in Turkey, a strong indication of the continuing 
dominance of the conventional national security perspective. Although it 
is increasingly redundant, it restricts thinking about alternative political, 
social, and economic possibilities. Turkey needs to change the way in 
which it thinks about borders to be able to create more effective 
alternative border security strategies. In short, Turkey needs to stop 
seeing its borders as fixed lines at the edges of the state territory which 
need to be defended against unwelcome visitors. 
 
9.1. Traditional border security concepts 
In this approach, physical boundaries are closely related to the notion of 
national security and the use of force by the state apparatus to ensure it. 
Accordingly, the role of state boundaries in national security is based, 
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first, on the prevention of military threat. Thus, as noted above, border 
areas become militarised and no-man zones with a special regime, where 
the highest priority is the fighting efficiency of military units ready to 
repulse the aggression of a potential enemy. This approach takes border 
security as security of boundaries, an isolated phenomenon and a sub-set 
of national security targeting the protection of a narrow line. 
Securitisation of a border zone means the largest possible control over 
any cross-boundary flows. From this perspective, a boundary is 
understood as a front line destined to stop the penetration in depth of the 
state territory by undesirable individuals, goods, information, etc. This 
barrier like borders operate like an anti-flow apparatus. The control of 
transboundary flows is easier if there are fewer inhabitants in the border 
zone and if economic activity there is weaker. Therefore, these zones 
sometimes became economically backward. All social life is subordinated 
to military needs. 
State institutions use boundaries to foresee and forestall any possible 
problems. Because old notions of national security inherently locate the 
threats externally. Accordingly these threats such as military aggression 
are clear and certain. It takes the border as a security fence which aims 
to secure the state in general rather than society, which is supposed to be 
a major task of the state. The assumption is that the security interests of 
border regions are similar to those of the state as a whole. 
 
9.2. Non-traditional border security concepts 
First of all, the objective is to find a delicate balance among the needs of 
border security, the development of cross-boundary cooperation, and the 
interests of the state and societies living in borderlands. Therefore, 
societal security comes to the agenda along with the state security. 
The perception of threats to national security is also changing. Threats of 
a militaristic character from other states are replaced by other threats 
from non-state actors. Therefore, the external location of threats is also 
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replaced by the threats already inside the state (such as ethnic conflicts, 
trafficking and terrorism). This concept assumes that it is impossible to 
cope with new challenges solely using military, police, or paramilitary 
forces. Even the most powerful armies of the world cannot adequately 
counteract illegal migration, international terrorism, the traffic in drugs 
and weapons, epidemics, global environmental disaster and organised 
crime. The change in the nature of threat is best captured in an Italian 
police officer’s words fighting against Sicilian Mafia. He says: ‘They 
[mafia] know they can't kill people as they used to, so now the whole 
system has evolved into an intricate web of interests that entangles 
politics, finance and the very structure of Sicilian society.’47 
In a highly mobile world, the attempts to keep growing transboundary 
flows under control by the same old methods, as in strengthening the 
barrier functions of boundaries, are not only inefficient but objectively 
harmful to society and the economy. On the contrary, only close 
cooperation with neighbours, based on mutual trust, demilitarisation of 
border areas and open boundaries, can bring positive results. According 
to the non-traditional approach to border security, governments should 
contribute to the development of cross-boundary cooperation at the local 
level.  Governments can no longer ignore the specific interests of border 
areas or create obstacles to their cooperation. Therefore, the notion of 
security acquires a considerable new dimension. 
A systematic approach to border security has been developed. This 
approach requires border security to be defended throughout the territory 
of the country, and outside the territory, not only at the borders. The 
struggle against terrorists, illegal immigration and drug trafficking 
cannot be reduced to defensive measures at the border. This is important 
because, while traditional security understanding give prominent 
importance to the state borders, non-traditional security concept tend to 
traverse these borders through re-bordering process. The state boundary 
                                            
47 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35234182, last accessed in January 2016. 
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is now not merely the line marking of the limits of the state territory and 
territorial waters. The concept of ‘border space’ now embraces not only 
the area along the boundary, but internal and external regions. The rapid 
developments in transport, international trade and communication 
technology has created new borders deep within the state territory, for 
instance, around international airports, and special customs or free 
economic zones.  
Border security is now a matter not only of the state. It must take into 
account the interests of local and international organisations and actors. 
A new view of border security involves not just an attempt to foresee or 
forestall all eventual situations which is an impossibility due to the 
unpredictable nature of threats, but the readiness to react to any 
challenge promptly and in an appropriate and flexible way. Finally, 
border security is not an isolated phenomenon or a sub-set of national 
security, however, it is a comprehensive approach to lead national 
security and organise all the assets. 
 
 9.3. Summary of the research findings 
Turkey has been preoccupied with the issue of border security for a long 
time.  In the modern era, to prevent an even greater crisis at the border, 
there were immediate and ongoing discussions between high ranking 
officials. Both Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdogan also 
recognized that the border had to remain open to vast migration from 
Syria in order to address the humanitarian crisis. Simultaneously, the 
government made significant financial investments and a variety of 
legislative changes in order to respond to the negative impacts. However, 
Turkey’s response to the recent terrorist attacks highlighted the tendency 
of the administrative elites in decision- making position to view national 
security issues in predominantly military terms. This was evident from 
various efforts taken at the highest levels of the security bureaucracy to 
secure the border such as building concrete walls.  
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The first significant finding of the research was that, the interviewee’s 
approaches to sort out the border security problems, albeit in different 
ways and in different measures, tend to over-privilege the simplistic and 
unhelpful, and still based on the prevalent idea that borders are first and 
foremost wholly divisionary or ‘barrier-like’. Likewise, in different ways, 
they also tend to over-privilege the state as being the primary borderer 
and the state territorial borders as primary borders. Thus, if border 
security is understood as a reflective process, it is fair to say that security 
including border security field in Turkey, is still state-centric and 
territorial based whose main means to stop the enemy is reinforced 
border lines. As a result, the internal/external dichotomy is common and 
border security is seen as a part of internal security. 
There was an unfortunate tendency to unthinkingly adopt militaristic 
perspective as conceptual and categorical givens. During the interviews i 
have seen that deterrence logic is common element in the mind sets of the 
interviewees. They think that visibility (high walls and border fences) 
make outsiders aware of punishment when they intend to violate the 
border. In other words, if a border is not visible, it fails to materialize its 
purpose. The, borders often are seen as ‘‘fixed entities’ at the edge of a 
sovereign state, as a line in the landscape, separator of societies, the 
passive and pre-given ground on which events take place. However, with 
the new concepts challenging state territoriality, borders have taken on 
new shapes. “In short, borders must be understood as dynamic sites of 
transnational reconfiguration” (van Schendel, 2005b: 46). Thus, border 
security strategies based on spatially rooted, solid and durable entities 
fixed to landscape inevitably create weakness as illegal flows, on the 
other hand, are highly mobile and unpredictable, and they often manage 
to find new routes. 
Border security is presented as passive, vulnerable and reactive. This 
defensive attitude creates vulnerability in the face of contemporary 
threats. The story of building watch houses against smuggling is very 
striking and a well-known example. Watch houses built against 
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smugglers in the east and south east of Turkey became vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks later because these watch houses were built in stream 
beds as smugglers used often. After terrorist attacks these watch houses 
has moved to the summits of hills for protection but it did not stop 
casualties.   
There is big difference in the target perception between security agencies 
and cross-border illegal groups. Cross border criminal organisations do 
not aim at the borders itself but deep inside the national heartland 
beyond. For them, border is just a staging post. However, border 
enforcement authorities’ primary concern is the border itself.  
Focusing too much on territorial borders has led to those insiders living 
in borderlands feeling neglected in favour of state among. This negative 
feeling is strengthened by the manipulation of terrorists. For the local 
people, ethnic and family ties supersede political boundaries. The 
increasing multidimensional interaction along the borders, despite the 
border barriers (as seen at the south-east part of Turkey commonly) is 
necessary for the social and economic development of the local people, 
which has been in existence for centuries. However, some of the markets 
have been defined as illegal and the trade flows are criminalised and 
punished by the state. However, there is a clear distinction between 
illicitness and laws of state. They are not overlapping conceptions. As a 
result, people are reacting to the ‘top-down’ imposition of state borders 
and it creates more illegality. Securing borders, therefore, is now less 
about securing lines. Securing borders, indeed, is giving much more 
emphasis on how people experience the borders. 
Although Turkey became preoccupied with the issue of border security for 
a long time it seems that it could not demonstrate a comprehensive 
systematic approach to learning from deaths for the last three decades. 
The government still does not think border security as a comprehensive 
framework to lead national security policy and to organise relevant 
departments and agencies. Instead it consider border security as a sub-
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set of national security. However, the new security environment 
invalidates the analyses of border security as an isolated phenomenon.  
Finally, above all, the most significant finding of the research was the 
fact that Turkey’s new foreign policy (open border policy, abolishing 
visas) opens up new spaces which enables new forms of cohesion and new 
forms to organize solidarity can and do emerge. Indeed, trans-border 
flows creates new horizontal spaces connecting the territories. Therefore, 
these changes in the configuration of spaces and borders have created an 
urgent need for a unique form of security governance which is not based 
on territorial protection mentality. So, rather than being primarily 
concerned with setting up new the institutional structures (which is 
important of course), Turkey should be centrally concerned with the 
construction of new spaces. In other words, to secure the society and the 
state, security strategies must be based on social space rather than 
geographic space. Only by this way Turkey can deploy its own solutions 
to the border security problems.  
However, Turkey’s current security architecture may have suited the 
security environment of the Cold War. This national security architecture 
is incapable in the face of new security environment.  This archaic and 
compartmentalised system acts as a barrier to collaborative endeavours 
across the security field. Coordination is necessarily minimal, because it 
is limited to the periods of war when national territory is attacked by 
external enemies. Claiming coordination at other times is just a pretence. 
This situation strikingly indicates the classic bureaucratic and 
organisational laziness, where policy is not determined by the nature of 
the challenge, but by the nature of the tools available. 
 
9.4. Outside traditional views 
The main argument of the thesis was to discuss that Turkey’s border 
security framework produces insecurity not only for Turkish society but 
also for state itself. This argument is consisted of two analytical 
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elements. Firstly, Turkey’s current border security approach creates a 
society of exclusions through its Cold War-inherent protection 
mechanisms, and how this exclusionary nature has the potential to 
produce insecurity for some.  Secondly, the difficulty in determining 
where the border is, what constitutes the border and where the 
securitization of the border should take place after the developments in 
the post-Cold War era and Turkey’s changing foreign and security policy 
has created new horizontal spaces connecting the territories?  
In a geographical sense, borders were traditionally understood ‘as 
constituting the physical and highly visible lines of separation between 
political, social and economic space’ (Newman 2006: 144). Only in the last 
few decades has it been recognised that the significance of borders lies 
not in its physical actuality but in the bordering process that produce 
them and the institutions that manage them. In Newman’s (2006: 149) 
words: ‘Demarcation is not simply the drawing of a line on a map or the 
construction of a fence in the physical landscape. It is the process through 
which borders are constructed and the categories of difference and 
separation.’ Hence, bordering is the main factor in border studies. By 
consolidating and securing borders the state institutions that manage 
boundaries do bordering to bring the territory under control. 
Besides, we have seen that security studies are struggling to emancipate 
themselves from the dominance of the traditional views based on realism. 
Critical approaches on the Westphalian state system have made the 
limitations of territory-based approach clear and opened up new ways to 
new strategies. After all, the assumption of that the state and the society 
are the same entities has become irrelevant and so do the security 
strategies based on the same assumption. 
As the security studies are moving beyond the state centric paradigm, the 
question is what to put its place. The old notion of national security far 
from convincing and far from producing practical solutions to the 
contemporary security problems. It does not offer real solutions for the 
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demand of people who expect that their state will protect them against 
cross-border threats in their daily life.  Although it still exists, systematic 
control of the territory has been doomed to be marginalised because 
crossing of the border is not only territorial. Trying to stop cross border 
activities based on kinship and religious ties; and identity mixed 
marriage in the south and east part has been creating resentment and 
more illegality.  Border security, thus, rejects the clear distinctions or 
borders between inside and outside, state and society, sovereignty and 
identity.  
In order to be more effective in this new world, states need to question 
their definitions of what is legal and illegal, and what is inside and 
outside. As the state strategy of territorial security has become irrelevant 
in the age of mobility, we are faced with the fact that conventional border 
notion has become irrelevant. ‘For example, states that challenge flows by 
defining them as ‘illegal‘ create more barricaded and violent borders as 
well as more sophisticated, albeit outlawed, organisations to keep flows 
going’ (van Schendel, 2005b: 59). Therefore, law enforcement methods of 
border authorities, involving the primary use of geographic space to 
control illegal flows should change. This way of border security strategy 
(simply reactive) is far from providing security for the state and its 
territory, as well as its society. In other words, the practices put in place 
to bring security actually bring insecurity because it produces more 
illegality. 
This principle is also a valid approach for migration issues, which is top 
on the agenda these days. In his award winning book Illegality Inc. 
Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe.  Ruben 
Anderson (2014) argues that the industries set up to control migration 
actually lead migrants to take greater risks along more dangerous routes. 
As more and more money spent in an attempt to regulate movement, 
these industries only create more illegal behaviour. Generally speaking 
illegal flows (migrants or any other movements across the boundaries) 
are subjected an anti-mobility mechanism containing walls, fences, 
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patrols to catch them and turn back where they come. Indeed, this regime 
of control is out of control. Solutions for illegal migration creates more 
illegal behaviour and exacerbate what it seek to prevent as it criminalises 
all the migrants. 
In addition, the discourses on border security are often state-centric and 
one-sided. These discourses tend to ignore the fact that it is consumer 
demand that fuels the illegal trans-border flows. Often, the state itself 
deems some goods undesirable by heavily taxing them and some goods 
become contraband as a result of state action. This is a striking 
contradiction between security discourses and policies because while 
states struggle for insuperable borders, it was, in reality, state action 
that borders are porous because of.  
The trans-border security arrangements in a form of state to state 
relationship would not bring solution unless they take into consideration 
societies’ sense of security and justice. Indeed, those arrangements are a 
part of reterritorialization which is a new form of territory and 
reterritorialized security strategies can only be successful by combining 
state security and societal security together because they are not 
overlapping arenas. Thus, trans-border arrangements devised for 
security of territory can only work by paying enough attention to the 
security of societies as societal concerns have a direct impact on the 
shape and legitimacy of security policies. We are well aware that society 
is not a passive entity and it has the ability to do bordering, as well as 
states. Along with the state, citizens and non-state actors also have 
power to construct, maintain and dismantle borders, and become 
authority in the process. It means state is not the sole actor of bordering 
process. The boundary between private and public has also changed and 
hence, statehood has changed. Therefore, Turkey should focus on the 
changed structure of the modern state system and changing nature of the 
statehood.  As an important note here, by referring to Poulantzas and 
Jessop, Hameiri and Jones (2013: 467) defining state ‘not merely as a set 
of institutions, agencies, and actors, but primarily as a social relation and 
265 
 
expression of power‘. They suggest that state power shape the use of state 
apparatus and struggle among coalitions of social and political forces 
determine the emergence of particular state forms and institutions and 
explain the way they function. 
Today, border security cannot be reduced to security at the borders or a 
true national security strategy cannot be based on physical protection of 
borders because borders have no capacity to protect territory of the state. 
By the help of technology, the new security environment has destabilised 
the border between the internal and external in such a way that there is 
no connection between border crossing and security. So, border security is 
more than security at the border, and its design and implementation are 
influenced not only by the reality of threats and security needs but also 
by how such threats are perceived, categorised and integrated into a 
larger securitisation discourse. The old security structure and analysis 
therefore inevitably will give way to a much wider and proper approach 
in the future. 
Societal security, therefore, as a tool offers new operational objectives, 
alongside conventional goals, for security departments. It ensures that 
departments and agencies need to be trusted, accountable and capable of 
preventing problems. And most importantly, this inevitably provides new 
forms of data and evidence into decision-making processes beside the 
views of the public itself. As a result, it naturally increases legitimacy by 
guaranteeing that the actions of sate are more likely to meet the 
expectations of the citizens. Ultimately, it will result in the societal 
cohesion within society by bringing knowledge and data together on the 
interaction between the material dimensions of border security 
(infrastructure, everyday security practices, etc.) and the perception of 
society, as one of the greatest safeguard of security. Thus, it will be able 
to develop security solutions that avoid the deadlocks and dilemmas of 
national security strategies based on territory.  
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However, Turkey’s border security understanding is based heavily on 
geography; and hence borders, border trespass and the connection 
between territory and sovereignty of the nation state. National security is 
reduced to inviolability of the territorial borders and hence strategy is set 
up to stop undesirable outsiders at the borders. As a result of this 
strategy inherited from Cold War, concrete walls and fences as solutions 
come to agenda like an anti-flow mechanism in turn. The sacrosanct 
character of the borders are emphasized every military border base, 
‘frontier is my honour’. As a result highly visible borders are always on 
the agenda as a deterrent factor against illegal flows from outside. Were 
they able to deter? Not, so far! Do they need to visible then? Some 
officials offered high-tech surveillance systems as a solution with 
reference to mountainous borders during the case study. However, the 
use of technological tools to secure the borders would not work because it 
contributes to insecurity feeling as it maintains the differences between 
‘us and them’, thereby sustaining a society of exclusions.   
These exclusions may result in enforcing secessionist movements because 
of the wrong belief that territory is necessary for security. This state 
centric logic of security has driven some identities to seek sovereign 
statehood as the only means of securing their identity and maintaining 
their difference. However, erecting new borders is not a solution because 
new state borders do not keep difference out or in. So, to secure the 
society and the state, security strategies must be based on social space 
rather than geographic space. This logic is the only option to meet the 
security needs of cultural groups within the state. This is not only about 
nation’s survival but also state survival as state and society’s survival are 
connected. If it is not handled correctly it will remove the base for 
everything else, because then we will not be here as ‘us’. 
The abolition of visas for citizens of neighbouring and several other 
countries has been an important step, especially for people with fewer 
opportunities.  Criminals have anyway already found their own ways to 
travel across borders. The step was important for the region on its path 
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towards more wealth for borderland people and rest of the country. 
People are in need of better life, but those who abuse the system are often 
the representatives of small numbers. In the long run, Turkey has to 
assure that the border security system is fair and efficient. At the same 
time it has to promote the sense of solidarity for people, assure them 
protection and share their burden. 
If Turkey can change the views of seeing our common borders as source of 
problem, it may then see the unique opportunities. Positive and mutual 
opportunities come not only through the likely economic benefits or the 
increased trade discussed above, but also through more encounters and 
meetings between people. These kinds of encounters have constructed 
new spatialities and by doing so created opportunities to shape the 
security environment. 
Indeed, the prevalent idea of disadvantages stemming from unstable 
periphery has also been a push factor for moving away from the idea that 
Turkey can cope with the border security problems by fortifying the 
territorial borders. The history proved that this idea has been 
unsuccessful in preventing the border security problems exacerbated by 
the unstable periphery. In the face of the increasing threats from 
terrorists and political instabilities in Iraq, Syria, in the whole Middle 
East, which do not seem to be sorted out in the foreseeable future, 
suggest that the militarisation of border control will likely increase. 
Therefore, a systematic, high-profile effort to transform border security is 
more necessary, more desirable and now perhaps more possible after 
Syrian crisis.  
Understanding the nature, shape, methods and meanings of illegal 
transnational activities remains far from adequate because of the lack of 
scientific a research and more importantly the difficulty of thinking 
outside the conceptual grasp of the modern state. Shifting attention to 
society from state has some practical implementations in the end. It will 
allow us to find out more not only about producers and consumers of 
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illegal goods, but also transporters, people from children to adults 
occasionally engaged on a daily wage, to professional truckers. Second, it 
allows security professionals to make true connections between not only 
overlapping illegal flows such as smuggling and terrorism, but also 
between different types of illegal flows. Hence, the system can 
differentiate between a tea or sugar self-smuggler because of tax on the 
items and an arm traffickers. Finally, it opens the doors for better 
understanding of the link between organised criminal networks around 
the border and lead to provide information about what motivate local 
people to violate the state border on a daily basis. It would inevitably 
provide a valuable perspective to shape the security environment. 
To summarize, border politics inevitably focus on the issue of bordering. 
Three types of bordering can be viewed mainly across Turkey’s borders, 
particularly the east and south-east borders. First, society’s bordering 
based on pre-border kinship and religious ties which were disrupted by 
the formation of state territorial borders. Second, state territorial 
bordering to mark its sovereignty and to control its territory. Third, 
‘border induced’ bordering practises that ‘spring up because of the 
borders existence’ (van Schendel2005b: 57) such as cross border shopping, 
gambling etc. These practices can be differentiated by the security 
professionals and may be tolerated by the state and hence make them 
legal. 
Security strategies and security institutions based on state geographic 
space (territory) are not relevant any more. They mainly pay attention on 
what enters to the territory but not what leaves it. They must be changed 
because this strategy itself is a security problem and far from providing 
security in the face of cross-border criminal networks. Organised criminal 
networks have strong advantages against Turkey’s bulky law 
enforcement authorities in the border security field. First of all, they are 
organised on the base of profit which is very tempted. They are flexible 
and highly mobile no matter where they are spatially. With the help of 
information and transport technology, they can mislead security 
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authorities and undermine the state territoriality. Manipulating kinship 
relations give them enormous opportunities for access to a detailed 
knowledge of topography and social fields to provide persons to navigate 
them across the border safely. 
Therefore, there is need for a new vision of security, a more appropriate 
one to this century, which combines elements of the other visions but 
which breaks away from the tough traditional understanding formed in 
the past which is no longer relevant. This security philosophy would be 
one that tries to meet the challenges of the new security environment and 
the technological and cultural realities of this century. A systematic 
approach to border security could guide an integration of border security 
and national security.  
There are some practical steps to be taken without wasting time, 
however, border security cannot be a responsibility of any individual 
institution, and a new perspective should be developed which 
encompasses whole national security structure. The challenge to border 
security in this century demands a far more radical approach than has 
been suggested so far. Such an approach has the potential to transform 
how state manages national security and it could bring together separate 
parts of the system. Equally important, reorganising security sector 
around a revised concept of national security will force departments and 
agencies to adapt to new structures and working cultures. This also 
would be helpful to remove the rivalry among the contesting institutions 
and give a valuable opportunity to shape the whole system. 
Coordination was the most problematic element indicated by the security 
professionals. In the traditional view of security, coordination is 
necessarily minimal because it is limited to periods of crisis when 
national territory is attacked by foreign forces. Claiming coordination at 
other times is just a pretence. Therefore, setting up a new body will add 
one more agency to a number of agencies that needs to be coordinated 
and hence worsen it because border security issues are so complex for any 
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single institution to handle on its own. In order to create significant 
changes, Turkey needs to have more holistic and comprehensive 
perspective of how to perceive the security. Focusing on societal 
insecurities can help security professionals to break the state-centred 
mind and may allow new perspectives. A new perspective based on 
societal security can lead and re-structure the national security in a way 
complementing and strengthening each other.  It clearly implies to put 
“more ‘national’ back into national security’” (Waever et al. 1993: 196). 
What we need for a better governance of the transformation process in 
general is to embrace dynamics of the new security environment, 
changing security and border concepts. The concept of ‘societal security’ 
might be a useful tool to understand the process. Thus, the real and 
permanent solution would be restructuring the whole national security 
architecture in line with the requirements of the new security 
environment. In a broader perspective, if border security is understood as 
a reflective process, which includes the primacy of security of the people 
and communities instead of states; if the goal of overall security politics 
became sustainable security which takes into account different 
dimensions, then, border security understanding would not be a security 
problem anymore. In practice, Turkey would be able to move from 
traditional hard border zone to a border of co-operation and interaction. 
She must therefore question the philosophy of the security which reflects 
on the everyday practises, and finally, discuss alternative security 
politics.   
 
9.5. Principle aims for the future and recommendations 
This project underlined two key principles on which an effective system of 
border security should be based: 
 Move beyond the pre-active and be there to shape the security 
environment. The most effective way of addressing risks to Turkey 
is to identify and address them in the source before those risks 
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turn out to threats. This will help ease pressure on the borders and 
security organisations. 
 Target activity in the first place instead of enemies. Border 
security needs to target activity to achieve its objectives and 
minimise tension on the borders. Border security activities should 
be directed at those movements and in those locations where they 
pose the highest risk, while legitimate movements should be 
facilitated. This is the only way to achieve flexibility and efficiency 
because government’s open border policy and kinship relations 
cause high volumes of movements of goods and people across the 
borders. The convergence of controls at entry points will quite 
likely create inefficiency for control and real difficulties for 
legitimate movements. 
The challenge in achieving security will deepen in the future.  The 
threats from organised crime to terrorism will intensify in the future and 
become increasingly sophisticated. An effective response to these 
challenges means going beyond the cooperative work between traditional 
security agencies that have been out of date, and requires re-structuring 
the security architecture and strategic leadership. This will eliminate 
contradictions or tensions between policies, programs or interventions, 
which will result in more efficient deployment of resources through the 
elimination of duplication. It will also eliminate the contradiction 
between society and state. It will result in more effective services as a 
result of clearer identification of the nature of problems, improved 
integration, the overcoming of fragmentation and involvement of the 
community. There can be benefits in terms of increased understanding 
and trust not only between societies and state, but also between agencies, 
which can lead to willingness to take risks, enhanced potential for 
innovation and improved outcomes. It inevitably will create capacity to 
resolve policy problems.  
Recommendation 1: There is no border security doctrine or strategy. To 
set a firm base, a single overarching border security strategy is required 
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that takes account of the full range of national security structure. Turkey 
could no longer rely on the aging national security structure. That 
strategy has to be based on a perspective that alters the narrow 
conception of national defence to a broader understanding of security. It 
also needs to set out the principles how security can best be provided 
inside and outside the country.  
Recommendation 2: A border security strategy could have the potential to 
transform the way governments’ and state departments’ approach to the 
issues of national security but the development of a strategy must be 
comprehensive and supported across the political and bureaucratic 
spectrum and by the wider public. 
Recommendation 3: Societal Security should become the conceptual 
framework for security services and national security framework in 
general. It would promote redefining law enforcement concerns as 
security concerns and hence converting law enforcement agencies (police, 
gendarmerie, and customs). It would also promote converting war-
fighting agencies (military) and strategies to carry out their duties. 
Recommendation 4: Successful implementation of any strategy requires 
ministerial leadership. At present, departmental units in government 
have little or no ministerial leadership. This leadership must be 
consistent with the direction and purpose among all the assets and reflect 
the philosophy of the new security environment. Therefore, it should be 
supported by a governance structure. Within the current system, the best 
way to achieve these requirements is revising and strengthening the 
Secretariat General of National Security Council as ‘Secretariat General 
of National Security’ under the authority of the Prime Ministry. In line 
with the new strategy, the establishment of its priorities and monitoring 
the performance can be achieved by the help of this secretariat. 
Recommendation 5: Given the changing nature and diversity of the risks, 
the government should legislate to establish a new security agency that 
will take on the work of Land Forces in terms of border security and 
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partly the work of other law enforcement authorities. It is a must for 
Turkey because dealing with new security risks requires their 
governance to be shifted beyond territorial borders and at the same time 
thinking outside the established institutions of the state.  This new 
organisation should not be an Interior Ministry agency because it will 
turn the border security to be an internal security issue.  
However, the relationship between the new organisation and other law 
enforcement agencies (police, gendarmerie and customs) will be a critical 
one. Traditional law enforcement agencies will continue their routine 
work while the new agency will carry out its role anywhere inside and 
outside the country, and play a crucial role in tackling most serious 
challenges from terrorism to organize crime. Therefore, equipping new 
agency with an appropriate range of powers over the other agencies will 
be important. There should be a code which enables the new agency 
override the other individual security agencies to conduct its duty. 
Turkey is now at a place where the history has repeated itself.  How the 
demilitarization of the police and the differentiation between the two 
universes was forced by the historical conditions, resulting in the police 
had left the army, a new institutional transformation is necessary to that 
extent. 
Recommendation 6: When we think about the wide range of border 
security issues, it is clear that such a huge work requires a new 
organisation and a single command and control structure responsible for 
the management and deployment of staff and resources. This also brings 
along the accountability. Today security and foreign affairs are 
intimately connected and inseparable. The nature of the security issues 
force the new organisation act as a kind of ministry of foreign affairs. 
Coordination is not enough to fight against the risks and threats. 
Integration is key. Therefore, those two functions should be merged and 
new ministry can take on both jobs and can be named as the Ministry of 
Security and Foreign Affairs.   
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Recommendation 7: There will be a need for clarification of ministerial 
and departmental roles on national security issues after setting up the 
new Ministry. This will also help the new national security secretariat 
monitoring the individual performances later on. 
Recommendation 8: A spokesperson for national security should be 
assigned based in the new national security secretariat. Enough 
resources and professional assistance should be provided for 
spokesperson. This will help to overcome contradictory statements from 
different departments which is crucial for public relation issues. 
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